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INTRODUCTION 
In the traditional story of immigration to America ( the "assimila­
tion story") , 1 the most motivated, talented, and intelligent of the 
world's dissatisfied people-our ancestors-came here to seek success 
in the world's largest, freest, and deepest national marketplace .  The 
American system,  we are told,  was demanding but fair, holding out 
equal economic opportunity in exchange for two things. First, the 
system required hard work on the job. Second, the system required 
hard work on the identity: to avoid consignment to America's lower 
economic caste, immigrants had to root out the linguistic and cultural 
components of their old-world selves and substitute the less affected, 
more facilitative incidents of American identity. Eventually, the immi­
grants' self-reliant efforts would bring the reward of Americanization. 
vVe refer to  the norms implicit in  the assimilation story as "assimilation norms." 
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This transformation, h owever, called for patience . Only the most 
clever and ambitious could reconstruct themselves completely within 
a few years of arrival. The rest had to be content with life as quasi­
Americans of foreign origin .  Their children,  however, would go on to 
achieve a full American identi ty and its accompanying economic op­
portunity.2 The third generation would complete the process of 
Americanization; internal ties to the antecedent language3 and cul­
ture4 would not burden the immigrants ' grandchildren .  
The assimilation story, while always normative ,5 has taken a par­
ticularly sharp normative edge in recent tellings .  These versions set 
the assimilation pattern of early twentieth-century European immi­
grants as a standard against which one should measure the social sue-
2 See Stanley Lieberson et a!. , The Coune of l'viothetcTongue Diversity in Nations, 81 Avr. J. 
Soc. 34, 55 (1975) (asserting that the first generation's loyalty to ancestral language gives 
way to a preference for English among their children); Alejandro Partes & Richard 
Schauffler , Language and the Second Generation: Bilingualism Yesterday and Today , 28 I=--n'L 
MIGRATION REv. 640, 643 (1994) (noting that "the first generation [learns] enough English 
to survive economically; the second . . .  speak[s] the parental tongue at home, but English 
in school, at work and in public life"). 
3 See Pones & Schauffler, supra note 2, at 643. The results of a recent generation of 
empirical studies of immigrant income make for an interesting comparison with this tradi­
tional three-generation acculturation story. Barry R. Chiswick, The A)fect of Americanization 
on the Earnings of Foreign-Bam JV!en, 86 J. PoL. EcoN. 897, 919 (1978), using the 1970 census, 
finds that foreign-born white men achieve income equality after approximately 13 years, 
implying that thev successfully assimilate after sufficient education about the labor market 
and in the English lang·uage. Later studies suggest a much slower rate of convergence, 
partly due to lower skill levels in immigrants admitted in recent decades. See, e.g. ,  George J. 
Borjas, Assimilation, Changes in Colw1t Quality, and the Earnings of Immigrants, 3 J. L-\B. EcoN. 
463, 465 (1985) (arguing that declining skill levels among immigrants arriving since 1950 
partly explain slow rates of earnings growth among recent immigrants): George J. Borjas, 
The Economics of Immigration, 32.J. EcoN. LITERATURE 1667, 1713 (1994) (''The relative skills 
of successive immigrant waves declined over much of the postwar period . . . .  "). RoBERT F. 
ScHOEN! ET AI.., THE MrxEo Eco:--:oMI C  PROGREss OF IMMIGR.·\0-"TS 8, 24-25 (1996), studies 
California and segments immigrants by countries of origin using data from the 1970, 1980, 
and 1990 censuses. The study shows that convergence trends depend on the group-the 
wage gap in California was eliminated across the 20 years for Japanese, Korean, and Chi­
nese immigrants; for Filipinos it was reduced from 64% to 74%; for Mexicans it increased 
from 60% to 50%. See id. at 24 tbl. 3. 7. For more on these statistics, see infra Part II. C. l. 
4 The immigrant groups' patterns of fertility, language, residence, and socioeco­
nomic status increasingly would resemble those of the natives. See Douglas S. Massey, The 
New Immigration and Eth.nicity in the United States, 21 PoPL:L-\TIO:--i & DEv. REv. 631, 640-41 
(1995). Intermarriage also becomes more common as the generations pass and income 
and education levels incrementally rise. See id. 
5 Noting that an assimilation norm has been held out through American history, this 
Article should not be taken to imply that American history stands alone in this respect. 
Indeed, by holding out the very possibility of assimilation on the part of new arrivals, the 
United States has displayed a commendable and comparatively rare pluralism that con­
trasts with stronger strains of ethnic exclusivity, marring the records of other countries. 
s·ee, e.g. ,  F. H. Buckley, The Political Economy of hnmigmtion Policies, 16 1:--:T'L REv. L. & Eco:--:. 
81, 90-92, 96 ( 1996) (showing that Canada admits higher skilled immigrants due to more 
restrictive screening for skills and money to invest); Turliish Gennans.2, Eco:"'cniiST, Jan. 9, 
1997, at 17 (discussing proposed legislation changing a 1913 citizenship law that makes it 
difficult to become a citizen without a German bloodline). 
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cess of more recent arrivals .  This usage of the early twentieth-century 
pattern , not coincidentally, has accompanied a thirty-year decline in 
the proportion of immigrants coming from Europe and a concomi­
tant increase in  immigration from Latin America and Asia. 6 Critics 
argue that new arrivals of Latin American origin,  hereinafter "Latinos 
and Latinas ," or in abbreviated form, "Latinos/as,"7 in particular have 
fallen short of this standard because too many have remained in a 
handful of large , Spanish-speaking enclave communities and have. 
failed to disperse across the continent.8 Critics contend that the re-
. 
suiting concentration of non-English speech and other incidents of 
foreignness pose a threat to the nation ' s  social , economic, and polit­
ical cohesion.9 Among other remedies, 10 proponents advocate regula­
tion to protect and enhance the s tatus of the English language and 
6 The watershed events i n  modern immigration law were the repeal of the Chinese 
Exclusion Acts by the Act of Dec. 17, 1943, c h .  344, 57 Stat. 600, and the Act of Oct. 3, 
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911. These ended the ban on Asian immigration, shifted 
entry requirements to favor members of families of presen t  residents, and imposed annual 
limits on the number of people admitted from both the Western and Eastern H emi­
spheres. The l imits on en tries from the V\Testern Hemisphere were the first in h istory. See 
Massey, supra note 4, at 637-38. Entries from Mexico were not  previously unregulated, 
however. See id. at 635-36. Although they were not  subject to a numerical cap, e n trants 
had to satisfy substan tial visa qualification requirements. See id. There were, as a result, 
hundreds of thousands of illegal Mexican e ntrants during the 1950s and 1960s. See GREG­
ORY D EFREIT.-'I.s, INEQUALITY AT WoRK: HISPANics IN THE U.S. LABOR FoRcE 17 (1991). 
7 Latinos/as are not iden tifiable by application of a generally accepted bright-line 
test. For the purposes of this Article, the category will i nclude persons born in or de­
scended from Americans born in Spanish-speakin g  countries in North and South America, 
in addition to the descendents of the Mexicans native to the southwestern states. vVe dis­
tinguish "Latinos/as" from "Anglos," by which we mean native-born, English-speaking 
Uni ted States citizens. Within the category of Anglos we distinguish "white Anglos" when 
the context demands. In our usage, Latinos/as and Anglos are all American, whatever 
their citizenship or residence. Ideally, we would h ave a system of more particular refer­
ence to country of origin.  
We use "Latinos and Latinas" and the abbreviated form "Latinos/as" to avoid the ge­
neric  masculine. For use of a similar abbreviated form, see, for example, Elizabeth M .  
Iglesias, International Law, Human Rights, and LatCrit Theory, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AivL L. REv. 
177 (1996-1997). We note that most of the Latin writers we rely on throughout this Article 
still use "Latinos." But anyone who is a feminist must analyze that usage. Luce Irigaray has 
been one of the most eloquent  critics of the designation of human beings (as well as ob­
jects) through the differe n tiation of the masculine and the feminine in Romance lan­
guages. See LucE I RICARAY, I LoVE To You 79-95 (Alison Martin trans., 1996). The 
language, she tells us, differentiates in such a way as to perpetuate fan tasies of the mascu­
l ine and the feminine and thereby has the masculin e  stand in for the universal human.  See 
id. 
vVe do not, however, take the furth er step of coining a word "Angla" to correspond to 
"Latina," even though this causes one of us to disappear in the description "Anglo." 
8 See infra Part II.B.l. 
9 See, e.g. , Economic and Demographic Consequences of Immigration: Hearings Before the Sub­
comrn. on Econ. Resources, Competitiveness, and Sec. Econ. of the joint Econ. Comm., 99th Con g. 
359 (1986) (statemen t  of Gov. Richard Lamm) ("English [is] one of the common threads 
that h old us together. We should be color blind, but we can't be linguistically deaf"). 
1 0 One advocated remedy is revision of the immigration laws. See, e.g. , Juan F. Perea, 
Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official Eng-
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thereby hasten ( or force) the assimilation of Latinos/ as and other for­
eign-born and foreign-language residents. 
The American public has heard similar "scare talk" before. Nativ­
istsl1 have been characterizing foreign-language speech as a threat for 
as long as non-English speakers have been settling in this country in 
large numbers .l2 Despite American civilization's unscathed survival, 
the nativist impulse powerfully continues to influence law and pol­
icy, 1 3 even in sophisticated quarters where skepticism usually greets 
such predictions of social disaster. 
Nativism derives part of its power from the negative reactions that 
some English-speaking Americans ( "Anglos" )  experience upon en­
countering foreigners in traditionally Anglo neighborhoods. 14 Its re­
maining power derives from the widely held assimilation norm. The 
assimilation story ties the English language to American national iden­
tity, asserts the primacy of both, and implies a concomitant duty of 
submission for this country's non-English speakers . 
The assimilation story also asserts that two factors-cost and voli­
tion-strictly delimit the permissible scope of non-English speakers ' 
claims for equality of treatment. As to cost, there is a broad zone of 
economically justified discrimination against non-English speakers . 
Since communication is costly, an otherwise qualified immigrant who 
speaks no or little English lacks a legal claim to equal consideration 
for most jobs in the United States. Similarly, cost considerations dic­
tate that foreign-language taxpayers have no general claim of right to 
public services in their own languages, even though they receive less 
!ish, 77 MINN. L. REv. 269, 332-47 ( 1 992) (discussing the history of and advocating reforms 
for the current l iteracy requirement of immigration laws) . 
ll The use of the term "nativism" implies a normative repudiation of the point of view 
denoted thereby. See Linda S. Bosniak, "Nativism " the Concept: Some Reflections, in IMMI­
GRANTS OuT! 279, 290-91 (Juan F. Perea ed. ,  1 997) . 
1 2  The notion that common language defined the nation and its people, substituting 
for a common culture and history, gained currency during the Colonial and Early Inde­
pendence eras. See DENNIS BARON, THE ENGLISH-ONLY QuESTION 28-46 ( 1 990) . Benjamin 
Franklin provides an example, expressing concern in 1 75 1  about the number of German 
immigrants in Pennsylvania and their failure to adopt "our Language or Customs." 4 BEN­
J.>uvllN FRr\NKLI!", Observations Concerning the Increase of lvfankind, in THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN 
FRANKLIN 234 (Leonard W. Labaree ed . ,  1 961 ) .  
13 The mid-1 990s have seen a resurgence of nativist sentiment. Thomas Muller ,  Nativ­
ism in the i\!Iid-1990s: Why Now ?, in lrviMIGRA.NTs OuT!, supra note 1 1 ,  at 1 05 ,  1 06-1 4, attrib­
utes this resurgence to economic and job insecurity among natives, cultural and social 
disparities, and continued infl ows of immigrants. For a well-known text that expresses con­
temporary nativist sentiment and quite explicitly focuses on race and ethnicity, see PE:TER 
BRr:\rELOW, AuE:-.: NATION: Co�·I:I·ION SENSE ABOUT AMERICA's IMMIGRATION D ISASTER at xvii, 
1 0, 57, 1 1 7, 129 ( 1 995) . Daniel Kanstroom, Dangerous Undertones of the New Nativism: Peter 
Brirnelow and the Decline of the West, in h·Ii'vliGRA1'iTS OuT!, supra note 11 , at 300, provides a 
useful discussion of Brimelow's work, reviewing the dangerous history of racist discourse. 
1 4 For a recounting of the history of nativist animus,  see Joe R. Feagin, Old Poison in 
New Bottles: The Deep Roots of iVIodem Nativism, in IMMIGRANTS OuT!, supra note 1 1, at 1 3, 1 3-
34. 
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value for the same tax contribution because the services are inaccessi­
ble . As to volition, the assimilation story argues that foreign-language 
speakers who suffer discrimination have a self-help cure that is un­
available to victims of race and gender discrimination .  Like previous 
generations of immigrants, they can learn English and cannot deny 
that they were aware of the desirability of doing so upon entry to this 
country. 
Together, these two factors suggest a general bar to all language­
related claims of right for non-English or bilingual speakers: the 
claims' very existence signals a failure of diligence and threatens to 
impose an avoidable cost. The full-blown nativist expedient of prohib­
itive legislation is a short step away. Regulations that create English­
only zones ("English Only") that exclude newcomers encourage 
non-English speakers to "get with the program."  
In this Article, we challenge the assimilation norm's economic, 
cultural, and ethical presuppositions, 1 5 marshaling a new case for in­
validating English Only regulations. We take up two classes of regula­
tion that the assimilation norm supports, one from public law and the 
other from private law. On the public side lie statutes, widespread in 
the states and now often proposed at the federal level, that elevate 
English to "official" status as the language of government ("Official 
English")  .16 On the private side lie employer regulations, widespread 
in American workplaces and sustained by federal courts , that mandate 
English speech at all times on pain of termination ( "Workplace Eng-
15 We join a distinguished body of race critical l iterature in doing so. See, e.g. , Bill 
Ong Hing, Beyond the Rl1etoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism: AddTessing the Tension of 
Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven JVIultiracial Society, 8 1  CAL L. REv. 863 
( 1 99 3) ; Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: A ccent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence 
for the Last Reconstruction, 1 00 YALE LJ. 1 329 ( 1 99 1 ) ; Yxta M aya Murray, The Latina-American 
Crisis of Citizenship, 31 U.C. D.-w1s L. REv. 503 ( 1 998) ; Perea, supra note 1 0; Juan F. Perea, 
Ethnicity and the Constitution: Beyond the Black and White Binary Constitution, 36 V\';-..r. & iVL\RY 
L. REv. 57 1  ( 1995 ) ; Juan F. Perea, Hernandez v. New York: Courts, Prosecutors, and the Fear of 
Spanish, 2 1  HOFSTRA. L. REv. 1 ( 1992 ) ;  Juan F .  Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making of Invisi­
ble Peoj;le, 70 N.Y.U. L REv. 965 ( 1 995) ;  Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, DeconstructingHomo[geneous} 
A mericanus: The Plhite Ethnic Immigrant Nanative and Its Exclusiona�y J..ffect, 72 TeL. L. REv. 
1 493 ( 1 998 ) .  
16 For antecedent treatments in the legal l iterature, see, for example, jose Roberto 
Juarez, Jr . ,  The Ameriwn Tradition of Language Rights: The Fmgotten Right to Government in a 
"Known Tongue," 1 3  L-\W & lNEQ. J. 443 ( 1 995) ;  Perea, supra note 1 0; Leila Sadat Wexler, 
Official English, Nationalism. and Linguistic Tenor: A French Lesson, 7 1  Wr\SH .  L .  REv. 285 
(1996) . These articles question the legitimacy of these statutes. 
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lish") . 1 7 We focus throughout this Article on Latinos/ as, 18 who com­
prise the largest foreign-language group among the recent generation 
of immigrants. l9 As such, they are the most prominent nativist 
targets. 20 
1 7 For antecedent treatments i n  the l i terature, see Mark L. Adams, Fear of Foreigners: 
Nativism and WoTkplace Language Restrictions, 74 OR. L. REv. 849 ( 1 995) ;  Alfredo Mirande, 
''En La Tierra del Ciego, El Tuerto es Rey" ("In the Land of the Blind, the One Eyed Person is 
King"): Bilingualism as a Disability, 26 N .M.  L.  REv. 75 ( 1 996) ; Cara D .  Helper, Comment, 
Enforcing the Equal Employment 0pp01tunity Commission Guidelines on Discrimination Because of 
National 01igin: The Overextension of English-Only Rules in Garcia v. Spun Steak Co. ,  79 MIN:-.:. 
L. REv. 391 (1994) ; Jeanne M. Jorgensen, Comment, "English-Only " in the W01kplace and Title 
VII Disparate Impact: The Ninth CiTcuit 's Misplaced Application of "Ability To Comply" Should Be 
Rejected in FavOT of the EEOC's Business Necessity Test, 25 Sw. U.  L. REv. 407 ( 1 996) ; jeffrey D.  
Kirtner, Note, English-Only Rules and the Role of Perspective in Title VII Claims, 73 TEx. L. REv. 
871 (1995) .  These authors advocate the application of Titl e  VII to English Only workplace 
regulations. We join them in  doing so, offering an expanded theoretical basis of support. 
1 8 This simplifying l imitation also enables us to cast the starkest possible l ight on the 
assimilation n01m's invidious nature. vVe show that the refrain of threat, cost, and volition 
permits legislators andjudges to avoid confronting the fact of persistent economic discrim­
i nation against Latinos/as based not on English-language disability but ethnic, and in 
many cases, racial origin .  
\11/e note that the limitation also carries the importan t  cost of  omission of  the particu­
lar experience of Asian immigranL�. 
1 9 Massey shows the trend by comparing the region of origin of immigrants for the 
period 1983-1993 , based on U.S .  Immigration and Naturalization Service sources. See Mas­
sey, supra note 4, at 634 tbl.l. Of the nearly 9.3 mill ion arriving, 54.0% came from the 
Americas, 32.7% from Asia, and 10.2% from Europe. See id. A comparison of the percent­
ages for the period 1960-1970 is instructive. At that time, of the roughly 3 .3 million arriv­
ing, 5 1 .7% came from the Americas, 12.9% from Asia, and 33.8% from Europe. See id. 
This comparison shows an increase in absolute numbers of Americans and Asians in the 
latter period as well as a notable increase in the percentage of Asians i n  the latter period. 
See id. 
20 There are several prominent issues regarding language and Latino/a citizens and 
residents that we do not consider in this  Article. The language of primary and secondarv 
education is the most prominent. See, e.g., Alberto T. Fernandez & Sarah WJ Pel!, The 
Right To Receive Bilingual Special Education, 53 Eouc. L. REP. 1 067, 1067 ( 1 989)  (arguing that 
students with l imi ted English skills have a right to bil ingual education because all students 
in the United States have a "right to a meaningful and appropriate education") . The con­
duct of criminal trials involving bilingual witnesses and jurors also has raised prominent 
questions. See, e.g. , Hernandez v. New York, 500 U .S. 352 ,  370-72 (1991 )  (opinion of Ken­
nedy, j . )  (upholding peremptory strikes of bil ingual jurors at a trial at which several wit­
nesses were to testify in Spanish) .  
Questions also arise respecting the tort law duty to warn. ComjJa·1-e Stanley Indus. v. 
W.M. Barr & Co. ,  784 F. Supp. 1 570, 1 575-76 (S .D.  Fla. 1992)  ( noting that English lan­
guage warnings might be i nsufficient when manufacturer uses non-English media to adver­
tise) ,  with Ramirez v. Plough, Inc . ,  863 P .2d 167, 177 ( Cal. 1993) (holdin g  that providing 
warnings only in English is  sufficient as a matter of law) . Special protection provisions can 
be found in consumer protection legislation in a number of states. See, e.g., N.J. ST.\T. As:-.:. 
§ 17:16C-6 1 . 6 (cl) (West 1 984) ( requiring retailers who do business in a language other 
than English to provide customers speaking that language with a copy of the receipt in that 
language) . 
Nor do we take up immigration policy ,  whether regarding numbers admitted, stan­
dards for admission, or the treatment of undocumented entrants. v\'e note only that the 
prominence of iVIexican border-crossers among undocumented entrants tends to be over­
stated. Sixty percent of i l legal entrants come from countries other than lviexico, and one-
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Our case against English Only regulations centers on the value of 
linguistic and cultural identifications to the individual person.  It 
shows that English Only regulations violate the basic right of personal­
ity of non-English-speaking and bilingual Americans without yielding 
any cognizable benefits to American society as a whole.  Our case ha.s 
two phases. The first approaches value from the point of view of the 
person as modeled in economic theory. It thereby highlights infirmi­
ties in all three foundations-threat, cost, and volition-of the nativist 
policy construct. 21 The second phase approaches value from the 
point of view of the person as modeled in Kantian moral and political 
theory. It centers on the right of personality 
.. requiring that each of us 
receive the legally protected freedom to represent and evaluate our 
basic identifications. This general theory of right leads to a theory of 
language rights that weighs against state-imposed n o rms of 
assimilation. 
This Article has three parts. Part I provides a more particular 
description of the problem-the nativist response to Latino and La­
tina immigration during the last four decades and its manifestation in 
Official English and Workplace English. 
Part II sets forth our economic analysis. vVe demonstrate that 
economic theory both undercuts the cost justification for state English 
Only mandates and permits legal intervention against Workplace Eng­
lish . First, we draw on the economics of language, which teaches that 
language difference is costly and that the cost of acquiring the domi­
nant language falls on minority-language speakers. Second, we draw 
on the economics of discrimination, which teaches that cultural differ­
ences of any kind can increase the cost of production and that the 
costs of difference fall on members of minority groups. 
The economics of language and of discrimination imply a com­
plex description of Latino/a immigrants' incentives. On the one 
hand, every reason remains to apply the traditional view that market 
incentives sufficiently assure that immigrants learn English with a view 
toward participating in the mainstream economy. 22 This application 
of economic theory rebuts the nativist characterization of a threat to 
American civilization-spontaneous order appears adequate to do the 
job here. 23 That being the case , public choice theory invites us to 
h alf of the total undocumented populatio n  originally entered under visas and then re­
m ained after their expiration.  See Kevin R. Johnson, Pttblic Benefits and Immigration: The 
Intersection of Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCU-\ L. REv. 1 509, 15 1 7, 
1 546 (1995 ) .  
21 We expand on Andre Sole, Official English: A Socmtic Dialogue/Law and Economics 
A nalysis, 45 FL-\. L. REv. 803 ( 1 993) .  
22 See Perea, supra note 10, at 348 (noting the "ovenvhelming social and econo1nic 
incentives to learn English"). 
23 See infra Part I I.A.3. 
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account for Official English as Jim Crow legislation in fact if not in 
name-a self-protective move by rent-seeking Anglos.24 On the other 
hand, the economics of language and of discrimination provide no 
basis for predicting that the economic opportunities the market offers 
to Latinos/as provide incentives to disperse across the continent. Dis­
crimination by white Anglos limits Latino/a returns on human capital 
investment and thereby lessens their incentive to assimilate.25 More­
over, the economic theory of discrimination fails to support a predic­
tion that free markets necessarily will cause this problem to disappear 
over time . Instead, it teaches that in a free market, suboptimal em­
ployment discrimination against minorities can persist indefinitely. 
This flawed economic incentive structure effectively undercuts 
any rational basis for applying the assimilation norm. If Latinos/ as 
face persistent employment discrimination due to ethnicity or race, 
then for many of them, returns on investment in assimilation will fall 
off long before the point implied in the assimilation story. At the 
same time, the phenomena that support the nativist claims-enclave 
settlement patterns and refractory Spanish speech-are explainable 
in rational expectations terms. Given limited returns on investment 
in English, i t  makes perfect cost sense to live in a Spanish-speaking 
enclave. At the same time,  volitional fault  shifts to white Anglos: ab­
sent the Anglos' continued practice of ethnic and racial discrimina­
tion, Latinos/as would share previous immigrant generations' high­
powered incentive to disperse. 
Finally, Workplace English in this analysis is indistinguishable 
from other discriminatory conduct that Title VII bars.26 Title VII cov­
erage , however, may be costly. Discriminatory employer practices may 
be cost reductive, and enforcement increases employer operating 
costs. This cost evaluation does not end the discussion,  however, be­
cause in legal contexts the ultimate cost-benefit result can depend on 
who bears the costs. We project that Latinos/as themselves will bear 
these modest costs. Thus, the question is: Would Latinos/as willingly 
bear the costs of a Title VII bar to Workplace English? We presume to 
answer in the affirmative because we see no reason to distinguish Lati­
nos/ as from other Americans with respect to their willingness to bear 
the costs of life in a free and equal society. 
Part III sets forth a theory of right that compels the law to accord 
suspect status to discrimination based on language . We connect the 
Kantian ideal of the free person to the contemporary notion that 
identifications play a constitutive role in each person's life .  Our the­
ory of right follows from an interpretation of what it means to treat 
24 
26 
See infra Part II.B. 
See infra Part II .C. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e ( 1994) . 
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each individual as a free person with equal dignity-an interpretation 
grounded in a description and defense of the ideal of the imaginary 
domain.  This theory of right demands that each individual receive 
the moral and psychic space to evaluate , to represent, and ultimately, 
to integrate the complex realities of culture , linguistic origin ,  national 
affiliation, ethnic identity, and religious heritage. Two points logically 
follow from our theory of right. First, the legal system should treat 
language as a fundamental identification encompassed by each per­
son 's right of personhood. Second, a legal system that treats Latinos/ 
as as equals�27 recognizes and respects the value they bestow on the 
Spanish language. In contrast, an English Only regime designed to 
force Latinos/as to speak the maj ority tongue in public life or in the 
workplace treats Latinos/as as something less than free persons, 
thereby degrading them and violating their imaginary domains. 
While articulating this position, Part III addresses recent, general 
debates on cultural rights. This discourse teaches that identifications 
are both constitutive of the person and, to some extent, embedded­
human beings cannot just step out of their identifications. This teach­
ing in turn destabilizes assumptions basic to the traditional metaphysi­
cal defense of the fully autonomous subject. \/'le accept this result,28 
but nevertheless define our project as Kantian because it focuses on 
freedom. To understand the subject as symbolically or socially con­
structed is to imply that freedom is fragile .  If who we are is pro­
foundly rooted in our identifications, then we cannot know for certain 
whether any of our judgments, evaluations, or actions are truly self­
determined . A need to thematize anew what freedom can mean for 
us arises from this uncertainty. 
The ideal of the imaginary domain renders this thematization 
consistent with the Kantian ideal that the individual person, as op­
posed to the state , must be legally designated as the responsible 
source of judgments and evaluations. This approach makes no at­
tempt to claim in the strong Kantian sense that we can make our eval-
27 \Ne write of " treatment as an equal" rather than " equal treatmen t,"  b o rrowing this 
distin c tion from Ro'.:ALD DwoRKI :--.: , TAKJ:--.:c RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 227 ( 1 977) . Treatm e n t  as an 
equal is fundamental, c o nsistin g  of the righ t to be treated wi th respect and c o ncern equal 
to anyone else. See id. Equ:1l treatmen t ,  in c o ntrast, is the equal righ t to a n  opportun i ty, 
resource, or burden .  See id. 
�s \·\'e accept this result \vithoutjoining the discussants in debating the t ruth about the 
constitution of the modern or postmodern subj e c t. Our argument does n o t  require us to 
answer the question of who we really are as subj e c ts .  I ts cen tral poin t i s  that such basic 
decisions about the meaning of identifi cation must remain with i ndividuals themselves. 
I ndeed,  i n  our 1 ie1,·, the focus of legal debates about m i nori ty rights and multicultu ralism 
should shift away from t h e  question of th e truth of the su�ject  and instead ask how and 
why state recogni tion of th e person demands the right of personhood-the righ t we call 
the imaginan· domain .  This need to c hange the question is n o t  solelv of p hilosophical 
i n terest. I t  allows us to rethi n k  the e thical  stakes i n  pol it ical  debates about iden ti ty without 
attaching ourseh·es to a simplistic or, worse yet, naturalized conception o f  iden titY. 
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uations and j udgments freely and solely in accordance with the moral 
law. 29 It nevertheless insists that our actions and j udgments inevitably 
engage us in the practice of self-responsibility. Even though our own 
histories profoundly determine our decisions, we still make them and, 
in so doing, make ourselves who we are. Self-responsibility re-emerges 
on this interpretation as a practice by which we constitute ourselves as 
unique beings who over time shape identities indissociable from the 
evaluative designs we give to our identifications. On this view, our 
value as free persons is independent of both our particular value and 
of the uses we make of our judgments and evaluations. This approach 
thus maintains the distinction, central in Kant, between the worth of 
our freedom and personhood and the value we make of them in par­
ticular cases. It offers, in sum, Kant with an existential twist.30 
Our conclusion applies the idea, which George Fletcher devel­
oped, that a culture or a nation can have a right to linguistic self­
defense, which justifies protective measures to ensure the survival of 
its majority language, including in extreme circumstances regulation 
like Official English.3 1 We conclude that the conditions for this right 
do not exist in the United States at this time . Indeed, if here and now 
any group could make a case for such a right, it would be Latinos/ as 
in the Southwest. 
We note that our treatment  couples two approaches that scholars 
usually deem mutually exclusive32-consequentialist economic analy­
sis and the defense of a basic right of personality.33 We caution that 
29 Some thinkers that psychoanalysis has influenced have redefi ned autonomy to 
make it consistent with the recogni tion that we are constntcted through and by a symbolic 
Other with which we inevitably engage in defining a self. Cornelius Castoriadis, for exam­
ple, clefmes autonomy as follows: 
Autonomy then appears as: my discourse must take the place of the dis­
course of the Other, of a foreign discourse that is in me, ruling over me: 
speaking through myself. This clarification immediately indicates the socinl 
dimension of the problem ( little matter that the Other in question at the 
start is the 'narrow' paren tal other; through a series of obvious connections, 
the parental couple finally refers to society as a whole and to i ts h istory) . 
CoRNELIUS G.\STORIADIS, THE IrvlAGINARY I NSTITUTION OF SoCIE"IY 1 02 ( Kathleen Blamey 
trans. , MIT Press eel. 1 987) ( 1 975) . 
30 See generally lVL-\.RTI"i HEIDEGGER, K-\NT A.."\D THE PROBLE\·1 oF METAPHYSICS ( Richard 
Taft trans. ,  Ind. Univ. Press 5 th ed. 1 990) ( 1 973) ( examining Kantian idealism in light of 
existentialism and hermeneutic phenomenology) . 
3 1 See George Fletcher, The Case fo-r Linguistic Self-Defense, in THE MoRALITY OF NATI0'-1-
ALIS\I 324, 333-35 ( Robert McKim & Jeff McMahan eels . ,  1997) . 
32 The convention that separates them follows from the deeply held view that rights, 
by their nature, transcend cost concerns. 
3:1 Any theory of deontological right begins with Immanuel Kant. See I:vr�L-\NCEL K-\NT, 
On the Common Saying: 'This 1Hay Be True in Themy, but It Does Not Apply in Practice, ' in K-\;-..�T: 
PouTJCc\l.. vVRJTINGS 61 ( Hans Reiss eel. & H.B.  Nisbet trans. ,  2cl eel. 1 99 1 ) .  For a succinct 
discussion of the difference between the use of cleontological and consequentialist theory 
in recent political philosophy, see Thomas Nagel ,  Ju.stire and Nature, 1 7  OxFORD J. LEG.-\L 
STUD. 303 ( 1 997) . 
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our treatment does not thereby purport to offer a theoretical formula 
that locates and resolves all tensions between these two approaches; 
rather, we identify two intrinsic sources of tension between them. 
First, we defend a right to personality, which limits the means open to 
a society in pursuit of general economic welfare or other utilitarian 
goals. Second, we defend the ideal of the person as the legally author­
itative source of her own identifications against any theory that vests 
such evaluation in some prior analysis (welfarist or otherwise) and 
that gives the State the power to impose that evaluation.  
At the same time, however, this basic right of personality recog­
nizes the legitimacy of consequentialist considerations. This recogni­
tion makes it possible to synchronize the approaches and thereby to 
mediate the tensions. At a minimum, a theory of right must take con­
sequences into account when evaluating the institutional and legal 
means that protect the right to personality in practice. With language 
rights,  economic consequences must play a still larger role because 
rights and costs operate as necessary complements in this context. To 
see the element of complementarity, posit an ideal world in which 
language acquisition is costless and each person strives to guarantee 
maximum respect for each other person. In this ideal world,  multiple 
languages present no practical problem because each person ' s  respect 
for the other leads each to learn all languages. 
The problem develops when we relax these heroic assumptions 
and look at a more realistic world of interpersonal frictions, communi­
cative breakdowns, and finite resources. In this world, we cannot real­
ize the ideal of complete respect for the means of communication 
closest to the other's identi ty; instead, we see a need to privilege one 
language to facilitate communication by reducing its cost. A concomi­
tant need to protect minority-language speakers with rights to per­
sonhood arises .34 The question that results is whether society feasibly 
can bestow these rights in practice.  We demonstrate in this Article 
that it can . Although our imperfect world cannot realize the ideal of 
complete respect for others '  means of communication, this ideal still 
can inform the rules of the game. 
Our approach, while admitting consequentialist considerations, 
strives to assure that they remain reasonably faithful to the person we 
defend. This concern leads us to depart from the traditional methods 
of law and economics. For others , economic theory, properly applied, 
automatically yields a single, morally defensible result. 35 For us,  eco-
34 See infra Part III. 
35 See, e.g. , RICHARD A. PosNER, EcoNOMIC A.t'IALYSIS OF L\W 284-89 ( 5 th ed. 1 998) 
(describing the interaction of economic efficiency and morality) .  For a disc ussion on the 
relationship between economics and morality, see Annalise E. Acorn, Valuing Vi1tue: !VIoral­
ity and Productivity in Posner 's Theory of Wealth lvlaximization, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 1 67 (199 3) . 
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nomic theory, properly applied, describes a range of possible conse­
quences, each of which is open to further moral evaluation .36 Our 
coupling of economic analysis with the defense of a basic right of per­
sonality serves an additional objective : advancing the proposition that 
economic analysis can coexist with the lessons of race critical theory.37 
We anticipate skepticism on this point from the race critical commu­
nity. The skepticism is justified because economic analysis has the in­
trinsically offensive property38 of treating the fundamental rights of 
minorities as contingencies open to legitimate negation in a rarefied 
world of formal welfare analysis.39 Despite this possibility, we are con­
fident that economic analysis has practical potential for race critical 
36 See AIV1AKIYA SEN, I NEQUALriY REEXAMINED 1 6-19  ( 1 992) , for a broad discussion of 
ways in which deontology and consequentialist economic theory could seiYe each other. 
37 Others have advanced similar propositions. See, e.g. , Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailo-ring, 43 
UCLA L. REv. 1 78 1 ,  1 786-1 800 ( 1 996) (showing, assuming a compelling interest to remedy 
past discrimination, that the narrow tailoring principle should not bar racial classifications 
that tailor the size of the preference to the remedial need) ; john ]. Donohue II I ,  Is Title VII 
E.jficient ?, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1 4 1 1 ,  1 4 1 1-1 2 ( 1 986) (commenting that the neoclassical eco­
nomic model, with its stress on the desirability of aggregating market preferences, has long 
grounded an argument against antidiscrimination legislation ) . 
38 CJ Richard Delgado, Rodrigo 's Second Ch-ronicle: The Economics and Politics of Race, 9 1  
MICH. L .  REv. 1 1 83, 1 195 ( 1 993)  ( reviewing RicHARD A .  EPSTEIN, FoRBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE 
CAsE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DrscRJMINATION LAws ( 1 992) ) ( commenting that the method­
ological individualism of economics creates a disciplinary bias that causes a systematic mis­
perception of racism's essence) .  
39 I n  addition, prominent exemplars o f  law and economics purport to undermine the 
policy assumptions supporting the body of rights that make up core accomplishments of 
the civil rights movement. See gene-rally EPSTEIN, supra note 38 ( arguing that Title VII need­
lessly infringes upon the freedom of competi tive employment markets) . 
Delgado makes a series of criticisms of economic methodology that provide a useful 
basis for demonstrating this unexplored potential. See Delgado, supra note 38. All of the 
criticisms, detailed below, are justifiable in the context of a discussion of Epstein 's book. 
We nonetheless think it is worth confron ting them as a way of opening an avenue of com­
munication and demonstrating that economic theory holds out a flexible mode of inquiry. 
Delgado 's discussants make the follmving charges, in addition to that mentioned supra 
note 38: 
( 1 )  Economics fails to "take into account the intentional, interest-serving dimension 
of white-over-black prejudice." Delgado, sup-ra note 38, at 1 1 89 .  Actually, subsequent exer­
cises in law and economics confron t  this point. See Robert Cooter, Ma-rket Affirmative Ac­
tion, 3 1  SAN D IEGO L. REv. 1 33,  1 50 ( 1 994) (describing discriminatory economic regimes as 
cartels) ;  cf Richard H .  McAdams, Coope-ration and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status 
Production and Race Discrimination, 1 OS HARv . L. REv. 1 003, 1 007-27, 1 0 70 ( 1 995)  ( describ­
ing discriminatory economic regimes as spontaneous orders that status competi tion 
drives) . 
(2 )  Economics needs to explain why competitive pressures do not el iminate racism in 
the market. See Delgado, sup-ra note 38, passim. Not only is this the endeavor of statistical 
discrimination theory, see infra notes 221-33 and accompanying text, but it also is a topic of 
increasing prominence in the field. See Symposium, Discrimination in P-roduct, C-redit and 
Labor lviarkets, 1 2 ]. EcoN. PERSP. 2 3-126 ( 1 998) . 
(3 )  Economics tends to assume peli"ect knowledge while the stigmatic picture that 
whites have of blacks limits their level of knowledge. See Delgado, supra note 38, passim. 
Information asymmetries and their contribution to racist economic behavior is what statis­
tical discrimination theory is all about. See infra notes 266-68 and accompanying text. 
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scholars and believe that an analysis grounded in an unequivocal affir­
mation of the individual 's right to treatment as an equal can usefully 
demonstrate this potential. 
I 
LATINO AND LATINA IMMIGRANTS AND ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE MANDATES 
A. Latino and Latina Settlement and Speech 
Nativists point to three aspects of the lives of Latino/a immi­
grants when they claim to identify a pattern of resistance to assimila­
tion. First, Latinos/as have gravitated to a small number of enclave 
communities rather than dispersing across the continent. Nothing 
about immigrant enclaves, of course, is new. Like turn-of-the-century 
arrivals, many Latino/a immigrants have settled in enclaves because 
they have arrived with a family or network connection that provides a 
job or a place to stay.40 Nativists charge that the enclave-settlement 
tendency is more pronounced among Latinos/as than with earlier im­
migrant groups. For example, a recent study found that today's top 
five receiving states take in 78. 2 %  of arrivals, and today's  top five re­
ceiving metropolitan areas take in 47.9% of arrivals.41 By contrast, 
1 9 1 0 's  top five receiving states took in 54. 0 %  of arriving immigrants, 
and 1 9 1 0 ' s  top five receiving cities took in 35.6% of arrivals.42 
Second, inflows of Latinos/as and other new "visible" immigrants, 
which began in the 1 950s and 1960s, promise to continue indefinitely 
and without abatement. Nativists contrast current immigration pat­
terns with the turn-of-the-century immigration wave, which Congress 
ended abruptly when it imposed entry quotas in the 1 9 20s.43 Entry 
quotas resulted in a substantial reduction in both immigrant visibility 
and concentration of immigrant populations in enclave communities 
( 4) Racial mythologies are firmly believed and interest promoting; images become 
realities that reinforce the images. See Delgado, supra note 38, passim. For a model that 
captures this dynamic, see Bradford Cornell & lvo Welch, Culture, Information, and Screening 
Discrimination, 1 04 J .  PoL Eco;-.;. 542, 558-59 ( 1 996) , discussed infra notes 250-68 and ac­
companying text. 
40 The existence of enclave communi ties also implies that the new arrivals are not 
taking jobs from American citizens. See D EFREITAS, supra note 6, at 234; MICHAEL J. PI  ORE, 
BIRDS OF PASSAGE: MIGRANT L>..BOR AND lNousTRL-\L SociETIES 1 20-23 ( 1 979) ( discussing 
labor-market segmentation) .  
4 1 See Massey, supra note 4, at 647 tbl . 2 .  For additional evidence of clumping, see 
'N.A.V. Clark, Scale Effects in International Migration to the United States, 30 REGIO:--Jc\L STUD. 
589, 591 tbl . l  ( 1996) ( noting that 70.3% of new arrivals between 1 985 and 1990 settled in 
California, New York, Texas, Florida, or Illinois) . 
4:-2 See Massey, supra note 4, at 64 7 tbl .2 .  
43 See Immigration Act of 1 924, ch. 1 90, 43 Stat. 1 53; Massey, supra note 4, at 635. 
l 
j 
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as immigrants assimilated over subsequent decades.44 Due to contin­
ued in-migration, Latinos/as will continue to be visible, and enclave 
communities will indefinitely persist.45 Thus, even if assimilation pro­
ceeds at the same rate as it did at the turn of the century, enclaves will 
not disappear.46 
Third, many Latinos/as speak Spanish among themselves. In 
fact, 48.0% of Latino/a households predominantly speak Spanish, 
33.0 % predominantly speak English , and the remainder alternately 
speak both languages.47 Nativists interpret these statistics to indicate 
that new arrivals to the enclave communities take advantage of Span­
ish-language infrastructures to avoid incurring the cost of English-lan­
guage education.48 Moreover, unlike turn-of-the-century immigrants, 
who crossed an ocean and practically had to cut ties with their home 
country, today's  Latinos/as enjoy easy access to their home countries 
and cultures and consequently have a diminished incentive to assimi­
late .49 With the proportion of Latinos/as in the overall population 
rising and projected to continue-from 9 .0% in 1 990 to a proj ected 
22 .5% in 205050-nativists argue that this refractory behavior imposes 
44 See Massey, supra note 4, at 641-43 (noting the pattern of Europeans' assimilation as 
their numbers declined) . 
45 One of the reasons for European immigrants' assimilation is "a long hiatus when 
few additional Europeans arrived."  Id. at 642. Therefore, Latin Americans will have diffi­
culty leaving their enclave communities because they "can expect to have their numbers 
conti nuously augmented by a steady supply of fresh arrivals from abroad." Id. at 643. 
46 See id. at 642-43; Pones & Schauffler, supra note 2,  at 645-46. 
4 7 See Andrew Pollack, The Fight for Hispanic Viewers: Univision s Success Story Attracts New 
Competition, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1 9 ,  1 998, at D l .  
48 See Massey, supra note 4, at 647. However, he offers n o  additional supporting evi­
dence. Moreover, if his argument is true, i t  is nothing new because widespread home­
language speech within the enclave lowers the immediate cost of assimilation for new arriv­
als. See Buckley, supra note 5, at 85 ( asserting that new immigrants are likely to settle in  
areas already settled by immigrants to  find compatriots and a more tolerant community) . 
49 See Hispanics: More People than Powe1; EcoNOMIST, Sept. 1 7, 1 988, at 32, 33 ( citing no 
data) . Latinos/ as have repeated this point themselves. See Pollack, supra note 47 (quoting 
the head of the Telemundo television network) ; cf THOI.-IAS SowELL, ETHNIC A..vJERJCA 243, 
276 ( 1981 ) (suggesting that Puerto Ricans' and Mexicans' tendency periodically to return 
home explains their income levels ) .  For a definitive statistical refutation of this suggestion ,  
see D EFREITAS, supra note 6, at 71-73.  
so "Between 1 970 and 1 990, the population of the United States increased 22.4%." 
Hing, sujJra note 1 5 ,  at 865. During that time the Latino/ a population increased by 1 4 1 %  
to reach 9% of the total U.S. population. See id. a t  865-66. According t o  the Census Bu­
reau, the relative percentage had increased to 1 0 .2% by 1995.  See HISPANIC A..viERICANS: A 
STATISTIC\L SouRCEBOOK 1 1  (Louise L. Hornor ed., 1 996) (drawing on the Uni ted States 
Census Bureau' s  Current Population Reports) . The Bureau predicts an increase to 1 1 .3% by 
2000 and to 22.5% by 2050. See id. 
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a cost burden51  and threatens national cohesion.52 We are , say nativ­
ists, facing the chaos of the Biblical Tower of Babel.53 
The facts just cited, h owever, at best suggest a possibility that Lati­
nos/as will assimilate at a slower pace than turn-of-the-century immi­
grants . They do not support a Tower of Babel projection.  Indeed, 
because Latino/a immigrants do learn English, the facts p oint to the 
contrary conclusion . Just like immigrants at the turn of the century, 
first-generation Latino/a immigrants incur the special cost of acquir­
ing English as a second language. They tend to read fluently within 
ten years and speak fluently within fifteen years .54 Also , as with past 
groups, the second generation speaks English fluently,55 and studies 
show that settlement in enclaves does not inhibit the acquisition of 
English skills.56 The third generation of Latino/a immigrants, re­
mammg consistent with historical patterns,  tends to be 
monolingual. 57 
51 See Joseph Tones, The Language Crusade: What 's Really Behind the Campaign for "Offi­
cial English "?, HtsPANIC, June 1 996, at 50, 52 (noting that nativists want English Only "for 
the sake of cost-effectiveness and unity") . 
52 The findings of the proposed Language of Government Act of 1 997 ,  S. 323, 1 05th 
Cong. § 2, summarize this perspective. The United States, they state, has a h istory of rich 
diversity, but the common thread is a common language. " [T] o preserve unity in diversity 
and to prevent division along linguistic lines, the United States should maintain a language 
common to all people." Id. § 2 (4) . Furthermore, a single language for federal govern­
ment operations will promote "efficiency and fairness to all people," id. § 2 (8 ) ,  and "help 
immigrants better assimilate," id. § 2 (6) ; see also H ing, supra note 1 5 ,  at 874 (describing the 
belief of many assimilationists that Latino/ a and Asian immigration increases bilingualism, 
creating problems for the educational system and leading to unwelcome changes in our 
national identity) . 
53 See Pones & Schauffler, supra note 2, at 640 (quoting from the policy statement of 
U .S. English , a political action organization prominent in the so-called "English Only 
Movement," the warning that without l inguistic unity, " [s] ociety as we know it can fade into 
noisy babel and then chaos" ( i talics omitted) ) .  Even prominent liberal Arthur Schlesinger, 
Jr. reportedly fears that a Tower of Babel may resul t  from multiculturalism. See Muller, 
supra note 1 3, at 1 1 3 .  
54 See Hing, supra note 1 5, a t  877 .  James Crawford reports that during the last half 
century, there has been a four percent to five percen t  increase in the anglicization rate 
among Latino/a immigrants. See JAMES CRAWFORD, HoLD YouR ToNGUE: BILI NGUALISM AND 
THE PoLITICS OF "ENGLISH ONLY' 1 27 ( 1 992) . Immigrants from different countries angli­
cize at different rates-with age, ties to the homeland, educational level, and economic 
prospects explaining, in large part, the differentials. See id. at 1 27-28. 
H igh demand has caused a large language-education infrastructure to spring up 
within Latino/a communities. English-as-a-second-language classes have long waiting lists 
in both New York and Los Angeles. See Torres, supra note 5 1 ,  at 54. 
55 See Hing, supra note 1 5, at 877. 
56 See id. at 863 app. b (describing Asian immigrants who both live in enclaves ancl 
learn English ) .  
5 7  See id. Even within the enclaves, Latino/ a parents who want their children to have 
the cul tural and economic advantages of bilingualism report having trouble getting the 
children to speak Spanish. See Mireya Navarro, Pop Cultu-re Blunts Immigrant Children 's Taste 
for Spanish, Hous. CHRON.,  Aug. 3 1 , 1 996, at 1 6. 
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The langu
_
a?� qu�stion fo: Latinos/as, t hen, is not one of English 
language 
_
acqu!Sltwn; mste
_
ad, 1t concerns th e degree to which English 
and assoCiated cultural traits completely replace Latino/ a antecedents 
in the second and third generations . Enclave settlement does have an 
impact at this level because second-generation English monolingual­
ism increases as immigrants disperse geographically and as the length 
of their residence in the United States increases .58 But fundamen­
tally, Latino/a families face the same cultural problems of earlier im­
migrants-ameliorating the generational loss of the paren tal 
language to preserve the resource of bilingualism. 59 The loss can 
come violently. In her novel, The House on Mango Street, Sandra Cis­
neros described a Latina mother who tries to surround her family, 
living in the heart of a Spanish enclave, with the beauty of Spanish in 
their home. Television does not respect her boundary, and to her 
horror she cannot keep her baby from speaking English: 
And then to break her heart forever, the baby boy who has begun to 
talk, starts to sing the Pepsi commercial he heard on T.V. 
No speak English, she says to the child who is singing in  the lan­
guage that sounds like tin .  No speak English, no speak English,  and 
bubbles i nto tears. No, no, no as if she can ' t  believe her ears .  5° 
B. Official English 
Under the assimilation norm, it is not Latino/a immigrants who 
need legal protection, but the English language. 61 Assimilationists ar­
gue that Latinos/ as, instead of complaining about their rights , should 
take the path to equal status by extinguishing their Latino/a identities 
58 See Portes & Schauffler, supra note 2, at 644-45. Pones and Schauffler studied 
eighth- and ninth-grade students in Miami who were either born here of at least  one for­
eign paren t  or born abroad and a resident  in this country for at least five years. See id. at 
646. Nearly 99% spoke English at least "well , "  and close to 73% spoke "very well" ;  more 
than 80% preferred to speak English. See id. at  649 . 
59 See id. at 651 .  
60 SANDRA CisNEROS, THE HousE ON M-·\.NCO STREET 74-75 ( 1 989) .  Compare the well­
publicized case of a county judge in Texas who, in the context of a child-custody dispute, 
ordered a mother who spoke only Spanish to her child to speak both languages, declaring 
her to be engaged in "child abuse" that would relegate the child to the status of a house­
maid. Clay Robison, Judge Defends His Order That i'VIorn Speak English, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 
30, 1 995, at l A; Luis Wilmot, Repmt Judicial Abuse to State Commission, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS­
NEws, Sept. 1 1 , 1 995,  at l OA. 
6 1 If the agenda of the English Only Movement can be taken as a guide, the two 
provisions with the highest profile are Spanish-language ballots and Spanish-language edu­
cation. I t  is not, say movement leaders, that Latino/a immigrants fail to share the aspira­
tions of their European predecessors, but that their political leaders have m isguided them. 
See Linda Chavez, Hispanics vs. Their Leaders, CoMMENTARY, Oct. 1 99 1 ,  at 47,  48; see also 
Hiram Puig-Lugo, Freedom To Speak One Language: Free Speech and the English Language 
Amendment, l l  CI-IICAJ'\Io-L\TINO L. REv. 35, 43 ( 1 9� 1 )  (noting that proponents of the Eng­
lish Language Amendment advocate termination of bilingual education ) .  
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and becoming fully American.62 Treatment as equals will follow in 
due course. 
This assimilationist analysis, carried to its logical conclusion, im­
plies that everyone in American society, including Latinos/as them­
selves, would be better off if Spanish speech were suppressed. The 
First Amendment's free speech guarantee blocks the achievement of 
this goal through direct legislative prohibition.63 But indirect means 
to the end of Spanish-language suppression prominently figure on na-. 
tivist agendas. Nativists have asked both the national and many state 
governments to correct what they see as an oversight of the Founding 
Fathers64 by privileging the English language with official status. Sen­
ator S.I .  Hayakawa made the first request when he introduced an Eng­
lish Language Amendment ( "ELA" ) to the Constitution in 1 98 1 .65 
62 See Chavez, supra note 61 , at 4 7 (noting that H ispanics, "l ike millions of immigrants 
before them, see their best opportunity for success in  assimilating to the common culture of 
America" (emphasis added) ) .  
63 See U.S.  CaNST. amend. I .  
64 The Constitution does not declare English to be the national government's official 
language, although an early Congress did reject requests from the German-speaking popu­
lation to publish laws in German. See Perea, supra note 10 ,  at 303-09. Federal level Official 
English legislation thereafter was sporadic. The New Mexico statehood legislation, i tself 
delayed until the territory had an Anglo majori ty, required the state to provide English­
language education and made English li teracy a required skill for state officials. See id. at 
321-23.  In Puerto Rico, taken by force in 1 898, the provision for English-language instruc­
tion in the schools was declared soon thereafter to be feasible and desirable by Major 
General Guy Henry, the second mil itary governor. See David Rodriguez Encarnacion, 
Evolucion del Derecho a la Educacion Consagrado en la Constitucion del 1 952 y su Desarrollo Jwis­
prudencial, 32 REV1STA juRIDICA DE LA U NIVERSJDAD INTERAMERIC.ANA DE PuERTo Rrco 423, 
426 ( 1 998 ) .  Imposition of mandatory English-language education was attempted by the 
colonial  government in 1909, see Lisa Napoli, The Legal Recognition of the National Identity of a 
Colonized People: The Case of Puerto Rico, 1 8  B .C. THIRD WoRLD LJ. 1 59,  1 83 ( 1998) , and most 
classes were conducted in English and unti l  1 948, see Ennio M.  Colon Garcia et al. , The 
Linguistic Factor, 32 REvrsTA juRJDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD INTERAiviERICANA DE P li ERTO Rico 
3 1 0, 3 1 4  ( 1 998) . An Act to provide a civil government for Puerto Rico,  and for other 
purposes, ch. 1 45 ,  39 Stat. 951  ( 1 9 1 7) , anglicized the spelling of the colony's name to 
"Porto Rico." Congress later reinstated the Spanish spelling. See Act of M ay 1 7, 1932, ch. 
1 90, 47 Stat. 1 58 ( codified at 48 U.S.C.  § 731a  ( 1 994) ) .  For an economic h istory of Puerto 
Rican colonization, see DEFREITAS, supra note 6, at 26-36. Puerto Rico is now officially 
bil ingual. See P.R. Lnvs A'IN. tit. 3,  § 941 ( 1 992) ( added 1 902) ( requiring all government 
reports published in  English also to be published in Spanish ) .  The issue remains a hot one 
in Congress. V\-'hen, in March 1998, a bill authorizing a referendum on statehood among 
the Puerto Rican voters was presented to and approved by the House of Representatives, 
an amendment conditioning statehood on English Only in federal offices and public edu­
cation was only narrowly defeated. See Lizette Alvarez, Senate Is Lukewarm, but Some Seek Vote 
on Puerto Rico, NY Tr:vrEs, Mar. 6, 1 998,  at A1 8. 
In  the states there has been a sporadic h istory of j uridical bilingualism. Pennsylvania, 
California, and Louisiana each had periods of official bilingualism. See Perea, sujJra note 
1 0, at 3 1 0-26. New Mexico remains officially bilingual, see id. at 323, as does Hawaii ,  see 
HAw . REv. Sn.T. ANN. § 1-1 3 (Michie 1 998) (Engl ish and Hawaiian ) .  For Texas 's bilingual 
h istory, see Juarez, s1tpra note 1 6. 
65 See S]. Res. 72, 97th Cong. ( 1 981 ) .  Others haYe reintroduced it many times since. 
See, e.g. , H .RJ Res. 37, 1 05th Cong. ( 1 997) (adding that English shall be used for all gov-
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When Congress balked at adopting the ElA, the movement' s  pol itical 
focus shifted to the states.66 Twenty-one states responded with Official 
English statutes, in some cases at the legislature ' s  instance and in 
other cases by popular initiative .67 Some of these statutes ,  which es­
sentially are mark-ups of the ELA, ambiguously68 declare "official sta­
tus" for English and accord an open-ended enforcement power to the 
ernment documents and official proceedings) ; H.R.J. Res. 1 3, 1 00th Cong. ( 1 987) ( adding 
that " [ n ] either U nited States nor any [s] tate shall require . . .  the use . . .  of any language 
other than English" ) ;  S.J. Res. 1 67 ,  98th Cong. ( 1983) ( declaring English to be the "official 
language of the U ni ted States" and grantin g  Congress power to enforce that declaration 
through "appropriate legislation" ) .  
According to i ts proponents, the ElA would "establish English as the official language 
of federal , state, and local governments; el iminate bil ingual [election] ballots; and permit 
bilingual" instruction in  public schools only for the purpose of effecting assimilation. Wex­
ler, supra note 1 6, at 354-55. More generally, " [ i ]  t would establish a national consensus 
that a common language is necessary to preserve the basic internal unity that is required 
for a stable and growing nation." The English Language Amendment: Hearing on SJ Res. 1 6 7  
BejoTe the Subcornm. on  the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judicimy, 98th Con g .  23 
( 1984) (statement of Sen. Huddleston )  [hereinafter The English Amendment] . For further 
discussion, see Wexler, supra note 1 6, at 354-55. 
66 Senator Hayakawa founded U.S. English in 1 983. See \Nexler, supra note 1 6, at 352 
n.287; Torres, supra note 51, at 52 .  
67 A twenty-second state, Nebraska, has Official Engl ish legislation datin g  back to 
1 920. See NEB. Col"\ ST. art. I, § 27 ( coverin g  all official proceedings, publications, and 
records, and all education-public, private, and parochial ) .  A predecessor of this provi­
sion was struck down i n  1\tleyer v. Ne&raska, 262 U .S. 390 ( 1 923) .  For a politi cal analysis of 
the state legislation, see Raymond Tatalovich,  Official English as Nativist Backlash, in l:v!�II­
GRANTS OuT! ,  supra note 11 , at 78, 80-9 1 .  
6 8  Courts can narrowly interpret a simple declaration of "official status" so as not to 
carry negative implications for government activities i n  other languages. Some of the judi­
cial opinions interpreting these statutes take this narrow approach. See Yniguez v. 
Arizonans for Official English, 42 F.3d 1 2 1 7, 1 22&-27 (rejecting the State ' s  in terpretation 
of a facially restrictive statute to permit use of other languages to faci l itate the provision of 
services) , ajj'd, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1 995) (en bane) , vacated as moot sub nom. Arizonans 
for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 ( 1997) ; Puerto Rican Org. for Politi cal Action v. 
Kusper, 490 F .2d 575, 577 (7th Cir. l 973) ( noting that an I ll inois statute making English 
the official language does not "prevent publication of official materials in other lan­
guages") ;  Martin v. Metropolitan Dade County, 637 So. 2d 3 1 3  (Fla. D ist. Ct. App. 1 994) 
(holding that a local ordinance repealing an antibil ingual ordinance passed one year ear­
l ier did not violate the state constitutional provision declaring Engl ish to be the official 
language) ;  see also The English Amendment, supra note 65, at 32 (statement of legislative 
attorney Charles V. Dale) (arguing that ElA alone would have l i ttle practical effect without 
an effective enforcement mechanism, which is not specifically defined by the EIA) . 
English Only activists take a more aggressive view of the statutes' meaning. After en­
actment in  California, U .S. Engl ish set up a center to police implementation ; in Dade 
County, Florida an English Only ordinance was held to bar bilingual signs at the zoo. See 
Sole, supra note 2 1 ,  at 8 1 0-11 .  
The Dade Coun ty experience reflects political tensions between Anglos and members 
of the region 's Cuban encla\·e. The County Commissioners voted the countv bilingual in 
1973. A.n initiati\·e ·'stipulating that public funds could not be used to teach languages 
other than English or to ' promote a culture other than the culture of the United States'
.
, 
revoked this designation in 1 980. Pones & Schauffler, supra note 2, at 645. The Dade 
County Commission rescinded that initiative in 1 993. See irl. iHartin was an attempt to 
trump the Commissioners '  action with the state constitution 's English Only provision. See 
i'vlartin, 637 So. 2d at 3 1 3. 
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legislature.69 Other Official English enactments are more specific, ex­
plicitly restricting the language of government business .70 
Federal English Only activity revived with the election of a Repub­
lican Congress in 1994.7 1 Since then, members of Congress have in­
troduced a number of Official English proposals in each house. The 
least restrictive proposals mandate English for federal government op-
69 See AL>.. CoN sT. amend. 509 ( ratified 1 990) (declaring English the official lan-
guage, authorizing the legislature to take all "steps necessary" to "preserve [ ] and en­
hance [ ] " English, and prohibiting any law to "diminish [ ] or ignore [ ] the role of English 
as the common language") ; CAL. CaNsT. art. I I I , § 6 ( added by initiative 1 986) ( declaring 
English the official language and authorizing the legislature to take all steps necessary to 
preserve and enhance it) ; CoLo. CaNST. art. I I , § 30a (added by ini tiative 1 988)  ( declaring 
English the official language and authorizing the assembly to implement) ; Fu. CoN ST. art. 
I I , § 9 ( added by initiative 1 988) ( establishing English as the official language and utilizing 
substantially the same language as Colorado) .  
Other states have provisions that make the declaration without granting enforcement 
power explici tly. See ARK. CoDE ANN. 1 -4-1 1 7  (Michie 1 996) (enacted 1 987) ; 5 ILL CoMP. 
STAT. 460/20 (West 1 993) (enacted 1 99 1 ,  with prior laws dating back to 1 923) ; IND. CoDE 
AN"! . § 1-2-10-1 ( Michie 1 998) (added 1 984) ; Kv. REv. STAT. A'1N. § 2 . 0 1 3 ( Banks-Bald,vin 
1 995) (added 1 984) ; M1ss. CoDE A'1N. § 3-3-31 ( 1 991 )  (enacted 1 987) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 1 45-1 2  ( 1 994) (enacted 1 987) ; N .D .  CENT. CoDE § 54-02-1 3  ( 1 989) ( added 1 987) ; VA. 
CoDE ANN . §  7 . 1 -42 (Michie Supp. 1 998) ( added 1 996) (declaring English to be the official 
language and stating that "no state agency or local government shall be required to pro­
vide . . .  [or] prohibited from providing" other language documents " [e ]xcept as provided 
by law" ) .  
Many states also have incidental provisions concerning the language o f  judicial pro­
cess, record keeping, and other government functions. See Wexler, supra note 1 6, at 348. 
For an example of a statute, see TEx. PRoP. CoDE A'1N. § 1 1 .002 (West 1 995) (enacted 
1 983) (specifying that no real property documents shall be filed in a language other than 
English ) .  
70 See ARlz. Cot-:sT. art. XXVIII ( added by referendum 1 988) (declaring English as the 
official language of ballot, public schools, and all government functions and actions and 
authorizing the legislature to take all reasonable enforcement steps) ; NEB. CaNST . art. I ,  
§ 27 (adopted 1 920) ( covering official proceedings, publications, records, a n d  all educa­
tion) ;  GA. CoDE 1\,"\IN. § 50-3-1 00 ( 1 998) ( added 1 996) ( declaring English the official lan­
guage for acts of government and public meetings and permitting official filings of other 
language documents only with an English translation ) ; MoNT. CODE ANN. § 1 - 1 -5 1 0  ( 1 997) 
(declaring English the official language for acts of government officers and employees) ; 
N . H .  REv. STAT. A'-'N. § 3-C: 1 to :2 (Supp. 1998) ( mandating English for all public docu­
ments, records, and proceedings in  which excepting cases the "public good" requires use 
of other languages) ; S.C. CoDE ANN. § 1 -1 -696 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1 997) ( added 1 987) ; 
S .D.  CoDIFIED L<\ws § 1 -27-20 ( Michie Supp. 1 998) ( declaring English the offical language 
and designating as language for public documents and meetings) ; TENN .  CoDE A "\IN. § 4-1-
404 ( 1 998) (added 1 984) (mandating English for al l  "communications and publications" 
of governmental entities) ; Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 8-6- 1 0 1  ( Michie 1 997) (added 1 996) ( apply­
ing to documents and written materials and stating that no state agency or pol i tical subdivi­
sion "shall be required to provide" such documents and materials in any language other 
than English, but excepting oral information provided to individuals in the course of deliv­
ery of a public service) . 
Courts struck down the Arizona statute on First Amendment grounds in Yniguez, 42 
F .3d at 1 241-42, and in Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1 998) (en bane) ,  wt. denied, 67 
U .S .L.W. 3436 ( 1 999) . 
7 1  Senator Dole endorsed federal-level Official English legislation in his 1 996 cam-
paign. See Torres, sujJTa note 5 1 ,  at 52.  
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erations and services and declare a "right" to government services in 
English.72 More restrictive versions repeal federal laws that require 
Spanish-language election ballots and that encourage Spanish-lan­
guage primary and secondary education.73 Congress has not, to date , 
enacted any of the proposals. 
72 See Language of Government Act of 1 997,  S.  323, 1 05th Cong. § 2; Bill Emerson 
English Language Empowerment Act of 1 997, H . R. 1 23, 1 05 th Cong.; English Language 
Empowerment Act of 1 996, H.R. 3850, 1 04th Cong. § 3 ( adding § 1 63 to 4 U.S .C. ) ;  Lan­
guage of Government Act of 1 995, H.R.  1 23,  1 04th Con g. § 3 (same) ; Language of Govern­
ment Act of 1 995, H.R. 345, 1 04th Cong. § 3 (same) ; Language of Government Act of 
1 995, S. 356, 1 04th Cong. § 3 (same) . The Language of Government Act of 1 997 provides, 
inter alia, ( 1 )  that " [ t] he [g] overnment shall conduct its official business in English, "  S. 
323, 1 05th Cong. § 3 ( adding § 1 63 (a) to 4 U.S.C. ) ;  ( 2 )  that the government has an "af­
firmative obligation to preserve and enhance the role of English as the official language of 
the . . .  government," id. (adding § 1 62 to 4 U.S .C. ) ;  (3 )  that " [ n ] o  person shall be denied 
services, assistance, or facilities, directly or indirectly provided by [g] overnment solely be­
cause the person communicates in English ," id. ( adding § 1 63 (b)  to 4 U .S.C. ) ; and ( 4) that 
" [e ]very person . . .  is entitled to . . .  communicate with the [g] overnment in English; . . .  
[ to]  receive information from or contribute information to the [g] overnment in English ; 
and . . .  [ to]  be informed of or be subject to official orders in English," id. ( adding § 1 63 (c)  
to 4 U.S.C. ) .  Savings clauses go on to state that the statute is "not intended . . .  to discrimi­
nate against or restrict the rights of any individual," id. § 2 (b) ( 1 ) ,  and "not intended to 
discourage or prevent the use of languages other than English in any nonofficial capacity," 
id. § 2 (b) (2) . 
For a variant proposal, see the Declaration of Official Language Act of 1 997,  H.R. 622, 
1 05th Cong. , and the Declaration of Official Language Act of 1 995, H . R. 739, 1 04th Cong. 
These proposed bills ( 1 )  declare English to be the official language, see H.R. 622 § 2 (ad­
ding § 1 61 to 4 U .S. C. ) ;  ( 2 )  state that English is the "preferred language of communication 
among citizens of the United States, "  id. (adding § 1 62 to 4 U.S.C. ) ; (3) encourage citizens 
to use English in a section labeled "Duties of citizenship," id. (adding § 1 64 to 4 U.S.C. ) ; 
and ( 4) command the INS to enforce the English-language proficiency standard, see id. 
(adding § 1 65 to 4 U.S .C. ) .  
73 See National Language Act o f  1 997, H . R. 1 005, 1 05th Cong.; National Language Act 
of 1 995, H.R. 1 005, 1 04th Cong. These proposals limit the Official English declaration by 
exceptions only for religious purposes, foreign-language training, and persons over 62. See 
H.R. 1 005, 1 05th Cong. § 2 (adding § 1 63 to 4 U.S .C. ) ;  H.R. 1 005, 1 04th Cong. § 2 (same) . 
In  addition, they repeal Bilingual Education Programs and Bilingual Election Require­
ments and require English in new citizen admission ceremonies. See H.R. 1 005, 1 05th 
Cong. §§ 3-5; H . R. 1005, l 04th Cong. §§ 3-5. 
Guam delegate Robert Underwood has introduced an English Only School Prayer 
Bill .  According to Representative Underwood, " [w] e should not tolerate prayers in dead 
languages like Latin, nor unfamiliar prayers in Hebrew, Greek, Arabic or Spanish ." English­
Only Prayers, PL\lN DEALER (Cleveland) ,  Aug. 1 2, 1 996, at 1 0D.  
Finally, there i s  a counterproposal. See H . R. Con .  Res. 4 ,  1 05th Cong. ( 1 997) ; H .R .  
Con. Res. 83 ,  1 04th Con g .  ( 1 995) .  These resolutions recognize the  importance of  English, 
but resolve to continue the provision of services in languages other than English to facili­
tate access to essential government functions. See H.R. Con. Res. 4;  H.R. Con. Res. 83. The 
declaration neatly summarizes several policy counters to the English Only Movement: 
\'Vhereas there is no threat to the status of English in the United States, 
a language that is spoken by 94 percent of United States residents, accord­
ing to the 1 990 United States Census, and there is no need to designate any 
official United States language or to adopt similar restrictionist legislation; 
'vVhereas "English-only" measures, or ?roposals to designate English as 
the sole official language of the United States, would violate traditions of 
cultural pluralism, divide communities along ethnic lines, jeopardize the 
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Constitutional litigation has followed enactments of these laws in 
the states. The Ninth Circuit struck down an Arizona p rovision that 
mandated English as the exclusive language of public services as 
facially overbroad and violative of the First Amendment's free speech 
guarantee. 74 The Supreme Court took the case only to vacate the 
lower court judgment as moot.75 Subsequently, in Ruiz v. Hull,76 the 
Supreme Court of Arizona reached the same result as the Ninth Cir­
cuit, offering both a more expansive reading of the First Amend­
ment77 and a parallel equal protection ground for invalidation.  78 
Pending a definitive federal court ruling, however, the constitutional­
ity of restrictive Official English statutes remains an open question.79 
provision of law enforcement, public health, education,  and other vital serv­
ices to those whose English is l imi ted, impair government efficiency, and 
undercut the national interest by h indering the development of language 
skills needed to enhance in ternati onal competi tiveness and conduct diplo­
macy; and 
vVhereas such "English-only" measures would represent an unwar­
ranted Federal regulation of self-expression,  abrogate constitutional rights 
to freedom of expression and equal protection of the laws, violate in terna­
tional human rights treaties to which the United States is a signatory, and 
contradict  the spirit of the 1 923 Supreme Court case Meyer v. Nebraska, 
wherein the Court declared that "The protection of the Constitution ex­
tends to all; to those who speak other languages as well as to those born 
with English on the tongue" . . . .  
H .R. Con. Res. 4 .  
74 See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English , 42 F.3d 1 2 1 7, 1 241 -42,  ajj'd, 69 F.3d 
920 (9th Cir. 1995) (en bane ) ,  vacated as moot sub nom. Arizonans for Official English v. 
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 ( 1 997) . The opinion holds, in ter alia, ( l )  that the statute is facially 
overbroad because it chills the speech of all Arizona public employees and officials and 
burdens their interest in  receiving information of non-English-speaking citizens; and (2 )  
that speech in a foreign language is not  unprotected expressive conduct. See id. at  1 229-30, 
1 232. 
7'0 See Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S .  at 43. 
76 957 P .2d 984 (Ariz. 1 998) ( en bane) ,  cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3436 ( 1 999) . 
77 R uiz joins Yniguez in  focusing on a violation of the right of elected officials and 
public employees to communicate with constituents and the public. See 957 P .2d at 998. 
But i t  also finds a violation of the First Amendment rights of "limited- and non-English­
speaking persons [ to ]  access . . .  information about the government when multi l ingual 
access may be available and may be necessary to ensure fair  and effective delivery of gov­
ernmental services to non-English-speaking persons." !d. at 997. 
78 The court applied stric t  scrutiny on the ground that the provision impinged on the 
First  Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances. See id. at 1 000. Because the 
State failed to establish a compelling state interest, the court held the provision violative of 
the Equal Protection Clause "because it impinges upon both the fundamental right to 
participate equally in the poli tical process and the right to peti tion the government for 
redress." !d. at 1 002.  
79 We would expect the Supreme Court defini tively to hold such restric tive Official 
English statutes unconsti tutional in line with Yn iquez rather than Ruiz, advancing a narrow 
First Amendment ground and avoiding the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. 
Under the time-honored preference for the narrow ground, avoidance of constitu­
tional challenges certainly would be sound l itigation strategy. The First Amendment 
framework allows only a tentative commitment to j uridical equal status for Latinos/ as. The 
im·alidating court need only accord Spanish equal status with English so far as it concerns 
direct, governmental prohibition of the act of speech. Although this matter has important 
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institutions may use direct mandate to suppress Spanish 
when the F1rst Amendment prevents the government from doing so.  
Employers often impose these language regulations on an absolute 
basis, requiring English speech at all times and in all circumstances 
regardless of whether the conversation includes customers, monol­
ingual English supervisors ,  or fellow employees. Employer justifica­
tions cite workplace safety, 80 simplicity, 8 1 transparency of 
administration,82 and professional appearances.83 Yet Workplace Eng­
lish regulations often lead to workplace conflicts ,  and numerous peo­
ple have reported disputes in recent years . 84 
implications for the Latino/a community's political rights, i t  need not entail affirmative 
recognition of equal status. An equal protection theory of invalidation,  in contrast, shifts 
the focus to the prevention of Spanish-language access to political participation and im­
plies an equal right to use political influence in the democratic process to secure Spanish­
language services. Government in Spanish would by implication join government in Eng­
lish in the universe of constitutionally sanctioned public goods. Even this l imited recogni­
tion of Latino/a equality may be difficult to extract in the present American context. Even 
less likely is substantive due process recogni tion of a right to a zone of protection for 
individual choice respecting language acquisition and usage. 
This Article's analysis of costs and rights applies regardless of the doctrinal  framework, 
however. In an ideal world, the courts would endorse a right to cultural and linguistic 
freedom under the Thirteenth Amendment, making reference to David Richards 's recenr 
exhaustive interpretation. See DAYlD J .  RicHARDS, WoMEN, GAYS, Ai\:D THE CoNSTITUTION 
( 1 998) . U nder Richards's moral and legal in terpretation, the Thirteenth An1endment in­
cludes and forbids all forms of moral slavery. See id. at 5 .  The concept of suspect classifica­
tion,  as reconstructed by Richards, condemns the "basis for law that reflects the unj ust 
degradation of a cul tural tradition (moral slavery) with which a person reasonably identi­
fies as central to their conscientious sense of personal and moral identi ty." !d. Further­
more, " [s] uch devaluation of identi ty is . . what unites on grounds of principle the 
interlinked grounds for the suspectness of religion, race, gender, and sexual preference." 
!d. This principle provides a powerful basis for constitutional condemnation of Official 
English and, more general ly ,  legal instantiations of the assimilation norm. Richards's in­
terpretation is the closest in the l iterature to our defense of the moral right of the person 
to be recognized as the self:authenticating source of the evaluation of her origin .  
80 See Carol Kleiman, Learning English Opens Doors for Ernj;loyees, CHI. TIUB . ,  July 9, 1 995, 
§ 8 (Jobs) , at 1 ;  David Poppe, Batchelor Defends English-Only Rule, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 28, 
1997, at  l C. 
8 1 See Kleiman, supra note 80; Diane E. Lewis, 5 Hotel Workers Quit, Cite English-Only 
Demand, BosTON GLOBE, Mar. 29, 1 997, at B3 .  
82 Employers have contended that Spanish-speaking employees can disrupt the work­
place by belittling other employees in conversations among themselves. See Gutierrez v. 
Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1 03 1 ,  1 042 (9th Cir. 1 988) , vacated, 490 U.S.  1 0 1 6  ( 1 989 ) ;  Long 
v. First Union Corp . ,  894 F. Supp. 933, 942 (E .D .  Va. 1 995 ) ,  ajf'd, 86 F.3d 1 1 51 (4th Cir. 
1 996) ; Dimaranan v. Pomona Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., 775 F. Supp. 338, 342 ( 1 991 ) ,  with­
drawn, No. 89 4289 ER (JRX ) ,  1993 \NL 326559 (C.D.  Cal. Mar. 1 7 , 1 993) . Employers also 
often mention the facilitation of supervision by non-Spanish-speaking supervisors. See Gu­
tierrez, 838 F.2d at 1 043; Garcia v. Gloor, 61 8 F .2cl 264, 267 (5 th Cir. 1 980) ; Dimaranan, 775 
F. Supp. at 342-43. 
83 See Garcia, 618  F.2d at 267 ( explaining the employer's claim that English-speaking 
customers object to hearing conversations they cannot understand) ; Lewis, sujHa note 8 1 .  
84 A t  least one ACLU lawyer alleges that incr<>ased reports could reflect increased 
employer usage of Workplace English. See Lewis, supra note 8 1 .  In the alternative, it  could 
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Meanwhile, the legal environment has turned markedly in the 
employers ' favor. Ten years ago, both the Equal Employment Oppor­
tunity Commission ( "EEOC") and the federal courts appeared to be 
in accord on the Title VII status of Workplace English. The EEOC 
Guidelines on Discrimination85 formally declared Workplace English 
a burdensome term and a condition of employment that disparately 
impacts a protected group and therefore presumptively violates Title 
VII 's  prohibition of national origin discrimination.86 Under this anal­
ysis, Workplace English regulations are sustainable only if an em­
ployer can make a showing of business necessity.87 Although leading 
federal cases initially adopted this position,88 the courts changed their 
view, rejecting the EEOC Guidelines and holding that broad Work­
place English rules do not automatically raise a prima facie case of 
reflect decreased tolerance on the part of Latinos/ as and others whose contacts the regula­
tions constrain (or perhaps an increased interest on the part of the press) . The Mexican­
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund and the ACLU have set up hot-lines to 
receive complaints. See Torres, supra note 5 1 ,  at 56. Protests now are common. See, e.g., 
Aly Colon, AOL Drops English-Only Policy, SEATTLE TIMES, July 25, 1 996, at A5 ( reporting a 
customer protest against English Only computer bulletin board) ; Ray Delgado & Julian 
Guthrie, Day Care Language Barrier: Spanish-Speaking Workers Claim They 're Forced To Use Eng­
lish on the Job, or Else, S.F. EXfuVIINER, Sept. 20, 1 996, a t  A4 ( reporting a worker protest) ; 
Lewis, supra note 8 1  (same) .  On a related front, there have been recent instances of pro­
tests by government employees in bilingual service situations who are fed up with doing 
much more work than similarly situated monolingual Anglos for the same pay. See William 
Booth ,  Growth in Bilingual jobs Brings Demands for lvlore Pay, WASI-L PosT, Jan. 1 9, 1 996, at A3; 
Clemence Fiagome, Bilingual job, Higher Pay, CHRJSTLA..N SCI . MoNITOR, Jan. 26, 1 996, at 3; 
Charles Strouse, Big Lang·uage Debate Pits English-Only vs. Bilingual, FRESNO BEE, Jan . 2 1 ,  
1996, a t  Al l .  
85 Guidelines on D iscrimination Because of National Origin,  29 C.F.R. § l 606.7 (a) ­
(b) ( 1 998) . 
86 See id § l 606. 7 ( a) .  
87 SeeYee v. Runyan, No. 0 1 942 1 85,  1 995 WL 441 49 (E .E .O.C. )  Uan. 27, 1 995) ( apply­
ing Guidelines) ; Decision 83-7, 3 1  Fair Empl. P rac. Cas. (BNA) 1 861 , 1 862 ( 1 983) ( sus­
taining limited English Only rule on safety grounds) ; Decision 8 1 -25, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Cas. (BNA) 1820, 1 82 1-22 ( 1 98 1 ) (applying Guidelines against absolute rule ) ;  Decision 73-
0479, 1 9  Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1 788, 1 804 ( 1 973) ( requiring business j ustification 
for absolute rule ) ;  Decision 7 1 446, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1 1 27 ,  1 1 28 ( 1970) 
(same ) .  
88  See Gutierrez v .  M unicipal Court, 838 F.2d 1 03 1 ,  1 039-40 (9th Cir. 1 988) ( holding 
that employee allegation of harm to identi ty sufficed to support preliminary i njunction 
and c i ting EEOC Guidelines with approval) ,  vacated, 490 U.S. 1 0 1 6  ( 1 989 ) ;  Saucedo v. 
Brothers Well Serv. , Inc . ,  464 F. Supp. 9 1 9, 922 (S .D.  Tex. 1 979) ( ruling that an English 
Only rule has disparate impact  and therefore raises the issue of business necessity) ; see also 
Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp . ,  8 1 3  F.2d 1 406, 1 4 1 0- 1 1  (9th Cir. 1 987) (sustaining radio sta­
tion order of English-language broadcasting format because the order was business re­
lated) . But see Garcia, 618  F.2d at 270 ( holding that no discrimination is presen t  when 
employees can speak English but choose not to do so) . 
Gutierrez makes the important point that bilingualism does not terminate the l ink be­
tween language and cultural identity. See 838 F.2d at 1 039. For further discussion, see 
Kenneth L.  Karst, Paths to Belonging: 17le Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N .C .  L. REv. 
303, 361-69, 376-77 ( 1 986) ; Bill Piatt, Toward Domestic Recognition of a Human Right to Lan­
guage, 23 Hous. L. REv. 885, 898-900 ( 1 986) . 
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disparate impact. 89 Under this approach, to make a prima facie case,  
the plaintiff must prove the existence of a discriminatory impact-that 
the adverse effect is significant and that the general employee popula­
tion is not affected to the same degree.9o 
This judiciary change signals shifting concerns. Degradation car­
ries decisive weight under the EEOC approach,  resulting in findings 
j·� that language prohibition is national origin discrimination.9 1  Today, 
courts reject this idea that expressions of ethnicity have Title VII sig­
nificance .92 Costs matter more in this analysis. Accordingly, courts 
cite Title VII 's  legislative history for the proposition that employer in­
ternal affairs should be interfered with as little as possible .93 Ascrip­
tions of fault also have shifted under the current approach.  Courts 
see complainants in these cases, who by definition are bilingual, as 
possessing a choice about complying with Workplace English regula­
tions.94 Once the court concedes the legitimacy of the employer' s 
forcing this choice, employee volition emerges as the determinant fac­
tor in the case.95 In effect, courts believe that employees who can 
speak English, who know the rule,  and who choose to speak Spanish96 
get what is coming to them. 
The cost and volition components of the assimilation norm have 
found their way into Title VII case law. The third member of the nati­
vist trio-the foreign language threat to American civilization-does 
89 See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1 480, 1 490 (9th Cir. 1 993) ;  Long v. First 
Union Corp . ,  894 F. Supp. 933, 943-44 (E .D.  Va. 1 995 ) ,  affd, 86 F.3d 1 1 5 1  (4th Cir. 1996) ; 
cf Dimaranan v. Pomona Valley H osp. Med. Ctr . ,  775 F. Supp. 338, 343-44 ( 1 99 1 )  ( finding 
that an employer's administrative justification blocks inference of disparate treatment) , 
withdrawn, No. 89 4289 ER (JRX) ,  1 993 WL 326559 (C .D .  Cal. Mar. 1 7, 1 993) . 
90 See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1 486. 
91 See Adams, supra note 1 7, at 903-04; see also Jorgensen, supra note 1 7, at 4 1 4  (discuss­
ing cases that connect English Only and discrimination) ; Kinner, supra note 1 7, at 874-75 
(arguing that English Only impacts non-English speakers ) .  
92 Compare Gutienez, 838 F.2d at 1 039-40 (adopting the EEOC's business necessity test 
for evaluating Title VII claims) , with Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1 487 (noting that Title VI I does 
not protect workplace expressions of cultural and ethnic identity) . 
93 See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1 489-90;  see also Long, 894 F. Supp. at 941  ( characterizing 
and rejecting the notion that the ability to converse in any language is a "p·rivilege of em­
ployment" subject to employer control (emphasis added) ) .  
94 See, e.g. , Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1 487 ( "The bilingual employee can readily comply 
with the English-only mle and still enjoy the privilege of speaking on the job." (emphasis 
added) ) .  
95 For challenges to the behavioral notion that bilingual speakers always have a 
choice, see Adams, supra note 1 7, at 906-07; Mirande, supra note 1 7 ,  at 94-98. Others chal­
lenge the notion that mutability of the characteristic should determine a Title  VII case in 
the defendant's favor. See Jorgensen, supra note 1 7 ,  at 4 1 9-20; Kinner, supra note 1 7, at 
899 , 903. On the importance of mutability in Title VII cases, see Peter Brandon Bayer, 
JV!utable Chamcteristics and the Definition of Discrimination Under Title VII, 20 U.C. DAvis L. 
REv. 769 ( 1 987) ; Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious Accom­
modation Provision to Redeem Title VU, 76 TEx. L. REv. 3 1 7, 33 1-32 ( 1 997) .  
96 See Spun Steak, 998 F .2d  a t  1 487;  Jurado v .  !::!even-Fifty Corp . ,  8 13  F.2d 1 406, 1 4 1 0  
(9th Cir. 1 987) ; Garcia v. Gloor, 6 1 8  F.2d 264, 269-70 (5th Cir. 1980 ) .  
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not yet explicitly figure into the j urisprudence. But i t  would be rash 
to predict its permanent absence. 
II 
THE EcoNOMICS OF AssiMILATION: LANGUAGE AcQUISITION, 
DISCRIMINATION, AND SPONTAi'IEOUS ORDER 
In this Part, we use economic theory to inspect the soundness of 
the three concepts-threat, cost, and volition-that support English 
Only.97 
This inspection confirms that multiple languages do result in ad­
ded costs for a given economy. But it also shows that these costs fall 
most heavily on minority-language speakers themselves .  As a result, 
individual economic incentives should keep overall costs at a manage­
able level, even given significant immigration. Moreover, enclave set­
tlement and bilingualism-each of which nativists call a threat-are 
rational (and unthreatening) when viewed economically. The analysis 
also shows that Official English does lend itself to a rational expecta­
tions description, but not as a first-best means to the end of Latino/ a 
assimilation. From a public choice perspective, Official English re­
sembles Jim Crow legislation designed to advance the collective inter­
ests of the Anglo m�jority either by discouraging Latino/ a settlement 
in the enacting state or by impeding the existing Latino/a commu­
nity' s access to public services and employment. 
The economic analysis ,  however, does not necessarily imply fric­
tionless repetition of the turn-of-the-century assimilation pattern. Ra­
tional members of an ethnic minority will migrate from enclaves only 
to the extent that the wider economy offers superior economic oppor­
tunities.9B It is not at all clear that these opportunities exist for many 
Latinos/as.  Moreover, the economic theory of discrimination pro­
vides no credible assurance that market forces will provide a solution 
to this problem in either the short or long run. In fact, the empirical 
evidence supports a prediction that Latinos/as will face m ore virulent 
and persistent discrimination than that which their turn-of-the-cen­
tury immigrant predecessors facecl .99 
97 I n  doing so. we do not wish to claim that microeconomic theorv should provide the 
exclusive meth odological framework for analysis of problems of assimilation and discrimi­
nation.  For criticisms with which we concur, see Glen n C. Loury, Discrim ination in the Post­
Civil Rights Em: Beyoncl i'vlarket Interactions, 1 2  J. EcoN. PERSP. 1 1 7,  1 1 8-23 ( 1 998 ) .  vVe draw 
on microeconomics here because i t  occupies a privileged role i n  today's legal policy dis­
course and comes to bear on the subj ect  matter with surprising results. 
98 CJ Hing, supra note 1 5 ,  at 891 ("In nw experience, immigrants who reside or work 
in ethnic enclaYes do so less out of ideological reasons than out of comfort or afforclabi l ity 
. . . . '' ) 
99 For a review of the empirical li terature o n  Lati nos/ as, see s·1.pm note 3 and accom­
panying text. v\'e h<n·e come across no empirical studies comparing the experiences of the 
different immigran t  generations with discrimination . 
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The character and intensity of Latino/a economic incentives to 
assimilate 100 depend on the character and intensity of discriminatory 
behavior by Anglos. If public policy problems arise because Latinos/ 
as maintain stronger home country ties than members of previous im­
migrant generations, Anglos can blame themselves. This analysis 
reveals a clear message for legal policy: a legal regime seeking to en­
courage assimilation should open opportunities for immigrants 
through the subsidy of English-language education or through the 
scrupulous enforcement of Title VII. English Only sticks are the tools 
of segregationists. 
A. Official English, Cost Economics, and Immigrant Incentives 
1 .  Language Difference, Its Costs, and Their Allocation 
Language differences make exchanges more expensive . Con­
sider, for example, a prospective trade between t\-vo monolingual par­
ties who speak different languages. Language acqms1t10n or 
translation costs necessarily will accrue if the parties consummate this 
trade. Like costs of transportation, the parties typically will pass these 
costs along to the parties' ultimate customers. 1 0 1 Compare the afore­
mentioned trade with a situation in which producers in a small coun­
try with its own language wish to enter the market in a big country 
with a different language . Here, the big country's market will deter­
mine the terms of trade, including the language . It follows that trad­
ers in the small country bear all the costs (and gain the benefits )  of 
learning the big country' s language . 1 02 
If we now take an additional step and consider international 
trade in a world of multiple languages, we see that a transnational 
lingua franca-presumably a big country' s  language-will reduce 
costs . The small country' s traders in particular will benefit from the 
lingua franca's emergence because it  gives them across-the-board ac­
cess to multiple markets at the cost of learning only one additional 
language. 1 03 The lingua franca is thus a public good. The distribu­
tion of the costs associated with the lingua franca, however, is une­
qual. Those whose first language is not the lingua franca, such as the 
small country's traders, bear the cost of learning it to reap the gains of 
the transactions that a common language facilitates. Residents of the 
big country ( or countries, as is the case with English today) for whom 
1 00 See suj;m Pan I. A. 
I O l  See Alben Breton & Peter Mieszkowski, The Economics of Bilingualism., i n  THE PouT-
IC-\L Eco:-;m·IY oF F1sC.-\L FEDER.-\LIS\1 261, 264 (vVallace E. Oates ed. ,  1 977) . 
! 02 See id. at 264-65. 
l 03 See id. at 262 ( noting that i nvesting in a second language can be profi tabl e if the 
countrv can realize gain to offset the investment) . They save the cosl'> of investing in acqui­
sition of multiple foreign languages. 
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the lingua franca is their native tongue receive a free ride. Some have 
referred to this premium that native lingua franca speakers enj oy rela­
tive to other language speakers as the "seigniorage of language . " 1 04 
The main points revealed by this pattern of costs and benefits and 
of seigniorage and peonage also apply to foreign language speakers 
within a national economy. The general currency of the native lan­
guage, like the lingua franca of global trade, is a cost-reducing public 
good because it  lowers transaction costs for the population as a 
whole . 1 05 Members of linguistic  minorities ,  like the small country' s  
traders, must bear the cost of  learning the native language if  they wish 
to access the benefits of full participation in the national economy. 
2. Public Policy Implications of Language Economics 
A justification for Official English from a social engineering per­
spective follows from the above-described economics. If general flu­
ency in the native language is a public good, then the pattern of usage 
of English in the United States is a legitimate issue of state concern. A 
large , geographically concentrated ,  Spanish-speaking minority 
amounts to an internal trade barrier that increases transaction costs in 
the wider economy. 106 In the long run,  the mandatory provision of 
public services in English reduces both trade frictions and the result­
ing costs by encouraging Latinos/as (and members of other  language 
minorities) to learn English and by hastening the disappearance of 
minority languages. l07 
This social welfare calculation needs unpacking. The calculation 
begins with the economic assertion that linguistic sameness lowers 
(and difference increases) costs. Supporters make two further asser­
tions. First, mandated sameness enhances our economic welfare. Sec­
ond, the polity as a whole therefore prefers mandated sameness. We 
question and negate the first of these assertions in the subsection that 
follows . 1 08 We address the second assertion in this subsection, asking 
tw·o questions. First, we question the positive correlation the calcula­
tion draws between cost-reductive homogeneity and real-world polit­
ical preferences. Second, we question the safety of assuming that 
sameness always lowers costs ,  suggesting that at some point one must 
1 04 Jd. at 266-67, 270. 
1 os See id. at 268. 
106 CJ Frank M. Lowrey, IV, Comment, Through the Looking Class: Linguistic Separatism 
and National Unity, 41 EMORY LJ. 223, 262-63 ( 1 992) (noting that the linguisti c  divisions 
among Canadian provinces have become so intense that after NAFTA, "trade with the 
Uni ted States [ might] become[  ] a more viable option than the economic integratior. of 
the provinces" ) .  
1 07 The argument in the text is a markup o f  Donohue 's time-based defense of Title VII 
against Becker's free market story of the inevitable disappearance of discrimination . See 
infra notes 1 85-90 and accompanying text. 
1 08 See infra Part I I .A.3. 
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concede the possibility that diversity can have positive consequences 
for social welfare . 
a. Homogeneity and Preference Aggregation 
The proposition that sameness lowers costs is not unique to the 
economics of language acquisition. This assumption also provides a 
basis for the following disturbing proposition, 109 which is fundamen­
tal to the economic theory of discrimination: 1 1 0 If sameness lowers 
costs, then all other things being equal, segregation enhances social 
welfare. Just as a common language lowers the cost of a discrete 
trade,  other common traits such as race,  gender, ethnicity, and social 
class lower costs and facilitate more complex, long-term cooperative 
economic relationships. Accordingly, one can expect people of simi­
lar types and tastes to sort themselves among different producing or­
ganizations-the narrower the variance of preferences within the 
firm, the cheaper the process of firm decision making. l 1 1  This sorting 
may even appear within complex, h ierarchical organizations in which 
the costs of group decision making do not loom large . Since such 
organizations segment themselves into teams performing different 
functions, we can expect to see segregation along lines of race,  lan­
guage , and gender. 1 12 It follows that mandated integration under Ti­
tle VII is costly. 
The same cost analysis that justifies government suppression of 
Spanish also justifies the repeal of Title VII. 1 1 3 This Title VII analogy 
1 09 The economics of this proposition stands apart from its questionable ethical pos­
ture. This calculation seizes on a point of ethnic and cultural difference, finds it to be 
mutable and costly, and concludes that a state-sponsored program of eradication advances 
social welfare. The majority trait automatically becomes the uniform standard in the cost­
reductive homogeneous regime. 
1 1 0  See infra Part I I .C.2 .  
1 1 1  See EPSTEIN, supra note 38, at 61-67; Cooter, supra note 39, at 1 42 .  
1 l 2  See, e.g. , Finis Welch, LaboHVIarket Disoirnination: An Interpretation of Income Dijferences 
in the Rural South, 75 J .  PoL. EcoN. 225, 230-3 1 ,  238 ( 1967) (arguing that forced integration 
of a multiracial workforce generates external inefficiencies,  which decrease productivity) . 
1 l 3 This is the famous argument of Richard Epstein. See EPSTEIN, supra note 38, at 61-
70,  76-77. 
The arguments for the suppression of Spanish and for the repeal of Title VII are 
distinguishable on the ground that education can change language whereas race, gender, 
and ethnic origin are immutable characteristics. But the distinction loses much of its co­
gency on closer inspection. Mutability, by i tself, does not disqualify a trait from state-spon­
sored protection. Religion is mutable too, yet a cost-based state policy encouraging non­
Christians to convert arguably would not advance social welfare. At the same time ,  lan­
guage is only mutable to some extent. The economic l i terature of discrimination makes 
reference to sociolinguistics to expand the definition of l inguistic difference. It is not just 
the words one speaks, but one ' s  verbal and nonverbal communicative apparatus-posture, 
gesture, eye contact, and inflection-that counts .  See Kevin Lang, A Language Theo·l)' of 
Discrimination, 1 0 1  Q.J. EcoN.  363, 366-68 ( 1 986) . h America there is a majority " code," 
the native speakers of which are whi te ,  Anglo, middle-class males. Others-women, Afri­
can Americans, Latinos/as, and other immigrants-all have to learn and use this code to 
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highlights several factors that complicate and weaken the welfare cal­
culation behind Spanish suppression. Repealing Title VII to reduce 
transaction costs would have substantial distributive consequences­
white men would win ,  and everyone else would lose. This redistribu­
tion of wealth and privilege would not reflect the preferences of soci­
ety as a whole, even if it were possible to prove that its cost reductive 
effect would cause the gross national product to rise.  This divergence 
between the economic optimum and the politically preferred result 
probably would persist even if the proponent of repealing Title VII 
shows that the benefit of a higher gross national product evenhand­
edly would trickle down among the losers ,  so the worst off would be, 
in the aggregate, at least as economically well off as before. Since los­
ing still hurts, it remains plausible that the class of losers might prefer 
to be less well off in a more equal society. 
The numbers work differently, of course ,  with Spanish suppres­
sion. The losers in this context are Latinos/as and other non-English 
speakers, for whom public services become less valuable. English 
speakers are the winners. Yet one still plausibly can posit a preference 
for sharing within the wider class of Title VII beneficiaries. The ra­
tionality for sharing is akin to the labor organizer's  appeal to long-run 
benefits of solidarity in the face of a short-run urge to give in to the 
employer. Prisoners '  dilemma literature presents a formal economic 
showing of this possibility. l 1 4 New evolutionary models illustrate the 
rationality of such cooperation by positing, first, a class of prisoners' 
dilemma players who over time have managed as a group to overcome 
the temptation to defect and achieve optimal ,  collective ends, and sec­
ond, another class of players who interact with the members of the 
cooperative group, but who always favor defection. 1 1 5 With infinite 
repeat plays, these models show that cooperation within the group is 
possible despite the presence of the class of opponents who are ever 
ready to divide and conquer. 1 1 6 In accordance with those models,  in­
tragroup cooperation may be benefit maximizing on an individual ba­
sis across the various classes of Title VII beneficiaries. 1 1 7 
succeed. Given the subtleties involved, it is not  at all clear that a reconstructed majority 
identity is within the reach of most of these outsiders. 
1 1 4 See, e.g., BRIAN SKYRMS, Evou.!Tro:-.� OF THE SoCL'li. Co:-:TR.-\CT 58-59 ( 1 996) . Skyrms 
offers a prisoners' dilemma analysis contrasting one cooperator in a universe of defectors 
to an identifiable group of cooperators in a un iverse of defectors. The solo cooperator is 
el iminated by the defectors. The group of cooperators playing with one another wil l  be 
evolutionarily fit, however. Defectors wil l  not be eliminated completely but will prey on 
the edge of the group of cooperators. 
11 5  See id. at 59. 
1 1 6 See id. (noting that although defectors "will persist as predictors on the periphery," 
cooperators will survive ) .  
1 1 7 CJ id. (discussing the possible benefits of in tragroup cooperation to increase "aver-
age fitness" over defectors) . 
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b.  Homogeneity and Diversity as Tradeoffs 
A second infirmity in the welfare calculation lies in its assump tion 
that homogeneity is absolutely cost-beneficial. This supposition ne­
glects the complex, real-world interrelation between sameness and dif­
ference. Within producing organizations, for example,  diversity of 
traits and tastes makes available different perspectives and talents that 
increase the likelihood of solving complex problems. Any accompany­
ing increases in communication costs accordingly may find justifica­
tion in the improved quality of results. 1 1 8 More broadly, most people 
have a taste for difference, albeit to widely varying degrees. Two pref­
erences operate-one for cost-reducing homogeneity and the other 
for costly but stimulating difference 1 1 9-with the inevitable tradeoffs 
between cost and variety depending on subjective tastes and differing 
from individual to individual. 
A second-best world presents no basis for predicting that the 
tradeoffs emerging in an environment of free individual interaction 
will be optimal. Barriers including information asymmetries,  free­
rider problems, and strategic concealment will prevent optimal out­
comes. 120 A number of possibilities result. One is that the assimila­
tion story, despite its currency, describes a suboptimally homogenous 
social result. In a dynamic environment, the societal whole could 
emerge better off if Latinos/ as were left to make their own decisions 
about learning English and acquiring Anglo cultural traits. If slow as­
similation resulted from their decisions, Anglos would gain the spil­
lover benefit of closer proximity to Latin American culture . Cultural 
acquaintance in turn would generate valuable opportunities for An­
glos in the markets of increasingly robust Latin American economies. 
In this scenario ,  Official English perversely channels Anglos toward 
costly insularity whereas investment in cross-cultural learning opportu­
nities provides the more promising means to an optimal assimilation 
equilibrium. 
c .  Nonconvergent Preferences 
A more complex outcome emerges if we take this line of reason­
ing in a different direction and consider the possibility that an eco­
nomic optimum with a multicultural inclination may not be the 
politically preferred result. Assume the present equilibrium IS eco-
1 1 8 See Cooter, sujJra n ote 39, at 1 42 .  
1 1 9 Education about the incidents of other cultures and languages lowers costs of cross­
cultural communication and thus e n h ances an individual 's  ability to e nj oy the ditieren t  
traits o f  others.  For a formal model suggesting this conclusion,  see ·william Brei t  & Joh n  B .  
Horowitz, Discrimination and Diversity: i'vlarket a n d  Non-i'vfarket SP!tings, 8 4  PLIB. CI-IOICE 63, 65-
70 ( 1 995) . 
1 20 See id. at 68. 
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nornically suboptimal due to h omogeneity. Under these Circum­
stances, government intervention to move society toward a more 
optimal level of interaction can find justification in theory. In prac­
tice, however, a policymaker considering this intervention would en­
counter the enormous problems of ascertaining the location and 
cause of the suboptimal equilibrium and of articulating a strategy for 
shifting it to a point of greater preference satisfaction.  
Suppose the policymaker undertakes a state-of-the-art study, con:­
cluding that Americans have a deficient level of multicultural knowl­
edge. In response, the policymaker proposes an extensive and 
mandatory program of multicultural education for grades one 
through twelve. 1 2 1 This program, by hypothesis, would make most 
members of the majority economically better off in the long run .  Nev­
ertheless , it is likely that the program would be politically infeasible in 
many American communities due to a perception (if not a reality) of 
excessive governmental invasion of the individual ' s  zone of choice 
with respect to matters of acculturation. 1 22 
Suppose we modify the program by employing a carrot-and-stick 
approach. This approach could, for example, make eligible for fed­
eral college loans only those students who have received the approved 
multicultural education. We suspect that critics would denounce as 
coercive even this modified program. Without enforceable govern­
ment action to the contrary, cultural preferences could continue to 
diverge from the economic optimum. 1 23 
The carrot-and-stick approach to multicultural education is diffi­
cult to distinguish from Official English if one narrowly views it as a 
1 2 1  A full exploration of multicultural programs in the schools is beyond the scope of 
this Article. We note that particularly in New York City these programs have gained accept­
ance as crucial for what it means to treat students from different  cultural backgrounds as 
equal . One curren t  aspect of the debate around these programs in New York con cerns the 
point in time at which schools should teach Spanish to all students. This debate recognizes 
that Anglo children can be economically disadvantaged in cities with a substantial Latino/ a 
minori ty if they arc not fluent in Spanish. See generally NATH."'N GLAZER, vVE ARE ALL MuL­
TICULTURALISTS Now ( 1 997) (discussing the changing face of America and how i t  will influ­
ence our future) .  
1 22 Cf Lisa D .  Del pit, The Silenced Dialogue: Power and Pedagogy in Educating Other People 's 
Children, in BEYOND SILENCED VoicEs: CL-\SS, R.\cE, At'JD GENDER IN U:-:rTED STA.TES ScHOOLS 
1 1 9 ,  1 2 2-23 (Lois Weiss & Michelle Fine eels. , 1 993) (asserting that issues of power are 
enacted in classrooms and that school cul tures accordingly are based on the cul tures of the 
middle and upper classes) . 
1 2 3  Breit and Horowitz suggest that this sort of mandatory education could have the 
projected effect of shifting cultural preferences to their economic optimum in  the small­
numbers situation of a university curriculum. See Breit & Horowitz, sujna note 1 1 9, at 68-
70. They qualify the suggestion, however, by noting that " there is no certainty that a con­
sensus will arise over the optimal amount of 'familiarity' [with other cultures] to impose" 
and no way to assure that a given policy assures the intended results. !d. at 69-70. 
\ 
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legal manipulation of a zone of choice for cultural freedom. 1 24 Like 
the education program, Official English manipulates tradeoffs be­
tween cost incurrence and cultural attachment. By withholding pub­
lic services from Latinos/ as, Official English induces a higher level of 
English-language cost incurrence than otherwise would occur, making 
it cheaper for Anglos to deal with Latinos/ as.  Of course ,  Official Eng­
lish also could yield economic benefits to affected Latinos/ as . But be­
cause Latinos/as would not have pursued these benefits voluntarily, 
they would be indistinguishable from those yielded through man­
dated multiculturalism. 
d. Summary 
Thus far,  our analysis does not preclude the possibility that Offi­
cial English could be Kaldor-Hicks efficient. 1 25 This possibility follows 
from the numbers: the majority gets the benefit of lower costs at the 
minority's expense. But the questioning process we have undertaken 
does highlight some significant counterfactual possibilities.  Rational 
solidarity across society's many minority groups could lead an overall 
maj ority to prefer forbearance of the economic benefit of state-im­
posed monolingualism. In the alternative , monolingualism entails op­
portunity costs that could alter the Kaldor-Hicks bottom line . 
3.  Economic Incentives To Learn English 
Let us assume that Anglo resistance to Spanish language and cul­
ture is embedded and that the opportunity costs of monolingualism 
L 24 This Article 's  analysis does signal a point of material distinction,  however. One can 
state the point both in the economic terms of this Part I I  and in terms of the ideal of the 
free person we describe in Part III .  
Economically, the difference l ies  in asymmetric incentives. When Latinos/as have a 
powerful economic incentive to acculturate themselves as Americans, Anglos do not per­
ceive immediate gains from multicultural education, even if these gains accrue as a long­
run proposition. One can defend from a welfare perspective mandatory multicultural edu­
cation,  but cannot defend Official Engl ish . 
From the poin t  of view of the ideal of the free person ,  the difference between a mul­
ticultural educational program, fairly designed and applied, and an English Only regime is 
that the first is inviting while the second is degrading. Part III indicates that groups and 
individuals only are reasonable to the degree they recognize that they cannot  bind others 
to norms to which they themselves would not agree to be bound. See infra n otes 29 1 -94 and 
accompanying text. This recogni tion implies a basis for defending multicultural education 
as a means to the end of equal dignity, even when mandated. Although society must allow 
to all groups cultural expression, there is always a danger that the maj o ri ty culture simply 
can assert its superiority, thus violating the conditions of reasonable cooperation.  Mul­
ticultural education protects against this danger. 
1 25 That is,  i t  results in most people being better off even as i t  leaves some people 
worse off, with the aggregate gain  outweighing the aggregate loss. See, e.g. , Kenneth G. 
Dau-Schmidt, Smoking in the Washroom of the Chicago School: A Reply to Crespi, 22 LAw & Soc. 
lNQ. 1 7 1 ,  1 77-78 ( 1 997) ( "A policy is said to be Kaldor-Hicks efficient if those who are 
made better off by the policy would pay more for adoption of the policy than those who are 
hurt by the policy would pay to avoid adoption of the policy." ) . 
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appear to be low so Official English seems to be welfare improving on 
a Kaldor-Hicks analysis. The economic analysis is still not complete .  
I t  remains to be seen whether the likely level of  Latino/ a acquisition 
of English is appreciably lower in a world of free choice than it would 
be in a world in which the government wields a stick. If Latinos/as 
are not less likely to acquire English skills by free choice, then Official 
English with its intrinsic capacity for perverse effects may not be worth 
the trouble .  
The analysis that ascribes desirable cost attributes to  a lingua 
franca implies that members of linguistic minorities have a high-pow­
ered incentive, which derives from the employment market, to learn 
the majority language. 1 26 Since entry of members of the linguistic mi­
nority into a given firm or workplace means additional communica­
tion costs ,  all other things being equal , a majority-group employer 
either will avoid hiring members of the linguistic minority or, if it 
chooses to integrate, will pay minority employees less to compensate 
for the resulting increase in costs (and decrease in profits ) not in­
curred by competing segregated firms . 1 27 The monolingual members 
of the minority group will "bear the cost of intergroup communica­
tion . " 1 28 Employment discrimination will persist while the communi­
cation costs of integration persist. 1 29 Members of the language 
minority may solve the problem of employment discrimination by in­
curring the cost of learning the majority language. In effect, for any 
given skill level the minority must make a greater human capital in­
vestment than the majority . l3o 
Despite their greater investment, members of the language mi­
nority may encounter obstacles on the road to wage parity. Assume, 
for example , that newly bilingual members of the minority seek the 
same wage as members of the majority but that monolingual members 
of the language minority offer the same labor for a lower wage . The 
bilingual and maj ority language speakers now could find themselves 
competing with minority monolinguals . Although the costs of com­
munication dictate that a rational employer will prefer a monolingual 
workplace , they do not necessarily determine the language chosen. 
An employer could invest in learning the minority language or in pay­
ing a higher wage to a bilingual supervisor or supervisors , enabling 
itself to employ a workforce monolingual in the minority language at 
1 2 6 See s upra n otes 1 0 2-04 and accompanying text. 
1 2 7 Th is model assume s  the absence of regulation successfully mandating equal pay for 
equal work. 
1 28 Lang, sujmt note 1 1 3,  at 373; see also Welch,  supra note 1 1 2,  at 2 3 1  ( arguing that the 
minoritY bears the cost of integration in the workplace) . 
1 29 See Breit & Horowi tz, supra note 1 1 9 ,  at 7 1 -72 ( noting that as the transaction costs 
of inte raction , such as communication problems, decrease, i n teraction wil l  increase ) .  
1 30 See Lang, s upm n o te 1 1 3,  at  376. 
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the lower wage. The higher the number of workers per bilingual su­
pervisor, the more viable this option becomes for the employer. 1 3 1 
Despite this caveat, incentives to learn the majori ty language 
should remain powerful . 1 32 The prevailing cost bias in favor of segre­
gated, monolingual workplaces assures the strength of those incen­
tives. The minority can retain its language and its economic 
independence only by restricting itself to segregated workplaces and 
to teams that are monolingual in the minority language . Segmenta­
tion into certain occupations may result, along with overcrowding in 
each . 1 33 Stratification also will occur because highly verbal manage­
rial and professional opportunities will be unavailable to members of 
the language minority. 1 34 Latinos/as understand this reality very 
well . 1 35 In the words of the Dominican singer Juan Luis Guerra: "pues 
no hablamos ingles/ni a la Mitsubishi/ . . .  ni a la Chevrolet. " 1 36 
B .  Official English,  Sorting, and Rent Seeking 
1 .  Latino and Latina Sorting 
The economic factors that create a powerful incentive for Eng­
lish-language acquisition also explain immigrants ' tendency to settle 
in enclave communities. A simple jurisdictional sorting model illus­
trates this point. 1 37 Assume an English-speaking federation with ten 
states of equal size, each with an international port of entry. At t=O a 
Latino/a minori ty has immigrated into the federation,  has settled 
evenly across the ten states ,  and now constitutes ten percent of the 
federation's population Y '�8 Assume further that ( 1 )  movement within 
the federation is costless, (2 )  it has unlimited job opportunities,  (3 )  all 
the Latinos/ as have become citizens, and ( 4) most Latinos/ as are bi-
1 3 1  The company wil l  have to compensate the bilingual supervisor for her special skill , 
of course. See generally Booth, supra note 84 ( reponing that bilingual and monolingual 
supervisors have demanded higher pay to speak Spanish) .  Because the cost advantage is 
greatest with a l ow supervisor-to-worker ratio, one would expect this pattern, and any re­
sul ting negative impact for English-acquisition incentives, to show up with respect to j obs at 
lower skill levels. See Lang, supra note 1 1 3 ,  at 373-74. 
1 32 Studies show that there is l ittle labor-market substitution between n ew arrivals and 
earlier immigrant generations. See infra note 270 and accompanying text. 
1 33 See Breton & Mieszkowski, sujna note 1 0 1 ,  at 270; Lang, supra note 1 1 3 ,  at 73-74. 
1 34 See Breton & Mieszkowski, supra note 1 0 1 ,  at 270. 
1 35 A5 the above evidence on English-language education indicates. See supra notes 54-
57 and accompanying text. 
1 36 JuAN LUis GuERRA, El Costa de la Vida [ The Cost of Living] , on AREITO ( Polygram 
Latino 1 992)  ( translating as "Since we don' t  speak Engl ish , got no Mitsubishi ,  got no 
Chevrolet" ) .  
! 37 For a review of the sorting literature, see Wil l iam W. Bratton & Joseph A. Me­
Cabery, The New Economics of jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second­
Best ·world, 86 Gw. L.J. 201 ,  239-43 ( 1 997) . 
1 :�s Assume further that no state has a special geographic connection to the home 
country and that each immigrant has made an individual decision and had no network ties 
to the federation .  
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lingual but prefer to speak Spanish because doing so facilitates 
cheaper communication. Given these assumptions, the model 
predicts that between t=O and t=l the Latinos/as will resettle ,  concen­
trating their population in a smaller number of states. 
Geographical concentration of the Latino/a population gener­
ates additional opportunities for transacting business in  Spanish , cre­
ating both employment and trade opportunities for which a relative 
disability with English presents no barrier. As the Latino/a popula­
tion concentrates, some Anglos may respond by moving out of the 
target states. 1 39 Eth nic and cultural bias provides one reason for such 
a reaction-Anglos apparently prefer to live in areas populated exclu­
sively by other Anglos. 1 40 Economics provides another reason for this 
behavior. As an Anglo's  immediate neighborhood populates with 
Spanish speakers , the seigniorial value of English declines, even 
though national economic integration and dominant Anglo numbers 
assure that it never completely disappears in any political subdivision. 
This simple sorting model predicts, all other things being equal, 
that Latino/ a concentration eventually will create a voting majority in 
one state . 1 41 This model depends on heroic assumptions and accord­
ingly is only suggestive . It nonetheless suffices to explain why Lati­
nos/as have not settled evenly across the United States and, so long as 
there continue to be substantial numbers of first-generation immi­
grants , why they cannot be expected to disperse from enclave commu­
nltles. For first-generation Latinos/as speaking limited English, 
opportunities in  enclaves will be superior to those in Anglo communi­
ties . 1 42 The model therefore requires us to qualify our description of 
a high-powered incentive to learn English . But the qualification is mi­
nor: an integrated national economy and an overwhelming Anglo ma­
jority ensure that English-language and bilingual employment 
opportunities will outnumber Spanish-language opportunities, even 
for those who live in enclaves .  
Latino/a sorting results from both economic incentives and cul­
tural preferences.  Since sorting coexists with an independent incen­
tive to learn English, it implies a long-term barrier to assimilation only 
to the extent that the Anglo community takes actions that retard the 
1 39 Cf David P. Kasakove, Note, New York State Association of Realtors, I nc .  v. Shaffer: 
When the Second Circuit Chooses Between Free Speech and Fair Housing, Who Wins ?, 61 BROOK. L. 
REv. 397, 422 ( 1 995) (discussing " tipping," which " is the sociological term used to refer to 
the critical point at which whites . . .  leave a community, because of black entry into the 
neighborhood"' ) .  
1 40 The population-sorting l i terature provides ample empirical support for this point. 
See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 1 37, at 242 & n . 1 69. 
1 4 1  Concentration in two of the ten states and a sl ight increase in the population of 
Latinos/as could mean a voting maj ority in two states. 
1 4 2  CJ Lang, supra note 1 1 3, at 370 ( noting that minori ty-language speakers l ikely wil l  
experience "occupational segregation") . 
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ordinary course of population dispersion in pursuit of economic op­
portunity. The model suggests that English Only legislation conceiva­
bly could serve just such a purpose. 
2. English Only as an Entry Barrier 
Return to t=O in the original ten-state model. A state wishing to 
discourage Latino/ a in-migration due to sorting can make itself mar­
ginally less desirable by enacting a restrictive Official English statute. 
If public services in Spanish remain available in the other states,  143 
then the Official English state has erected an effective barrier against 
Latino/a in-migration. Indeed, assuming costless movement, the state 
can expect out-migration of its present Latino/a population.  Of 
course, because the other states are free to copy the legislation, the 
long-term efficacy of this strategy remains questionable .  A "race to 
the bottom" could result, with all states adopting Official English stat­
utes . 1 44 Ironically, in that event, the Latinos/as have a heightened 
incentive to concentrate in enclave settlements .  Once all states adopt 
Official English, each potential target state offers the same set of costs 
and benefits to Latino/a citizens. Only a sorting process can differen­
tiate the states again:  a solid Latino/a majority in one state supplies 
the means to remove even a consti tutional Official English mandate . 
3. English Only and Domestic Interest Groups 
We can further modify this public choice analysis of Official Eng­
lish to explain domestic politics in a state with a Latino/a minority 
and a restrictive Official English statute . Hypothesize a single state 
and assume the following: ( 1 )  a ten percent Latino/a minority, many 
but not all of whom are bilingual, ( 2 )  an even distribution across the 
state of Latinos/ as, (3 )  no bilingual Anglos, ( 4 )  residents who all are 
citizens and taxpayers, (5 )  no possibility of in-migration of Latinos/ as 
from other states, (6)  a monolingual provision of public goods and 
services, and (7 )  a government operating in pursuit of the public in­
terest, meaning it distributes the return of the highest possible supply 
of public goods as equally as possible to all taxpaying citizens. 
Keeping the aforementioned assumptions in mind, consider the 
following scenario . The government concludes that the provision of 
monolingual services is inconsistent with its notion of the public inter­
est and decides to provide bilingual public goods and services to the 
H3 This conclusion rests on the assumption that complete information is available to 
al l  sides. 
1 44 This race to the bottom is analogous to the result that follows from applying juris­
dictional competition theory to welfare provisions for the poor. In the standard model, 
wealth redistribution must proceed at the centralized, federal l evel because the states have 
an incentive to encourage poor people to move out by lowering the level of the welfare 
provision. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 1 37,  at 2 1 7-3 1 .  
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extent feasible. An anti-Latino/a political entrepreneur responds by 
putting a restrictive Official English provision on the ballot. The An­
glos have a cost incentive to vote in favor of the initiative. To the 
extent that bilingual government imposes additional costs on all tax­
payers solely for the purpose of providing Latinos/ as an effective pro 
rata return for taxes paid, self-interested Anglos have no reason to 
support bilingual government. 
Even if the marginal increase in cost that bilingual government . 
causes is quite low, a discrete class of Anglos will have a h igh-powered 
incentive to work to insure the measure 's  success. This class will con­
sist of present and prospective Anglo public employees.  If the state 
provides bilingual public services, then bilingual Latinos/as will have 
a qualification advantage with respect to j ob openings. The degree of 
that advantage will depend on the scope of the decision to provide 
bilingual services, the distribution of the Latino/a p opulation,  and 
the presence or absence of economies of scale in the providing of 
services. If the population of Latinos/ as is evenly distributed and the 
government provides all public services through small offices spread 
thickly across the state, bilingual Latinos/as could have a qualification 
advantage for virtually every public position. If the distribution of La­
tinos/ as is uneven and economies of scale have encouraged the devel­
opment of a small number of large government offices spread 
unevenly across the state, then bilingual ability will not be a universal 
qualification .  Even so ,  the decision to provide bilingual services still 
could disrupt extremely the expectations of entrenched Anglo civil 
servants. 
4. English Only and Local Politics 
The two models presented thus far-the multijurisdictional-mi­
gration modeP45 and the public-service provision modeP 46-can com­
bine to thicken this rational expectations description of state politics . 
For example, consider a state with multiple internal tiers of elected 
government-counties, cities, and towns. Assume further  that the 
state has a substantial Latino/a minority that remains well short of a 
state-level voting majority, but through the ordinary process of settle­
ment and sorting has gained voting majorities in several political sub­
divisions within the state . To the extent that officials in those political 
subdivisions have discretion regarding the public-service provision,  
Anglo public employees in those districts will have an incentive to 
work for Official English at the state level. There , Anglos still consti­
tute a majority, even as the Latinos/as elect their own to the local city 
hall, sheriff s  office, and school board. A state-level statute, if restric-
1 45 
1 46 
See supra P art II.B . l .  
See supra Part II .B.2-3. 
-
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tively drafted, can hard-wire English language seigniorage at the local 
level. 1 47 
5 .  Summary: The Multijurisdictional and Single-State Models 
Official English emerges from this public choice analysis as the 
functional equivalent of Jim Crow legislation. l 48 In the multijurisdic­
tional-migration model, Official E nglish operates as a tariff that dis­
courages in-migration of a minority that the maj ority deems 
undesirable. To the extent that Latino/a in-migration implies (or is 
perceived to imply) increased labor-market competition for certain 
Anglos, 1 49 we find a textbook example of a privileged group using law 
to perpetuate its economic dominance and to retard the operation of 
market forces that impair its position.  In the single-state model, Offi­
cial English affects Latino/a subordination more directly, if only with 
respect to access to public j obs and services.  In this scenario, the ma­
jority again uses its legislative power in the Jim Crow tradition to con­
tain a minority's economic aspirations. 
1 47 The back-and-forth experience of Dade County, Florida with Offi cial English re­
flects this scenario. See supra note 68. But it is important to note that elected officials  are 
only beginning to feel Latino/ a voting power, even within the enclave states. See, e.g., Todd 
S. Purdum, California G. O.P. Faces a Crisis as Hispanic Voters Tum Away, N .Y. TIMES, Dec. 9 ,  
1 997, at A1 (noting that politicians are beginning to recognize the importance of appeal­
ing to growing numbers of Latino/a voters) . The following chart catalogs the number of 
Latino/ a elected officials at the state and local levels in 1 985 and 1 994: 
Public Official 1 985 1 994 
State executives and legislators 1 1 9  1 99 
County and municipal officials 1 ,3 1 6  2, 1 97 
Judicial and law enforcement 5 1 7  65 1 
Education and school boards 1 , 1 85 2 ,4 1 2  
Total 3, 1 47 5 ,459 
SouRCE: HISPA!'>�IC ArviERJCA!"'S: A STATISTICAL SouRCEBOOK, supra note 50, at 97.  
Some have attributed past electoral failures for Latinos/ as to lmv levels of voter regis­
tration and turnout. See, e.g. , Charles S. Bullock, I I I  & Susan A. MacManus, Stmctuml Fea­
tures of Municipalities and the Incidence of Hispanic Councilmernbers, 71  Soc. Sci . Q. 665, 678 
( 1 990) (showing that given adequate voter participation, Latino/a representation on city 
councils grows as the percentage of Latinos/ as in the population grows under a variety of 
structural arrangements ) .  In 1 992, the national Latino/a registration level was 35 .0%, 
compared with 70. 1 %  for whites; turnout was 28.9%,  compared with 63.6% for whites. See 
HISPANIC AMERICANS: A STATISTICAL SouRCEBOOK, supra note 50, at 98. Gerrymandering 
also has occurred, most famously in Los Angeles. Compare Chavez, supra note 61 , at 47 
(noting that a court order created a voting district to give Latinos/as a seat on the L.A. 
County Board of Supervisors) ,  with Hiopanics: More People than Power, supra note 49, at 32 
(discussing a justice Department suit alleging that voting districts were deliberately drawn 
in L.A. County to exclude Latinos/ as and other minorities from power) . 
1 48 See Sole, supra note 2 1 ,  at 828-29. 
1 49 This proposition is controversial when advanced in the context of Latino/a immi­
grants. See generally DEFREITAS, supra note 6, at 209-5 1 ( concluding that some jobs are lost, 
but not nearly as many as advocates of closed borders allege ) .  
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Admittedly, these public choice scenarios cannot afford an exclu­
sive account of Official English . Nativist ideology has independent 
and powerful causal force , particularly in a time when norms have 
arisen to foreclose direct expression of racist impulses in public dis­
course. 1 50 The scenarios show how neatly these impulses dovetail with 
rent incentives.  
C. Employment Discrimination and Latino and Latina Incentives 
The assimilation story cannot plausibly be applied as a norm ab­
sent a concomitant and credible promise of equal economic opportu­
nity. It is, after all ,  economic opportunity that gives immigrants 
incentives to disperse from enclaves and to complete the pro cess of 
Americanization . Without equal economic opportunity, it is not clear 
why we should expect dispersion and full assimilation. 
But why should discrimination block application of the assimila­
tion norm to today's  Latinos/as when early twentieth-centu ry eastern 
and southern European arrivals also suffered and overcame signifi­
cant national origin and religious discrimination? We suggest two an­
swers. First, two wrongs do not make a right. It is one thing to intone 
that immigrants should "pay their dues" when the dues are the costs 
of learning English to achieve equal economic opportunity. It is quite 
another to require them to undergo a vicious hazing process of indefi­
nite duration. Gloria Anzaldua describes a youth 's  experience of An­
glo linguistic terrorism: 
I remember being caught speaking Spanish at recess-that was 
good for three licks on the knuckles with a sharp ruler. I remember 
being sent to the corner of the classroom for " talking back" to the 
Anglo teacher when all I was trying to do was tell her how to pro­
nounce my name. "If you want  to be An1erican, speak 'An1erican. '  
If you don ' t  like it, go back to Mexico, where you belong." 1 5 1 
Anzaldua's experience is not unique. 1 52 
Second, it is not at all clear that the concept of "national origin" 
discrimination, closely tied to those early twentieth-century immi­
grants, adequately describes the discrimination barrier confronting 
Latinos/as .  Mexicans, Puerto Ricans , Cubans, Dominicans,  and Cen­
tral and South Americans descend from Native Americans and Afri­
cans as well as from Europeans. In their responses to the 1 980 census, 
1 50 See Tatalovich,  supra note 67, at 8 1 -82 (making this point with admirable rigor) . 
1 5 1  GLORIA fu'iZALDUA, BORDERLANDS/ L".. FRONTERA 5 3  ( 1 987) . 
1 52 Rosa Rosales, a spokesperson for the League of Uni ted Mexican Ci tizens, recalls 
going to school under a regime that " threatened to have our mouths washed out with soap 
and our knuckles hit with rulers when we spoke Spanish in the hallways. "  Stefanie Soott & 
Nicole Foy, Judge 's English Decision Rapped, SAN A'ITONIO ExPRESS-NEws, Aug. 30 ,  1 995,  avail­
able in 1 995 v\'L 9500 1 54 .  
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forty percent of Latinos/ as classified themselves as neither black nor 
white but as "other ." 153 These responses suggest that for many Lati­
nos/as, their "visibility" stems less from their lack of acculturation 
than from their skin color. 154 
Discrimination-whether ethnic, racial, or a combination-pre­
vents assimilation. 155 To the extent that Latinos/as face discrimina­
tion, the appropriate analogy for the Latino/a enclave is not the turn­
of-the-century immigrant community, but the Mrican American com­
munity of the contemporary inner city. 1 56 Of course, an acknowledg­
ment that Latinos/as are targets of discrimination requires further 
examination of our description of a high-powered Latino/ a incentive 
to acculturate as Americans. Discrimination reduces returns on 
human-capital investments ,  and reduced projected returns lower the 
present value of a proposed investment. A persistent residual income 
differential due to discrimination means that a rational Latino/a 
makes a smaller human-capital investment than a similarly situated 
white Anglo. Accordingly, Latinos/as have a reduced incentive to ac­
culturate. In addition, the Latino/a perception that heightened dis­
crimination barriers exist outside of enclave communities lessens the 
incentive to disperse in search of economic opportunity. 1 57 If maxi­
mal assimilation is the objective , Official English is the wrong tool.  A 
vigorously enforced antidiscrimination law will be more successful. 
1 .  Evidence of Economic Discrimination 
Statistical evidence strongly suggests that markets convert per­
sonal skills into economic outcomes differently for Latinos/as than 
for white Anglos. The studies we describe below detail adverse eco-
1 53 Forty-four percent answered white, and 3.9% said black. See Clara E. Rodriguez, 
The Effect of Race on Puerto Rican Wages, in HISPANICS IN THE L>\BOR FoRCE 77, 77 (Edwin 
Melendez et a!. eels . ,  1991 ) .  
1 54 Nativist regulation, viewed from this perspective, stems less from a need to see ac­
tual assimilation and integration than from a racist need to ascribe fault . 
1 55 For a discussion of racism as a motivating force in  contemporary debates about 
immigration policy, see Kevin R. Johnson ,  The New Nativism: Something Old, Something New, 
Something Borrowed, Something Blue, in IMMICRr\NTS OuT! , supra note 1 1 ,  at 1 65,  1 73-8 1 .  
1 56 See Clark, supra note 4 1 ,  a t  598-99 (showing considerable evidence of economic 
segmen tation among immigrant.-; in d ifferent California counties and suggesting that local­
ization of some Latino/a groups may be contributing to the creation of an immigrant 
underclass similar to the existing localized African American pattern ) .  
The Latino/ a enclave, like the African American enclave, emerges as a place of safety 
from the world outside: "All brown all around, we are safe. But watch us drive into a neigh­
borhood of another color and our knees go shaki ty-shake and our car windows get rolled 
up tight and our eyes look straight. Yeah. That is how i t  goes and goes."  CISNEROS, supra 
note 60, at 29. 
1 57 See Hing, supra note 1 5 ,  at 89 1 .  
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nomic treatment of Latinos/ as through the use of varied data sets and 
different methods of investigation. 1 58 
Latinos/as consistently earn less than whites , and little progress 
in closing the historic income differential has occurred during the last 
thirty years . 1 59 The average family income of Latinos/ as was 69 .2% of 
whites ' in 1 973,  and it fell to 62 .9% in 1 987. By 1 993 ,  however, it 
climbed to 70.0% , 160 which was roughly the same as the 1 973 level .  
Language barriers and other educational and skill differentials par­
tially explain these figures. The studies yield various quantifications 
of the impact of these differences. Scholars have found that language 
abilities account for income differentials ranging from as little as four 
percent to as much as thirty-three percent. 1 6 1 Differences in the par­
ticular samples that the studies compare and in the meth odologies 
that the studies apply explain the variations. 
But language barriers, skill differentials, and other productivity 
factors do not completely explain the differential .  Studies that adjust 
1 58 The text paraphrases Glenn Loury's description of the literature respecting African 
Americans. See Loury, supra note 97, at 1 1 8 ;  see also William A. Darity Jr. & Patrick L. 
Mason,  Evidence on Discrimination in Employment: Codes of Color, Codes of Gender, 1 2 ]. EeoC\. 
PERSP. 63, 63 ( 1 998) (surveying the l i terature as a whole and concluding that " [ t] he evi­
dence is ubiquitous" that discriminatory treatment in the labor market contributes greatly 
to the racial and gender disparity in the American economy) . 
1 59 See DEFREITAS, supra note 6, at 56-57 & tbl.3. l .  
1 60 See HISPANIC  AMERIC<>u"ls: A STATISTICAL SouRcEBOOK, supra note 50, at 1 47. The 
complete raw incomes for 1 980 and 1 993 are as follows: 
Latino/a V\1hite 
Median 
1 980 22,591 30,92 1 
1 993 22,886 32,960 
Mean 
1 980 27,594 36,264 
1 993 30,291 43,285 
SouRcE: U.S. BuREAU OF THE CENsus, CuRRENT PoPuLATION REPoRTs: lNC01viE, 
POVEKIY, A.N D  VALUATION OF NONCASH BENEFITS-1993 at 5 tbJ .2 ,  reprin ted in 
HISPANIC A:viERJC"u'JS: A STATISTICAL SouRCEBOOK, supra note 50, at 1 47. 
1 6 1  See Gilles Grenier, The Effects of Language Characteristics on the Wages of Hispanic-Amnc 
ican Males, 1 9 ]. HuM. REsouRCES 35, 50 ( 1 984) (concluding that "language attributes," like 
speaking Spanish during childhood, may account for up to one-third of income differen­
tials between Latino and non-Latino males) ; Cordelia vV. Reimers, Labor Niarket Discrimina­
tion Against Hispanic and Black Nien, 65 REv. Eco0: . & STAT. 570, 576-77 ( 1 983) (finding that 
poor English accounts for 1 8 %  lower earnings for Puerto Ricans and four percent to 1 4 %  
for other main Latino/a groups) ; Cordelia Reimers ,  The Wage Structure of Hi;panic lvlen: 
Implications for Policy, 65 Soc. Sc1. Q. 401 ,  407-l l ( 1 984) [ hereinafter Reimers, Wage Struc­
ture] (estimating wage functions for Latinos) ; see also ScHOEN! ET AL. ,  supra note 3, at 28-29 
( finding that differences in completed education could explain one-half of the 1 990 wage 
gap of Mexican immigrants in California and one-third of the wage gap of Central Ameri­
can immigrants in California) . 
One can infer that continued arrival of large numbers of non-English-speaking La­
tino/a immigrants retards the rate of closure of the Latino/a-\vhite Anglo income differen­
tial , obscuring economic gains made by existing residents. 
1 
1 
I 
1 1 
I 
l 
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for differentials in human capital find a residual gap . DeFreitas ' s  
study, for example, compares the incomes of white ,  Puerto Rican, and 
Mexican males. 1 62 All of the men he sampled had been born in the 
United States, were fluent in English,  and had lived in the same met­
ropolitan area for at least five years . 1 63 The study found that Puerto 
Ricans ' income was 62 .6% of whites ' ,  and Mexicans'  income was 
74.7% of whites' . 1 64 It also found that for college graduates, Puerto 
Ricans earned 70 .0% of what whites earned, while for Mexicans ,  the 
percentage was 74.5% . 1 65 When the study controlled for age as well as 
education, Mexicans fared better, earning 95 . 1 %  as much, while Pu­
erto Ricans earned 92 .6% as muchJ66 Other studies have concluded 
that the residual differential, an indirect measure of the impact of 
discrimination on wages, for Puerto Ricans is 18 .0%. 1 67 The literature 
offers a range from nine to fifteen percent for the residual differential 
in income between Mexicans and whites. 1 68 
Comparative figures on "returns to schooling"-percent figures 
representing the change in earnings associated with each additional 
year of schooling-that Schoeni, McCarthy, and Vernez generated 
point in a similar direction. 1 69 In 1 970, the figure for United States 
natives was 7 .9%,  and by 1 990 it had increased to 1 0 .3% . 1 70 The com-
1 62 See DEFREITAS, supra note 6 ,  a t  7 1 -73. 
1 63 See id. at 7 1 . 
1 64 See id. at 7'2 tbl .3.7. 
1 65 See id. 
1 66 See id. (showing the result> for persons with over 1 6  years of education who were 
ages 30-34) .  
1 67 See Reimers, Wage Structure, supra note 1 6 1 ,  at 407, 4 1 3  (noting also a 1 '2 %  differen­
tial for other Latinos/as and a six percen t  differential for Mexicans) . 
1 68 Studies show human-capital, adjusted earnings differentials between white and 
Mexican American males as fol lows: Jeremiah Cotton, Nlore on the "Cost" of Being a Black or 
Mexican American Male Worker, 66 Soc. SCI . Q. 867, 883 ( 1 985) ( reporting  a treatment dif­
ferential of 1 4.6%,  using 1980 data) ; James D .  Gwartney & James E. Long, The Relative 
Earnings of Blacks and Other Niinorities, 3 1  lNous. & L\B. Rn. REv. 336, 34'2-44 & tbl .4 ( 1978) 
(reporting a residual differential of nine percent, using 1 970 data) ; Dudley L. Poston , Jr. et 
al . ,  Earnings Differences Between Anglo and 1\.iexican American lvfale Worke�s in 1 960 and 1 970: 
Changes in the "Cost " of Being Niexican American, 57 Soc. SCI. Q. 6 18 , 6'25 ( 1 976) ( reporting 
1 3.46% to 1 6.57% depending on age , using 1 970 data) ; Patricia A. Taylor & Susan Walker 
Shields, Nfexican A mericans and Employment Inequality the Federal Civil Service, 65 Soc. Scr. Q. 
38 1 ,  384, 386 ( 1 984) (finding a statistically significant difference in Mexican American and 
Anglo salaries in the civil service, with only Gvo-thirds of the variance being explained by 
employment characteristics) ;  Naomi Turner Verdugo & Richard R. Verdugo, Earnings Dif­
ferentials A mong ivfexican Ame1ican, Black, and White 1\!Jale Workers, 65 Soc. Scr . Q. 4 1 7, 4'24-'25 
( 1 984) (noting that discrimination accounts for 19% of the gap, using 1 981  data) . But  see 
Stephen J .  Trejo, H'hy Do iVIexican Americans Earn Low Wages ?, ] 05 J .  PoL EcoN. ] '235, 1 245 
( 1 997) (showing that Mexican Americans earn low wages due to human-capital deficien­
cies and not clue to smaller labor-market rewards) . 
1 69 See ScHOEN! ET AL. , supra note 3, at 55-56 & tbl .4 .6 .  
1 70 See id. at 56 tbl .4.6.  
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parable 1 970 figure for Mexican Americans educated in the United 
States was 6 .4%,  but by 1 990 it had decreased to 5 .3 % . 17 1 
These figures,  which are the product of regression analyses of 
census or personnel data, 1 72 fall short of affirmative proof of em ploy­
ment discrimination because they do not foreclose the possibility that 
other factors, such as secular changes in the relevant job  base1 73 or 
information problems concerning immigration status, 1 74 also contrib­
ute to the residual income gap. 1 75 Therefore, at best they represent 
an "upper bound" measure of discrimination's  effects .  1 76 A different 
and less well-developed line of empirical research ,  h owever, ap­
proaches the problem from a different angle to produce affirmative 
showings of discriminatory behavior. Audit studies of m atched white 
and Latino/a job seekers reveal statistically significant differentials in 
job search results for whites and Latinos/as. 177 
1 7 1 See id. Meanwhile, the 1 990 figure for immigrants born in Canada and the United 
Kingdom, as wel l  as educated in the United States, was 8.3% and for immigrants born in 
Japan, Korea, and China, as wel l  as educated in the United States, was 1 3 . 1  %. See id. at 56-
57 & tb1 .4.6. 
1 72 See id. app. at 69-74 (describing the data and regression analyses for the data we 
reference) . 
1 73 See DEFREITAS, supra note 6, at 89. 
1 74 See ScHOE"-'I ET AL. , supra note 3, at 58 (" [T]he wage penalty for being undocu­
mented may be as high as 7-1 0  percent. " ) . Schoeni, McCarthy, and Vernez also mention a 
special statistical discrimination factor-the difficulty of distinguishing l egal from il legal 
immigrants. See id. To the extent that i l legals present legal risks to the employer, one can 
expect difficulty in effecting informational separation to depress wages for all Mexicans. 
See id. at 57-58. Alberto Davila ,  Alok K. Bohara, and Rogelio Saenz make the same point. 
See Alberto Davi la et al., Accent Penalties and the Earnings of Jv[exican Americans, 74 Soc. SCI . 
Q. 902, 903-05 ( 1 993) . Their study finds that independent of English-speaking proficiency, 
heavily-accented Mexican Americans earn significantly lower wages than nonaccented 
Mexican Americans. See id. at 905. In  addition, they find that accen ted M exican Ameri­
cans pay more for their accents than do accented Germans and I talians. See id. at 9 1 4. 
1 75 For further discussion, see James J. Heckman, Detecting Discrimination, 1 2  J .  EcoN. 
PERSP. 1 0 1 ,  1 03-07 ( 1 998) (warning against reading discrimination into the disparity in 
hiring of whites over blacks when interpreting the residual wage gap ) . 
1 76 For a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the methodologies employed, 
see Darity & Mason, supra note 1 58 ,  at 67-68. 
1 77 See, e.g. , Marc Bendick, Jr. et al . ,  JV[easuring Employment Discrimination Through Con­
trolled Experiments, in NRJCA.N A.rviERJCANS AND PosT-lNDUSTRL;\1. l..ABoR iVlARKETS 77, 88-89 & 
tbl .3  (James B. Stewart ed. , 1 997) (finding a rate of discrimination in excess of 20% in 
Latino/a-Anglo pairings, with Latinos being nearly three times more likely to experience 
discrimination than Latinas) ; Michael Fix et al . ,  An Overview of Auditing for Discrimination, in 
CLEAR AND Col'\'VINCING EVIDENCE: MEASUREMENT OF DisCRJMINATION IN AM ERI CA l ,  22 
tbl . l . 3  (Michael Fix & Raymond J .  Struyk eds. ,  1 993) ( finding that Latinos are three times 
as l ikely as non-Latino whites to experience employment discrimination ) ;  see also 
Genevieve M. Kenney & Douglas A. Wissoker, An Analysis of the Con-elates of Discrimination 
Facing Young Hispamc job-Seekers, 84 A.vl. EcoN. REv. 674, 676-77 ( 1 994) (finding that the 
differential in response narrows as the Latinos go from the inquiry and preinterview stage 
to the postimerview job-offer stage) .  The Latinos who get through the screening process 
do better at the latter stage, although there still is a statistically significant differential in 
job offers. See id. An inference of crude statistical discrimination arises-employers are 
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An additional body of studies also warrants mention . This body 
of work investigates whether skin color contributes to the wider pat­
tern of discrimination. One study, 178 whose findings some have con­
troverted, 1 79 looks for differences in earnings among groups of 
Mexican Americans divided according to their skin color-light, me­
dium, and dark. The study adj usts for human-capital differentials 
and concludes that the darkest, most Native American-looking group 
members earn substantially less than their lighter-skinned counter­
parts . 1 80 Another study compared the earnings of New York City Pu­
erto Ricans who identify themselves as "other" in census reports with 
those who identify themselves as "white . " 1 81 With everything else con­
stant, males who identified themselves as nonwhite earned eight per­
cent less than those who identified themselves as white . 1 82 Anzaldua 
echoed the studies and the controversies they engender: "I am visi­
ble-see this Indian face-yet I am invisible .  I both blind them with 
more accepting once they see that the Latino applicant does not have expected u ndesir­
able qualities. 
Some have criticized audit s tudy methodology. See Heckman, supra note 175 ,  at 107-1 1 
(emphasizing that unobsen·ed variables can cause h i ring differentials to be due to factors 
other than discrimination) . But see Kenneth J. Arrow, VVhat Has Economics to Say About Ra­
cial Discrimination ?, 1 2 ]. Eco:--�. PERSP.  9 1 ,  93 ( 1 998) (acknowledging the criti cism but con­
cluding that " [ w] hile one can always invent hypotheses to explain away these results, there 
is really no reason not to draw the obvious conclusions" ) ; Darity & Mason ,  supra note 1 58, 
at 79-81 (answering Heckman and describing an audi t  study designed to meet many of the 
criticisms of the audit technique) .  
1 78 See Edward E .  Telles & Edward Murguia, Phenotypic Discrimination and Income Differ� 
ences Arnong J'viexican Americans, 7 1  Soc. SCI. Q. 682 ( 1 990) . 
1 79 See A.lok K. Bohara & Alberto Davila, A Reassessment of the Phenotypic Discrimination 
and Income Diferences Among iVIexican Americans, 73 Soc. Sc1 .  Q. l l 4 ( 1 992)  (subjecting the 
same data to a different statistical methodology and finding no support for the finding of 
discrimination ) .  But cf Edward E .  Telles & Edward Murguia, The Continuing Significance of 
Phenotype Among lviexican Americans, 73 Soc. SCI.  Q. 1 20 ( 1 992)  ( concluding that a l inear 
regression model is better suited to an analysis of Mexican American earnings and that 
Boharo and Davila's results do not alter the finding that dark phenotype translates into 
lower earnings for Mexican Americans) . 
1 80 See Telles & Murguia, supra note 1 78, at 693. Telles and Marguia are surprised by 
the lack of a significant differential between the light group and the medium group.  See id. 
They suggest that the medium group members were heavily concentrated in both the con­
struction industry and in unions, compensating for the greater labor-market endowment of 
the light-skinned group members .  See id. They also suggest that given the prevalence of 
low skills across all three groups, the light and medium group members did not face fur­
ther discrimination within their already circumscribed labor markets. See id. at 694; see also 
Carlos H.  Arce et a! . ,  Phenot_vpe and Life Chances Among Chicanos, 9 HISPfu'liC J. BEH.W. SCI. 
1 9, 25-30 ( 1 987) (dividing their sample into two phenotypical dimensions, skin color and 
physical features, and finding that Chicanos with lighter skin and European features had 
h igher socioeconomic status) . 
1 8 1 See Rodriguez, supra note 153 ,  at 86. 
1 82 For females, the differential was not statistically significant. See id. at 86-88. For 
another study, see ·william Darity Jr. et  al., ExjJlaining Dif erences in Economic Performance 
Among Racial and Ethnic Groups in the USA: The Data Examined, 55 AIVI. J .  Eco:--� . & Soc. 41 1 ,  
422 ( 1 996) ( reporting, on basis of 1 980 and 1 990 census data, that black Latinos/ as suffer 
proportionately more income loss due to differential treatment than do white Latinos/ as) .  
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my beak nose and am their blind spot. But I exist, we exist. They 'd 
like to think I have melted in  the pot. But I haven ' t, we haven ' t. " 1 83 
2. The Economic Theory of Discrimination 
The hypothesis that discrimination negatively impacts Latino/a 
incentives to assimilate also must endure testing in the framework of 
the economic theory of discrimination. This theory poses three com­
peting explanations for discriminatory behavior: taste, cost, and asym- · 
metric information. 1 84 The three explanations in turn provide 
conflicting long-term proj ections of the degree to which the market 
will correct discriminatory behavior and therefore draw conflicting 
conclusions about both Latino/a assimilation incentives and the need 
for (and justifiable scope of) antidiscrimination legislation.  The fol­
lowing analysis shows that the asymmetric information approach,  
which projects that discrimination will persist over the long term, 
most accurately describes the situation of Latinos/ as and other immi­
grant groups . 
a. Taste 
Gary Becker's  famous theory of discrimination1 85 as a product of 
a "taste for separation" is the foundation of the economics of discrimi­
nation. Under Becker's theory, discrimination results from a taste for 
segregation that employers and employees hold. 1 86 If this taste is 
widespread, the target minority receives a lower wage in  the market­
place and finds employment only with the least prejudiced employ­
ers. 1 87 These employers benefit from a cost advantage because 
society's widespread taste for segregation depresses wages for minority 
labor. In Becker's neoclassical setup , the nondiscriminatory employ­
ers employ this cost advantage to drive discriminatory employers from 
the market, and the wage differential falls over time. 1 88 The market's 
eventual equilibrium always is nondiscriminatory; hence, antidis-
1 83 A"1ZALD0A, supra note 1 5 1 ,  at 86. 
1 84 As the discussion will show, the cost and asymmetric information explanations are 
closely related because asymmetric information implicates costs. 
1 85 See GARY S. BECKER, THE EcoNOi'vliCS OF D ISCREvl!NATIOi': (2d eeL 1 97 1 ) .  
1 86 See id. at l4 .  
1 87 See id. at 1 07 .  
1 88 See id. at 43-45; Kenneth J Arrow, 1Vfodels offob Discrimination, in RACIAL D ISCRIMINA­
TlO:" 1 :--: Eco:-;o;-..IIc LIFE 83, 86-87 (Anthony H .  Pascal ed. ,  1972 ) .  In a perfect market, a 
person having a special preference must pay for i ts satisfaction, and any employee demand­
ing special working conditions is paid less; thus, segregation is a higher cost mode of pro­
duction.  See Cooter, supm note 39, at 1 39-4 1 .  We should note that discrimination 
disappears in the Becker model " [o] nly if the supply of entrepreneurship is perfectly elas­
tic in the long run at zero price, so" that employers have no discretionary income with 
which to enjoy their taste for discrimination. Heckman, supra note 1 75 ,  at 1 1 1 - 1 2 .  
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crimination legislation is unnecessary189 and is merely a transfer 
mechanism that causes efficiency losses. 190 
b .  Cartels) Castes) and Dynamic Models 
Subsequent variations on taste theory destabilize these emphatic 
free market conclusions . Becker's model left the economic commu­
nity with two disquieting alternative possibilities. 1 91 On the one hand, 
American history thus far has falsified the prediction that market 
forces will eliminate discrimination. 1 92 Indeed, under the model, "it 
is unclear how [a pattern of] discrimination could have arisen in the 
first place." 193 In the alternative, an admission of pervasive racism 
among white Anglos could sustain the theory. 1 94 If the taste for dis­
crimination is very widespread, its cost implications become trivial, 
and the market corrective never operates. Unsurprisingly, the aca­
demic literature has not much pursued the latter proposition. 195 
1 89 See Donohue, supra note 37, at 1 42 1-22. Ironically, taste theory indirectly confirms 
the above analysis of Official English. See supra Pan I I .A. l ,  2 (a) - (b) . Just as labor-market 
incentives assure that Latino/ a immigrants will learn English, price competi tion  in product 
markets causes discrimination barriers to disappear over time. In addition, a strong nega­
tive implication arises for applications of Title VII to Workplace English: just as the free 
economy eventually solves any assimilation problems, i t  also provides solutions for any 
problems respecting employer-employee relations. If Workplace English is cost effective, it 
will survive and redouble the Latino/a educational incentive; if i t  is  not, Workplace English 
employers will be driven out. 
1 90 See Shelly J. Lundberg & Richard Startz, Private Discrimination and Social Intervention 
in Competitive Labor l'viarhets, 73 A:v1. Eco1'. REv. 340, 340 ( 1 983) ( noting  the often-made 
argument that antidiscrimination laws cause efficiency losses, but concluding that this leg­
islation is desirable under some condi tions) ; see also Cooter, supra note 39, at 1 56 (arguing 
that antidiscrimination laws can "benefit a social group by reducing competition from 
others") . Note, however, that the assertion is not that "discrimination is efficient." As be­
tween an economy without discrimination and an economy with discrimination, u ti l i ty and 
income are comparable, but the ultimate question as to whether resources are being put to 
their most productive uses is indeterminable .  Answering that question requires a moral 
determination about the appropriateness of faci l itating the discriminatmy taste. See Stew­
art Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination �jjicient ?, 76 AM . Eco"-:. REv. 228, 228 ( 1 986) . 
1 91 Arrow objects to taste the01y from a different  perspective. For him,  it "under­
mine [s] " rational choice themy by introducing a variable in  addition to profits for the 
employers. Arrow, supra note 1 77, at 94-95.  
1 92 See Cooter, supra note 39, at 1 50.  
193 Lundberg & Startz, supra note 1 90, at 340; see also GEORGE A. i\J.;.ERLOF, The Econom­
ics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales, in AN EcoNOM IC THEORisT's BooK OF 
TALES 23, 34 ( 1 984) (" [T] here are a fair number of cases where opportunities have arisen 
for deviants to break the caste code and make economic profits, with consequent rise in 
their social position and erosion of the caste taboos. " ) . A negative implication for the 
robustness of neoclassical microeconomic methodology also resulted. See Lang, supra note 
1 1 3 ,  at 365. 
1 94 See Lang, supra note 1 1 3, at 364-()5. 
1 95 The exception is Michael Selmi , Testing for Equalil)': Me1it, Efficiency, and the Affinna­
tive Action Debate, 42 UClA L. REv. 1 25 1 ,  1 284-89 ( 1 995) , which draws on psychological 
literature to suggest that unconscious discrimination will be a persistent phenomenon and 
will resist market correction. Selmi 's  analysis leads to a conclusion similar to that of Cor­
nell & Welch, supra note 39, which we discuss infra text accompanying notes 250-G8. Race 
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Some have employed a cartel analogy to bring the model into 
rough alignment with American history. 1 96 This analogy explains that 
racial maj orities collaborated to exclude competition from other 
groups and to shift the cost of discrimination to these groups, j ust as 
producers often conspired to form cartels to escape the discipline of 
price competition. 197 Since cartels are unstable, the maj ority pro­
cured legislation-Jim Crow legislation-to reduce the risk of defec­
tion. 1 98 These discriminatory statutes provided a narrow j ustification 
for antidiscrimination legislation. This legislation legitimately can 
serve the limited purpose of repealing or preempting Jim Crow con­
straints on free markets. 1 99 Once the legal support of the discrimina­
tory price conspiracy vanishes, however, price competition will assure 
due employment for qualified people.200 According to this logic ,  
Congress should repeal Title VII .  
Two additional lines of  analysis depart from this narrow view of 
Title VII while adhering to the neoclassical projection of long-run 
market elimination of discrimination . The first accepts the Becker 
model, but recasts it in a stochastic time frame. The analysis asserts 
that the market corrective requires an intolerably long time period to 
operate successfully. Title VII is justified as an interim measure be­
cause it drives discriminators from the market more quickly than non­
intervention by lowering their profits .20 1  
The second line of analysis expands on the cartel analogy. It 
posits normatively sustained group solidarity in the racial mcy ority and 
attempts to show how, assuming a spontaneous-order scenario,  the 
norm can sustain discrimination in the face of cost pressures. A ques­
tion arises about showing a spontaneous order: How can collusion 
among millions of white employees who have no recourse to the legal 
system enforce a segregationist norm that is contrary to the interest of 
employers?202 To answer this question, the leading model posits a 
critical theory also predicts this result while suggesting that the matter should be pursued. 
See, e.g., Derrick Bell, After We 're Gone: Prudent Speculation on America in a Post-Racial Epoch, 34 
ST. LoUis U. L.J. 393, 402 ( 1990) ( asserting that " the mass of whites . . .  wil l  accept large 
disparities in economic opportunity in comparison to other whites as long as they [ retain] 
a priority over blacks") .  
1 96 See Cooter, supra note 39, at 1 50-57. 
1 97 See id. at 1 50. 
1 98 See id. at 1 56 ( " [S] outhern whites actively used the power of the state and local 
government to reduce competi tion from blacks through the 'jim Crow' legislation . . . .  " ) .  
1 99 See id. at 1 55-57. Antidiscrimination legislation also prohibits physical violence 
against those who defect from discriminatory norms. See ErsTu:--: , supra note 38, at 246-47. 
�oo See ErsTErN, supra note 38, at  76-77 .  
20 1  See Donohue, supra note 37, at 1 426. 
�02 AtTO\V enters the neoclassicist' s objection to this rnove. See ArTO\V, supra note 1 77, 
at 98-99.  The description is ,  he says, contrary to r.he tradition of economics, which recog­
nizes group interests only in l egally sustained form. Group solidari ty holds out benefits for 
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caste equilibrium.203 Under a caste equilibrium, the norm against 
dealing with the minority leads to economic retaliation against defec­
tors, meaning those employers who h ire cheaper minority employees 
face product-market boycotts . Those employers who do not wish to 
discriminate can escape the system only by creating an equilibrium­
breaking coalition and by setting up their own subsector.204 Since 
they may incur substantial costs of searching out one another in the 
process, it is possible for discrimination to persist even if most employ­
ers would prefer to integrate and most customers are unprejudiced.205 
The caste equilibrium model leaves intact the neoclassical ac­
count of a free market corrective while altering the description of the 
normative environment in which it operates .  In other words, but for 
the normative barrier, cost pressures would eliminate discrimination.  
Two alternative economic approaches-cost and statistical theory­
controvert this assertion and predict persistent discrimination regard­
less of social norms. 
c. Cost Theory 
Cost theory follows from the observation that workforce homoge­
neity lowers production costs .  Recall that the cost story has provided 
the basis for our simultaneous descriptions of high-powered Latino/a 
incentives both to learn English and to settle in enclaves.206 Retold in 
the context of discrimination theory, the cost story provides a basis 
both for predicting that discrimination will persist in the long run and 
for attacking Title VII. 
In the contexts in which taste-based discrimination increases costs 
and is economically irrational, cost-based discrimination reduces costs 
employees, but not for employers. Thus, the theory has to do the heroic job of making 
collusion among hundreds of millions of white Americans plausible .  
203 See AKERLOF, supra note 1 93, at 37-42.  Akerlofs construct seems unsuited to ex-
plaining the persistence of discrimination in the post-Title VII economy. Given a shifting 
normative pattern, nondiscriminatory subsectors seemingly would proliferate with ease . 
The "noncompeting groups hypothesis," that Darity and Mason describe, reaches an end 
point similar to that Akerlof reaches. Darity & Mason, supra note 1 58, at 85. 
The caste concept has been revived in the legal l iterature in  an expanded version that 
draws on social theory. This analysis asserts that the pursuit of social status within discrete 
communities provides an ongoing incentive for enforcement of the discriminatory norm. 
See McAdams, supra note 39, at 1 007, 1 01 9, 1 027, 1 046-5 1 ,  1 064. The advantage of this 
approach is its depiction of society ·with antidiscrimination laws and a large population 
containing both those who follow the nondiscrimination norm and those who continue to 
discriminate despite price pressures. The weaknesses, in  our view, are thinness in  the de­
scription of the majority population 's  normative constitution and a reliance on the notion 
of a robust spontaneous order that has no support in economics. For a presentation of the 
latter point, see William W. Bratton et a! . ,  Repeated Games, Social Norms and Incomplete CorjJo­
rate Contracts, in AsPECTS OF FAJ RNE.Ss I N  CoNTRACT 1 6 1 ,  1 68-78 (Chris Willett ed. ,  1 996) . 
204 See AKERLOF, supra note 193 ,  at 37, 40-41 .  
205 See id. at 44. 
206 See supra Part II .A.3 .  
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and is economically rational. 207 As a result, the same free market as­
sumptions that support a prediction that taste-based discrimination 
disappears over time support a prediction that cost-based discrimina­
tion can persist. Moreover, according to this view, any legal prohibi­
tion of discrimination increases the costs of production ( even 
assuming costless enforcement) ;208 therefore, Congress should repeal 
Title VII. 209 
This cost story significantly overlaps with the assimilation story. 
This overlap becomes apparent when one applies the message of the 
cost story to Mrican Americans. Recall that according to the litera­
ture, the list of human differences having negative production cost 
implications is long, extending to all aspects of identity and personal­
ity. :no It includes not only language, but also accent and a range of 
nonverbal codes that manifest themselves in posture and gesture. 2 1 1 
Thus, cultural and ethnic identification, in addition to factors like the 
number of years of school completed and other investments in techni­
cal skills, determines individual economic opportunity sets. To 
achieve economic parity with whites, Mrican Americans must mini­
mize their cost implications to employers by shaping their behavior to 
mimic white patterns to the fullest extent possible. "Assimilation" is 
an appropriate term for this process of reinventing oneself to sur­
mount the linguistic and cultural divides that separate a minority from 
the maj ority group. 
Cost theory therefore demands an added capital investment from 
both Mrican Americans and immigrants: assimilation . Ideally, we 
would read Title VII to mean that Mrican Americans should not  have 
to make this added investment to reconstitute themselves culturally as 
whites. In a regime of equal economic opportunity, full qualification 
207 See EPSTEI�, supra note 38, at  6 1 .  
208 This is Epstein 's  argument. See id. at 6 1 -67, 76. It overstates the role of decision­
making costs in the broader economy. Epstein depicts all producers as if  they were law 
firms with large numbers of partners, each with an individual vote. See id. at 6 1 -67. On that 
model, heterogeneity of personnel indeed might lead to decision-making costs approxi­
mating those in political life. In the real world, however, h ierarchical organization ordina­
rily solves that problem. One wonders what Epstein is talking about. Someth ing like the 
treatment in Pan II .A.2 (b)  would be more plausible. There may be a cost advantage to 
homogeneity in large h ierarch ical organizations, but it is the lesser benefit s temming from 
segregated teams. The cost is less impressive in the restated version-the U.S .  Army, after 
all , has become one of the nation's  model integrated organizations. 
209 The problem with this approach is the deterministic importance it accords to the 
identification of costs of all sorts and the impoverished framework i t  allows for the articula­
tion of countervailing benefits. See, e.g. ,  John J. Donohue I I I ,  Advocacy Venus A nalysis in 
Assessing Employment Discrimination Law, 44 STAX L. REv. 1 583 ( 1 992)  ( reviewing  EPSTEI�, 
supra note 38, and arguing that the early success of Title VII supports the contention that it 
generates substantial benefits) . 
2 1 0 See supra Part I I .A.2 (a) . 
2 1 I See Lang, supra note 1 1 3, at 366-68. 
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should follow upon successful investment in  technical skills. 212 Con­
trariwise ,  proposing the repeal of Title VII endorses placing on Mri­
can Americans rather than on employing firms (and society as a 
whole) the burden of these assimilation costs. 2 13  
The repeal proposition also raises questions concerning skills-ac­
quisition incentives. On the surface,  and particularly with widespread 
and significant assimilation costs,2 1 4  repealing Title VII diminishes 
these incentives.  Advocates of repeal controvert this prediction,  
claiming that discrimination barriers create heightened rather than 
reduced incentives to invest in human capital. 21 5 Just as minority-lan­
guage speakers must (and do) invest more to reach skills parity, vic­
tims of racial discrimination would have to invest heavily to develop 
demonstrable skills, including indicia of white acculturation .2 1 6 The 
incentive to do so derives from the j ob market payoff. Of course ,  if 
integration remains costly, minority j ob seekers who make this invest­
ment will not receive certain j obs until all qualified whites have found 
employment.2 1 7  Nonetheless, because of a proj ected exhaustion of 
the supply of qualified whites, one can predict that minority appli­
cants eventually will find work at the level for which they are 
qualified. 2 1 8 
This Horatio Alger-like description of incentives for racial minori­
ties precisely parallels the assimilation story's  description of self-reliant 
immigrant success. Its application to Mrican Americans ,  an histori­
cally disadvantaged group whose ancestors arrived in America as long 
ago as those of the most advantaged white Anglos, is ironic.  The de­
scription also makes problematic assumptions. First, we would argue 
that it is inaccurate to assume that an inevitable exhaustion of the 
supply of qualified whites guarantees equal opportunity for Mrican 
Americans. We would modify this proj ection by recognizing a cogni­
zable risk of a white surplus and would expect rational , risk-averse M­
rican Americans investing in skills to do likewise. This modification 
implies that the proj ected returns on Mrican American skills invest­
ment will be less than the Horatio Alger story predicts. Second, the 
story presupposes an absence of racial animus. We think rational Mri­
can Americans would discount the predicted value of any returns for 
2 1 2 In Part I I I  we state an eth ical case supporting this proposition.  
2 1 3 This argument assumes that Titl e  VII successfully has shifted costs to firms. I t  is ,  of 
course, not at all clear that the level of Title VII enforcement is  thorough-going enough to 
shift these costs to firms in  the first place. 
2 1 4  See sujn-a Part I I .A. l .  
2 1 5 See EPSTETN, supra note 38, at 40-4 1 . 
2 1 6  See supra Part I I .A. l .  
2 1 7  See E rsTEJN, supra note 38, at 35 .  
2 ! 8  See id. a t  34-40 (assuming that some employers invest i n  adequate information 
about the skills of minori ty applicants ) . 
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the contrary possibility. We can restate this argument in cost terms by 
stating that the costs of integration may include significant residual 
frictions, stemming from negative white responses to dark skin 
color-costs that investment in acculturation cannot reduce.219  This 
residual animus means a rational Mrican American would not predict 
that an investment in skills would result in an equal opportunity to 
achieve a return. Ex ante investment incentives accordingly de­
crease.220 Thus, an examination of the assumptions underlying the 
Horatio Alger story casts doubt on its motivational power. 
Latinos/as, particularly those of color, receive the same message: 
Persistent discrimination based on the costs of difference means that 
returns on investment in acculturation start to diminish at an earlier 
point than the assimilation story predicts . A disturbing proposition 
thus arises for economic theory: discrimination can persist indefinitely 
despite constant competi tive pressure to produce at the lowest possi­
ble cost. A line of formal theory-the statistical theory of discrimina­
tion,  which draws on the economics of asymmetric information-also 
suggests this proposition. 
d .  Asymmetric Information: Statistical and Screening Theories 
Statistical theory removes the economics of discrimination from 
the neoclassical world, in  which information is complete and costless, 
to a second-best world, in which information is costly and incomplete. 
In the second-best world, employers subj ect  to cost constraints have a 
choice when they make hiring decisions. They can hire based o n  a 
limited number of easily observed but imperfect  signals ,  accepting the 
attendant chance and cost of mistakes.22 1 Alternatively, they can re­
duce the number of mistakes by investing in the development of par­
ticularized information about candidates. If the cost of obtaining 
accurate information exceeds the cost of mistakes that the imperfect 
signals generate , the rational employer will use the cruder measure. 
Furthermore, if the employer's  experience makes minority group 
membership a negative signal , the employer will not give full effect in 
the hiring process to a minori ty applicant's  equal or greater skills . 222 
21 9  Both cost and taste figure into white discriminatory preferences, and in a world 
without Title VII, the persistence of the costs in a free market economy would create a 
space for the exercise of the taste. Because the two varieties of cost are not distinguishable 
in the real world, shifting the cost of acculturation to African Americans through a Title 
VI I  repeal would only serve to m ake the world safe for exercise of the taste. 
220 Loury takes the posi tion that the economic explanation of continuing racial ine­
quality in the labor market should accord a central place to the "skills gap . "  Loury, supra 
note 97 ,  at 1 1 8. He points to a cluster of responsible social and cultural factors, each 
having a racial quality-"geographic separation, deleterious social norms and peer influ­
ences, and poor educational quality." ld. 
221  See AKERLOF, supra note 1 93,  a t  23-24. 
222 See Cooter, supra note 39, at 1 58. 
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The formal model of statistical discrimination223 assumes a non­
discriminatory but Bayesian employer who responds to greater mea­
surement error respecting the performance of minorities.224 The 
employer evaluates workers by calculating a weighted average of the 
particular worker' s  directly observed productivity and the mean pro­
ductivity of the group. 225 Greater measurement error stemming from 
cultural difference indicates that the employer weights the mean fig­
ure more heavily when evaluating minorities.226 The result is not dis­
criminatory with respect to groups as a whole because both the 
maj ority and the minority receive the same average compensation . 
But heavier mean weighting yields underpayment for highly produc­
tive minority group members and overpayment for unproductive mi­
nority group members. 227 
Discrimination results when this pattern continues across genera­
tions. If employers cannot accurately identify good performance,  in­
centives to make productivity-enhancing investments lessen 
accordingly. 228 Rational minority group members will reduce their 
human-capital investments in skills that the employer cannot observe 
directly. Over time,  minority workers ' mean productivity will decline, 
while whites will  become relatively better skilled and receive higher 
average compensation. This result is discriminatory, given equal ini­
tial endowments between the two groups.229 Therefore , legal prohibi­
tion of discrimination improves labor-market allocations.230 
Statistical theory justifies Title VII despite the fact that it assumes 
unprejudiced white employers . The theory's j ustification,  however, is 
qualified. Statistical theory, like cost theory, argues that discrimina­
tion persists in  a free market because it stems from cost calculations, 
and one may term it cost efficient. 231 Title VII implies costs too :  the 
opportunity cost of barring employers from using the cheapest means 
223 See Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 Avt.  Ecor-: . REv. 
659 ( 1972 ) . 
224 For a discussion of Bayesian theory, see, for example, Michael 0. Finkelstein & 
William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REv. 489, 496-
505 ( 1 970) ; Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Verdical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict 
Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabalistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CoRNELL L. REv. 24 7, 
255-56 ( 1 990) . 
225 See Phelps, supra note 223, at 659. 
226 See id. at 660. 
2 2 7  See id. at 660-61 .  
228 See Paul Milgrom & Sharon Oster, job Discrimination, l\tiarJ1et Forces, and the Invisibility 
Hypothesis, 102  QJ. EcoN. 453, 456-57 ( 1 987) . This disincentive occurs because the mem­
bers of the group enjoy the diffusion of the benefits of the investment. See Cooter, supra 
note 39, at 1 58. 
229 See Lundberg & Startz, supra note 1 90,  at 341-42, 344-45. 
230 See id. at 340 (showing formally that a policy forbidding separate wage schedules 
between two types of workers forces an increase in allocative efficiency) . 
231 See Schwab, sup-ra note 1 90,  at 228. 
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of employee evaluation.  232 On the other hand, extensions of the sta­
tistical model have introduced the possibility that statistical evaluation 
can lead to structural inefficiencies.233 These extensions marginally 
strengthen the case for Title VII. 
The statistical model is not without i ts cnt1cs. One cnt1osm is 
that the model is too crude. For example, it  presumes that employers 
cannot distinguish entry-level candidates based on the candidate ' s  
number of  years of  education.  234 In the real world, cri tics argue,  em­
ployers cheaply develop basic information workups ,  decreasing their 
232 See id. This cost structure i n  turn suggests that the more cost efficient way of curing 
the problem is to increase the flow of information to the market so that it no longer has to 
rely on crude signals. See Cooter, supra note 39, at 1 59-60. The problem with this solution 
is that an increased information set can magnify a discriminatory tendency.  See infra notes 
247-67 and accompanying text. 
233 Schwab offers a model that draws on the idea of a market for lemons first advanced 
in George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons ": Quality Unwtainty and the JVIarket Mechanism, 
84 QJ. EcoN. 488 ( 1 970) . See Schwab, supra note 1 90, 229. Schwab shows " that statistical 
discrimination [may] increase [ the]  efficiency of labor supply for the favored group but 
decreases efficiency for the disfavored group." !d. The upshot is " that the net  efficiency 
effect cannot be determined a priori." !d. 
More particularly, Schwab's model posits both a standardized employment market in 
which employers judge employees on statistics and an individualized economy in which 
each employee is self-employed and there are no information asymmetries. See id. Assum­
ing that all workers look alike in the standardized market and that employers treat them 
based on the averages, and further assuming that employees are drawn from the individu­
alized market to the standardized market by higher wages, Schwab's model shows that an 
unregulated economy may allocate too few workers to the standardized market. See id. at 
229-30. Schwab then changes the assumptions so that firms in the standardized market get 
information about employees in  the form of one true stereotype, by which employers 
costlessly can divide workers into two groups: Group 1 workers are, on average, more pro­
ductive than Group 2 workers, but all workers of ability a ( highly skil led m arginal workers) 
have the same behavior whatever their group. See id. at 2 3 1 .  Given the foregoing assump­
tions, the efficiency of statistical discrimination depends on ( 1 )  the relative numbers of 
type a workers; (2 )  the extent of the cross-market shift in  wages; and (3) the net change in 
output as workers go to standardized market and workers in  the standardized market go to 
the individual market. See id. A legal ban on statistical discrimination means that wages of 
Group 2 workers move "closer to a socially optimal incentive to work, but causes the wage 
of [ G] roup 1 workers to diverge further from an efficient level ." Id. at 232.  "The net 
efficiency effect depends on shape of abil ity functions of the two groups." Id. Further­
more, " [ s] tatistical discrimination is most likely to be i nefficient when the disfavored group 
has relatively large numbers of unskilled workers," "pulling down its average skill level ," 
"while the skilled workers are more evenly distributed between [ the two] groups." Id. Sta­
tistical discrimination becomes unambiguously inefficient  if the labor supply of Group l is 
inelastic, so that all work in the standardized market, while the Group 2 supply is elastic, so 
that more able members tend to stay in the individual market. See id. In this case the result 
is that employers in the standardized market only see substandard Group 2 workers. See id. 
at 232-33; see also Milgrom & Oster, supra note 228, at 456-57 (arguing that information 
asymmetries create employer incentives to underpromote and underpay h ighly effective 
minority employees to avoid creating a credible marketplace signal of capability and 
thereby capture minority's services for a low price ) . 
234 See Lang, supra note 1 1 3 ,  at 365. 
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reliance on statistical generalities .235 The model also  assumes that 
employers continue to use statistical abstracts in their internal evalua­
tions, but real world firms have an incentive to develop particularized 
information to improve the quality of internal job assignments .236 Fi­
nally, critics cite statistics on returns for formal education that date 
from the early 1 980s to show that young African Americans reap a 
greater income increase than young whites for an additional year of 
schooling. 237 Critics argue that these results refute the suggestion that 
statistical practices have a negative incentive effect on minorities'  skills 
acquisition. 238 These critical arguments produce the tendency, partic­
ularly in the legal literature, to dismiss as minimal the potential for 
statistical discrimination.  239 
This dismissal meri ts strict scrutiny. 240 Whatever the statistical 
model ' s  methodological shortcomings ,  it is implausible to proclaim 
235 See ErsTEIN, supra note 38, at 34; D arity & Mason, supra note 1 58 ,  at 83; see also John 
J .  Donohue I I I  & James J. Heckman, Re-Evaluating Federal Civil Rights Policy, 79 GEO . LJ. 
1 71 3, 1 725 ( 1991 )  (noting that if employers can distinguish among African American em­
ployees based on the number of years of schooling, then a statistical effect would result 
only if all high-school graduates were treated equally, and that even in that event i t  might 
be possible to develop information respecting performance in school) .  
236 See Milgrom & Oster, supm note 228, at 455; see also JosEPH G. ALTONJI & CHARLES 
R. PIERRET , EMPLOYER LEAR.t'IING AND STATISTICAL DisCRIMINATION ( National Bureau of 
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6279, 1 997) (using an information theory to argue that 
employers discriminate based on easily observable variables, such as years of schooling and 
race, in the first period of an employment  relationship, but that learning stemming from 
noisy indicators of worker performance causes wages to become more closely tied to pro­
ductivity in subsequent periods) . 
237 See jAMES P. SMITH & FINIS R. WELCH, CLOSING THE GA.P: FoRTI YFARS OF EcoNOtviiC 
PROGRESS FOR BLACKS 40, 1 1 3-1 6 ( 1 986) . 
238 See EPsTEIN, supra note 38 ,  at  40-4 1 ;  Donohue & Heckman, supra note 235, at 1 725. 
239 See EPSTEIN, supra note 38, at 40-41 ;  Donohue & Heckman, supra note 235, at 1 725. 
This dismissal is an essential link in Epstein 's story that qualified minority candidates even­
tually get picked up in the free market hiring process. See EPSTEIN, supra note 38, at 34-37 
( arguing that due to search costs the law only should encourage e mployers to develop 
fuller information) . But cf Donohue, supra note 209, at 1 609 (arguing that an effort to 
reduce job search costs for minorities through freedom of contract imposes a dignitary 
harm on minorities and that the result of Epstein's approach is higher search costs for 
minority job-seekers and more employer rejections of minority job-seekers) .  D arity and 
Mason comment that this point of view ultimately seeks to absolve market processes from a 
causal role in the discriminatory results that are manifest in American society. See Darity & 
Mason, supra note 1 58, at 83. I t  follows that any deficiency must be with the victims them­
selves-whether due to poor schooling or cul tural factors, or perhaps as the result of some 
inherent quality. 
240 The dismissal may to some extent reflect dissatisfaction with statistical enforcement 
techniques. But misuse of statistical evidence in employment discrimination litigation is a 
separate problem. In the l itigation context, the use of averages to show a discriminatory 
pattern can have the perverse effect of discouraging the development  of particularized 
information. See, e.g. , Stephen Coate & Glenn Loury, Antidiscrimination Enforcement and the 
Problem of Patronization, 83 A.rv1. EcoN. REv. 92, 92-93 ( 1 993) (using a formal model to ex­
amine the perverse incentive effects of statistiC' ! enforcement) ; Robert S. Follett et a!. ,  
Problems in Assessing Employment Discrimination, 83  A.M. Ecol'. REv. 7 3 ,  73 ( 1 993) (analyzing 
problems when using statistics in the unquantifable area of employment discrimination) ; 
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that whites and Mrican Americans have equal skills-acquisition incen­
tives .  Scholars generally concede that although incidences of racial 
discrimination markedly declined during the period 1 9 65-1 975 , the 
movement toward economic racial equality has stagnated since the 
mid-1970s. 241 Along the same lines, the education gap between young 
Mrican Americans and young whites, which in former decades had 
narrowed steadily, became a constant during the 1 980s.242 This trend 
occurred while the aggregate wage gap between Mrican Americans 
and whites widened from the low point it had reached in the 1 9 70s�243 
Moreover, whatever returns Mrican Americans receive on  investments 
in schooling, the corresponding returns for Mexican Americans do 
not even approach those of whites and actually have deteriorated dur­
ing the past two decades . 244 
More importantly, statistical theory makes a broader point that 
becomes obscured when we focus exclusively on formal problematics. 
The model ' s  basic insight originated with Arrow's touchstone discus­
sion of information asymmetry and discrimination.245 Arrow argued 
that once experience has led employers to believe that minority group 
members perform worse than majority group members,  that belief 
does not necessarily yield to hard information about a candidate ' s  ed­
ucation and experience. 246 As employers scrutinize candidates more 
carefully, cultural difference begins to influence them.  247 Qualitative 
evaluations may turn on unverifiable or unobservable factors ,  such as 
habits of thought, "steadiness, punctuality, responsiveness , and initia­
tive"-factors employers more easily can access in own-group candi­
dates. 248 What begins as statistical observation becomes a taste 
prejudice that cognitive dissonance perpetuates. With an ethical code 
condemning discrimination, cognitive beliefs become necessary so­
cially to justify the discriminatory conduct.249 
Mark R. Killingsworth, Analyzing Employment Discrimination: From the SeminaT Room to the 
Cotrrtmom, 83 �vi. EcoN. REv. 67, 7 1  ( 1 993)  (discussing the problems resulting when statis­
tical studies are used in the courtroom) .  
24 1 See John J .  Donohue III & James H eckman, Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The 
Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 1 603,  1 604 
( 199 1 ) .  
242 The aggregate fall i n  the education deficit during the 1980s was one half as great as 
that during the 1 970s. See James P. Smith ,  Alfinnative Action and the Racial Wage Gap, 83 AM. 
EcoN. REv. 79, 81 ( 1 993) . " [T] he schooling gap of black workers with 1 - 1 0  years of experi­
ence has remained constant at about 0.5 years throughout the 1980 ' s." Jd. 
243 See id. at 80-81 .  Wage parity for new college graduates was achieved in  1 97 1 -1 972, 
but wage gains at this level steadily eroded thereafter. See id. at 81 . 
244 See supra notes 1 72-77 and accompanying text. 
245 See rurow, supra note 1 88, at 95-97. For a recent reaffirmation ,  see Arrow, supra 
note 1 77, at 96-97. 
246 See Arrow, supra note 1 77, at 97. 
24 7 See id. at 96. 
248 Arrow, sujJTa note 1 88, at 97. 
249 See Arrow, supra note 1 77 ,  at 97. 
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Arrow's insights are formalized in a recent model of  screening 
discrimination from Cornell and Welch .250 The model posits that a 
prospective employer will be interested in unverifiable,  intangible 
qualities that consti tute the candidate ' s  character.251  It  draws on the 
economics of language to assert that the employer can better judge a 
candidate ' s  character type (high or low) when the employer shares 
vrith the candidate a common cultural background, which enables the 
employer to understand the full range of the candidate ' s  verbal and 
nonverbal communications.252 
More specifically, Cornell and Welch assume that employers hire 
from a pool of candidates evenly distributed both between two cul­
tural (or raciai) types and between good and bad types within each 
cultural pool.253 The Cornell-Welch employers are neutral, but do 
have a cultural type and more readily can identify good and bad types 
of their own cultural type because of better information.254 Cornell 
and Welch' s  results parallel those of the statistical model-the more 
information an employer develops about a group of candidates in a 
given pool,  the greater the pool's variance. 255 If the employer selects 
only one candidate , the best candidate is likely to come from the 
group with the widest distribution.256 Since employers receive more 
information about candidates in the pool that share their cultural 
background, the probability that the chosen candidate will come from 
that group increases as the number of candidates increases. 257 The 
chances of same-group hiring are fifty percent with two candidates 
(one from each group) ,  are seventy-five percent with four candidates 
( two from each group) ,  and continue to rise as the number of candi­
dates increases.258 Recast in a generational framework, the model 
predicts that in a universe of as few as forty candidates and five j obs, it 
would take more than one million generations before the chances of 
other-group hiring exceeds fifty percent. 259 
250 See Cornell & Welch, supra note 39, at 543 n . l .  
25 1 See id. at 543. 
252 See id. at 543-44. 
253 See id. at 549. 
254 See id. 
255 See id. at 548. 
256 See id. at 549. 
257 See id. at 552. 
258 See id. at 544-45. Assuming both two possible types (good and bad) evenly distrib­
uted in the population and an ability to distinguish between them only with own group 
candidates, neutrality results only when there are two candidates. In this case there is only 
a 50% chance that the candidate from the same background is bad. As the number of 
candidates increases, the probability of hiring a same group applicant approaches one. 
This analysis derives from the "rank-order tournament [  ]" l i terature. Id. at 545 (in ternal 
quotation marks omitted) . 
259 See id. at 546. 
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Cornell and Welch recognize the possibility that with a concen­
tration of employers from one group in the high-wage sector, the 
model's h iring dynamic implies the evolution of a caste sys tem.260 If a 
pool of favored-group candidates remains available, nothing exists to 
trigger the market corrective of hiring from the growing pool of capa­
ble candidates in the excluded group.261 Employers have less incen­
tive to hire from the disadvantaged pool because by doing so they lose 
the benefit of the screening device.  262 Segregated workplaces prolif­
erate accordingly, and the excluded group makes up the low-wage sec­
tor of the labor market. Rational employers, relying on  market 
information concerning h iring patterns, cease incurring the cost of 
considering candidates from the excluded group.263 Eventually, cog­
nitive dissonance causes the advantaged group to develop theories to 
explain and to justify the segregation in terms of the excluded group 's 
inferiority.264 The resulting discriminatory equilibrium, however,  is  
not immobile.  Either entry by excluded-group employers into the 
high-wage sector or exhaustion of the supply of good types in the ad­
vantaged group will break the equilibrium.265 
The Cornell-Welch screening model, like both the cost and the 
statistical models, assumes that discrimination is cost efficient. But the 
Cornell-Welch model works from that starting point to destabilize ad­
ditional cost assumptions that have crept into the legal literature. It 
demonstrates that information asymmetries can lead to discriminatory 
results even when the employer invests in researching background in­
formation and in interviewing candidates.266 The model also projects 
that discriminatory results , once repeated,  become discriminatory 
schema, which can be perpetuated in a market economy.267 It thus 
260 See id. at 558-59 . 
261  See id. 
262 If  the supply of good types in  the favored pool is exhausted, however, d iscrimina­
tion breaks down. See id. at 555. Thus, there is no direct conflict with Epstein 's  market 
corrective. He presupposes that the pool of favored group candidates is exhausted and 
that equal information either is available or can be developed. See EPSTEIN, supra note 38, 
at 34-37. This analysis implies a descriptive question: How quickly, if ever, does the pool of 
good white types at the high end of the United States employment market become 
exhausted? 
263 This result is a "cascade effect." See Cornell & Welch, supra note 39 ,  at 547.  
264 See id. at 558-59. Note that to the extent that the discrimination has had the effect 
of depressing the minority's skills-acquisition incentives, minority group members might 
not be in  a position to take advantage of this opportunity. One can state the incentive 
point in psychological as well as economic terms. See Bruce Elmslie & Stanley Sedo, Dis­
crimination, Social Psychology, and Hysteresis in Labor Ma-rkets, 1 7  ]. EcoN. PsvcHOL. 465 
( 1 996) . According to Elmslie and Sedo: "One initial bout of unemployment that is not 
productivity based can lay the foundation for continued future unemployment and persist­
ently lower job status even if no future discrimination occurs." Jd. at 474. 
265 See Cornell  & Welch, mj:rra note 39, at 554-55. 
266 See id. at 54 7-52. 
267 See id. at 554-55.  
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reaches the same end point as statistical theory, but takes a different 
route, which completely avoids (and even reverses) the obj ection that 
commentators lodge in the legal literature . The model also suggests 
that one cannot safely assume that market forces will correct an inher­
ited pattern of discrimination, even though i t  acknowledges the possi­
bility of correction under the right conditions.268 Finally, the model 
controverts the notion that the economics of discrimination posits an 
absolute assumptional choice between prejudiced whites ( taste the­
ory) and unprejudiced whites ( cost theory) . "Neutral" cost-based be­
havior can trigger the development of discriminatory tastes that add 
to the costs of integration. 
The screening model is particularly pertinent to Latinos/ as be­
cause its conceptual roots lie in language discrimination theory.269 It 
supports two predictions. First, discrimination against Latinos/ as may 
persist for an extended period, even if one excludes phenotypic  fac­
tors . 270 The screening model asserts that English fluency alone does 
not ensure equal opportunity-assimilation must be absolute. Lati­
nos/as and other immigrants gain wealth at a correspondingly high 
cultural cost. Second, since employers within the enclave economy 
will best appreciate the skills of Latinos/ as who are not completely 
assimilated, these Latinos/as intensively should pursue opportunities 
within the enclave . As applied to Latinos/as ,  then, the information 
asymmetries posited in the screening model imply an economic op­
portunity barrier that separates the enclave and mainstream 
econon1ies. 27 1 
3.  Summary 
Can we describe the incentives of a rational second-generation 
Latino/a in l ight of the above economics? As illustrated above , the 
literature offers contrasting incentive stories. In the maj ority view, dis-
268 See id. These ideal conditions, an exhaustion of the supply of qualified whites or an 
adequate supply of minority employers, arguably wil l  not arise in the real world. 
269 See supra Part I .A-B. 
270 The l ikelihood of phenotypic  discrimination complicates long-term projections. It 
gives rise to the possibility of a separating assimilation equilibrium based on skin color. On 
this model white Latinos/ as face lower barriers and eventually, upon acquisition of com­
pletely American cultural identi ties and appearances, uncover economic opportunities suf­
ficient to prompt dispersion. Meanwhile,  by analogy to the experience of African 
Americans, Latinos/as of color face more substantial barriers and tend to remain in en­
clave communities. Cf Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, 'vv7titeness, and Transformation, 143 
U.  PA. L. REv. 1 659, 1 670-71 ( 1 995) (describing the phenomenon of racial tipping by 
which neighborhoods become segregated due to white distaste for people of color) . 
27 1  Previous immigrant generations faced similar barriers, of course . But because par­
ticular barriers' heights wil l  depend on the totality of the economic and cultural circum­
stances, racial attitudes could mean that those confronting Latinos/as are materially 
higher. 
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crimination has a depressive impact on skills investment, 272 thereby 
contributing to its own perpetuation.  A minority, grounded on the 
legal side, describes a heightened incentive to take advantage of edu­
cational opportunity to overcome the barrier of discrimination.273 
Which incentive story should we incorporate in the description of sec­
ond-generation Latino/a incentives? 
It is not clear to us that we can or should make an absolute choice 
between the high- and low-incentive alternatives. Certainly, the low­
incentive story is technically correct because it inexorably follows from 
the economics of investment; accordingly, aggregated Latino/a 
choices should show a depressed level of skills investment. The aggre­
gate result, however, does not capture an all-purpose description of 
rational choice. Just as different subjective preferences with respect to 
risk determine the choices of investors, so too will Latino/a choices 
turn on subj ective factors-talents ,  ambitions,  familial and cultural 
ties, and risk aversion.  Thus, in our economic picture, Latinos/as 
have a wide zone of rational choices for investments in human capital. 
We would expect some Latinos/as to invest more heavily than others, 
in the same manner as did yesterday's  immigrants and as do today's 
Anglos. 
Although this economic description is capacious, it has a power­
ful normative implication .  It emphatically negates the normative as­
similation story. Latinos/as neither have broken past immigrant 
patterns nor have failed to live up to some vague obligation  to accul­
turate . Instead, they rationally have responded to the problem of as­
similation in the unique circumstances they confront. Moreover, 
while the assimilation story focuses exclusively on immigrant choices, 
the economics shows that Anglo choices also matter. Since Latino/a 
cultural choices depend upon economic prospects ,  these choices de­
pend in part on Anglo choices about Latino/a opportunities .  Only 
one moment of culpability occurs in this story-the moment when 
Anglos convince themselves that their own Americanness implies su­
perior capability. 
D .  Workplace English and the Costs o f  Title VII 
Finally, we turn to the economic implications of requiring Work­
place English to find justification in a showing of business necessity 
under Title VII .  
One easily may articulate an economic case against application of 
Title VII to Workplace English . The absolute suppression of Spanish 
in the workplace is cost-justifiable because communication is costly, 
272 See Coate & Loury, supra note 240, at 92-93;  Cooter, supra note 39, at 1 58; Cornell & 
Welch, supra note 39, at 555-56; Milgrom & Oster, supra note 228, at 454-55 .  
273 See supra Part I I .A.3 .  
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especially when the environment is not monolingual. 274 The resulting 
transparency renders supervision cheaper and reduces frictions in in­
tra-employee relations. 275 The employer, who bears the cost of inef­
fective workplace rules, has a strong incentive to promulgate the 
lowest cost set. Over time,  employers and employees will sort them­
selves between monolingual and multilingual environments .276 Addi­
tionally, Title VII enforcement is i tself costly. If the employer has a 
goal of cost reduction, it should have Workplace English . 
However forceful this cost case may be,  i t  is not conclusive . The 
identification of a set of costs alone does not conclude the determina­
tion of social welfare. We must appraise costs in broader contexts 
before concluding an inquiry about any particular course of action. 
The costs of applying Title VII to Workplace English fail to impress 
when we examine them in this broader context. 
First, this cost case does not differ in substance from the cost case 
for a complete repeal of Title VII .  Recall that according to the cost 
theory of discrimination,  all other things being equal, rational em­
ployers have a high-powered incentive to operate segregated work­
places. 277 Thus, the same social welfare judgment that activates Title 
VII as a whole justifies the constraint on employer business judgment 
which is actualized as a qualified prohibition of Workplace English. It  
would be anomalous to allow free rein to business judgment in the 
limited context of Workplace English but not in other contexts gov­
erned by Title VII .  
Second, the economics provides no credible assurance that Work­
place English reflects only cost concerns and bears no taint  of ethnic 
or racial animus. The economics we reviewed above does not describe 
any financial incentives that assuredly constrain such impulses, at least 
as long as a robust market correction story is lacking.278 
274 Cj supra Part I I .A .l  ( discussing the general economic costs associated with bilin­
gual interactions) . 
275 See supra notes 82-84. 
276 
277 
See Breton & Mieszkowski, supra note 1 0 1 ,  at 262-63. 
See supra Pan I I .C.2 (c ) . 
278 Indeed, Workplace Engl ish appears to be doubly attractive to many employers for 
this reason .  I t  could be disruptive of employee relations yet still be cost reductive because 
it offers a means to terminate employees that is unrelated to the more conventional and 
work-related matters included in the notion of "good cause." 
Anecdotal evidence does indicate that large firms have been waking  up to the fact that 
Latinos/as constitute 1 0% of the population and have been adjusting their business prac­
tices to increase Latino/a market share. For such a firm, the goal of good will in the 
Latino/a community could lead to a decision against Workplace English despite a projec­
tion that bilingualism increases management costs. But this story in the end only rein­
forces our conclusion. In our view, large American firms have been remarkably slow in 
their "discovery" of the Latino/a market. vVe suspect that Anglo myopia and prejudice 
have long retarded pursuit of these ready profits .  
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Third, although Title VII enforcement intrinsically is costly,279 
the prohibition of Workplace English presents no  s ignificant addi­
tional cost burden. The Workplace English cases have simple facts­
most concern work rules with no arguable relationship to business ne­
cessity. 280 The message to employers resembles a per se rule:  do not 
fire employees for speaking Spanish to each other in informal situa­
tions. In a dynamic environment, such a message even could have a 
transformative affect. To the extent that Workplace English stems 
from animus and fear, its prohibition prompts the rational employer 
to suppress the taste for segregation without incurring further signifi­
cant costs .  
Thus, the economic case against Title VII for Workplace English 
fails as an absolute assertion. But, because Title VII coverage and en­
forcement still will be costly, we must answer one remaining question: 
Who bears the cost? 
To answer this question we consult, by analogy, economics that 
predicts the effects of taxes on employment. Given static labor de­
mand, a payroll tax can cause a reduction in employment or in 
wages.28 1 Since empirical studies of these taxes do not clearly evi-
It is helpful to consider some examples. First, we note the recent performance of the 
stock of U nivision, the larger of the two Spanish-language television networks. A block of 
stock purchased for $50 million in 1 992 recently was reported to be worth $700 mill ion. 
See Pollack, supra note 47. Part of the increase in  value came at the expense of the net­
work's competitor in the market. See id. But much of the value comes from perceptions of 
an arbitrage profit opportunity created by Anglo myopia-a large gap between the net­
work's audience share and ad share. See id. Apparently, the gap will be closed, and net­
work revenues will increase as marketers discover the existence of the Latino/ a market. 
For a second example, consider Sears. For about three years, Sears has been manag­
ing 1 48 of its stores, all located i n  or near Latino/ a communities, in a manner that would 
appeal to Latina/a tastes. In so doing the company has reversed a cost-benefit decision 
not to micromanage to reach geographical e thnic markets. Sears i s  happy; sales in the 
effected stores are way up. See Jennifer Steinhauer, A Minority Market with iVIajor Sales: Stores 
Redo the iVIerchandise J'viix and the Hispanic Dolla-rs Flow, N .Y.  TIMES, July 2,  1 997, at D l .  'vVhat 
surprises us is not the result of this management decision,  but the length of time it took 
Sears to ascertain the existence of the opportunity-decades in the case of stores in places 
l ike East Los Angeles, California and Hudson County, New Jersey, for example.  We also 
note that by definition the new policy entails the extension of managerial responsibility to 
Latinos/as. See id. 
A final example, in which an external shock led to sudden visibil ity in  the business 
community, involves People magazine .  People started a quarterly Spanish-language issue af­
ter a special issue on the singer Selena proved extremely successful .  The people at People 
had never heard of Selena before her murder was front page news. See Octavia Emilio 
Nuiry, iVIagazine Mania, HISPANIC, Dec. 1996, at 53, 53-58. People En Espcn'iol now publishes 
monthly. 
279 See Donohue, supra note 209, at 1 602-03. He estimates the total cost of Title VII 
enforcement at $ 1 5  billion per year, or $200 per worker. See id. at 1 602. Given standard 
estimates of elasticity of demand for labor, it follows that total employment  is reduced by 
one-fourth of one percent or 1 88 ,000 jobs. See id. at 1 603. 
280 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text. 
2 8 1  See DA-'IIEL S .  HA.vlERMESH, L>.BOR DEi'vL<\..'ID 1 69-73 ( 1 993) . 
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dence a proportionate effect  on levels of employment, an inference 
that the burden falls on wages arises. 282 We can draw a more tailored 
analogy to models that predict the effect  of a tax on a particular group 
of workers , again given static demand for labor. The impact of this 
tax depends on the relative supply behavior of the affected workers 
and on the ability of employers to substitute the taxed workers for 
others.283 Without relative supply elasticity between the affected 
group of workers and other workers, a relative decline in the affected 
group's  wages again offsets the tax.284 In that case,  any impact on 
employment levels additionally depends on relative supply within the 
affected group. To the extent that employers can substitute workers 
from other groups,  a smaller aggregate impact on wages and employ­
ment will result. Indeed, given high substitutability, members of the 
affected group will have an incentive to take steps to realign them­
selves with an untaxed group.285 
When reading these parameters together with the results of the 
empirical literature on labor elasticities ,286 one can draw an inference 
that bilingual Latinos/as themselves consequently would pay for spe­
cial Title VII protection in the form of lower wages. The labor elastic­
ity studies reveal only very small "elasticities of complementarity 
between immigrants and natives, or between new immigrants and 
older cohorts ."287 
It is important to note that the predicted trade off between pro­
tection and wages assumes imperfect enforcement of Title VII .  Such a 
wage adj ustment could be hard to realize in a world of perfect en­
forcement. Given diverse workplaces, employers would have to pay 
Latinos/as at the same level as members of other groups.288 Even if 
bilingual workplaces without Workplace English cost more than bilin­
gual workplaces with Workplace English , employers could not pass on 
the cost in the form of a reduced number of j obs for Latinos/ as, at 
least to the extent that perfect enforcement of Title VII requires em-
282 See id. 
283 See id. at 1 8 1 .  
284 See id. 
285 See id. at 1 78-8 1 .  
286 See, e.g. , id. at 61-1 36. 
287 !d. at 1 26; see DEFREITAS, supra note 6, at 232-34. The implication is that immigrant 
flows have relatively little effect on the wages of domestic workers. The wage studies con­
tradict the neoclassical view, which suggests that the arrival of low-skilled immigrants de­
presses wages and increases unemployment. See id. at 231 .  They also support Piore 's 
description of immigrant employment in a secondary segment of low-wage jobs on the 
industrial periphery. See id. DeFreitas concludes that Latino/a immigration has not af­
fected significantly the wages or employment of American-born Latinos/as, but that un­
documented immigrants adversely have affected the employment of African American 
males and wages of African American females. See 1:d. at 250. 
288 See EPsTEI!"\, supra note 38, at 36 ( noting that perfect enforcement prevents workers 
from discounting their servi ces) . 
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ployers to hire a proportionate number of qualified bilingual Latinos/ 
as . This scenario yields an inference of cost shifting to the 
employer.289 
But Latinos/ as still would bear significant costs even in this scena­
rio. An employer who wishes to avoid the cost of bilingualism would 
avoid locating in a region with a significant non-Anglo population.  
These employers, if located in regions with mixed Latino/ a and Anglo 
populations, would tend to take up residence elsewhere. As a result, 
Latinos/ as would have reduced job opportunities .  The resulting con­
centration of monolingual firms would harm bilingual firms that did 
not relocate to a monolingual region and abandon their bilingual sta­
tus. Those bilingual firms would suffer a long-term cost disadvantage, 
and monolingual firms would drive them out of business, reducing 
the stock of job opportunities available to Latinos/ as. 
The imperfect enforcement scenario is the more plausible of the 
two, and it holds out no significant hopes of cost sharing. But the case 
for Title VII constraints on Workplace English remains compelling 
even if cost sharing is very unlikely. As the next Part demonstrates, 
choices respecting language implicate an individual ' s  right to treat­
ment as an equal .  It is fundamental to American ideology that we 
must make sacrifices to secure these freedoms. We have no doubt 
that Latinos/as stand as ready as other Americans to incur this cost. 
III 
THE INTRINSIC WRONG OF LEGAL SuPPRESSION oF SPANISH: 
LANGUAGE, FREEDOM, AND THE 
IMAGINARY DoMAIN 
Our economic analysis shows that English Only reinforces the sei­
gniorage of the English language by increasing the cost of withdrawal 
into a Spanish-language enclave and by prodding Latinos/as to in­
crease their investment in English-language acquisition .  Our analysis 
does not deny that linguistic sameness lowers costs under one promi­
nent model of social welfare calculation.290 But it does identify three 
points that undermine that calculation's  soundness as a basis for pub­
lic policy. First, the analysis questions whether we safely can assume in 
every case that the imposition of the English language (or  any other 
majority trait) effectively enhances welfare.291 In our complex mul­
ticultural world-characterized by growing trade, transnational con­
tacts ,  and emerging communities of nations in Europe ,  Asia, and 
South America-we must at least question the assumption that homo-
289 CJ id. (noting that because an antidiscrimination law would preven t  free market 
bargaining, employers would pay more for services) . 
290 See supra notes 1 00-04, 1 08-l l ,  207-1 2 and accompanying text. 
29 1 See supra text accompanying note 271 .  
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geneity is cost beneficial . Second, assuming that language homogene­
ity enhances social welfare, economic theory suggests that free market 
incentives suffice to assure language homogeneity's prompt evolution 
in any society with a large linguistic majority. Third, whi te Anglos' 
economic discrimination against Latinos/as presents the only signifi­
cant barrier on that assimilationist evolutionary path. Our ultimate 
conclusion is simple. Because legal suppression of language and legal 
sanction of segregation follow from the same cost economics, both 
Official and Workplace English impose a form of peonage on Lati­
nos/ as that is discriminatory. 
In this Part, we step outside the consequentialist framework of 
economic theory to discuss the characteristics of right and wrong that 
make it both intrinsically and extrinsically wrong to suppress Span­
ish.292 Proof of an intrinsic or extrinsic wrong cannot rest on eco­
nomic analysis alone. We have shown, for example , that legal 
suppression of Spanish is the functional equivalent of jim Crow. Yet if 
we are to complete our analysis, we must still go on to demonstrate 
that something is deeply wrong with these laws. Without a reasonable 
moral, political, or legal conception of the person coupled with an 
interpretation of freedom and equality, the fact that legal suppression 
of Spanish is the functional equivalent of Jim Crow is just  a fact. What 
makes i t  wrong is that legal imposi tion of peonage controverts the 
292 Let me explain why we are arguing that the suppression of Spanish is both an 
intrinsic and an extrinsic wrong. At least under a strict reading of Kant, the suppression of 
Spanish simply can be understood as an extrinsic \Hong, in  the sense that i t  is a violation of 
the doctrine of Right. To quote Kant: 
Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone's free in accordance with a 
universal Jaw, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist 
with everyone's freedom in accordance with a u niversal law. 
If then my action or my condition generally can coexist with the free­
dom of everyone in accordance with a universal law, whoever hinders me in  
i t  does me wrong; for this hindrance ( resistance) cannot coexist with free­
dom in accordance with a universal law. 
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MoRALs 56 ( Mary Gregor trans., 1 991 ) ( 1 797) .  
Outer freedom is outer i n  the sense that i t  issues from an external source such as law. 
But we are also making another point, as we will see shortly. Given our understanding of 
personality, the development of one's potential to shape an identity can and should be 
understood as inner virtue. Kant never would have spoken of potential. This reliance on 
potential clearly has Hegelian overtones. See Cr-J.A.RLES TAYLOR, SouRcEs OF THE SELF 
( 1989) . But despite this difference, an internal virtue in Kant includes respecting your 
own person as an end in itself. For us, the development of the potential or capability to 
shape an identi ty then can be grasped as internal virtue. Hence, our argument that the 
suppression of Spanish can be both an intrinsic and an extrinsic wrong. If a Latina makes 
Spanish-speaking into an end and this confers ethical value on her mother tongue, then it 
clearly can be part of her respect for her own person that she speak her language. If  she 
fails to be true to the pursuit of her end, even if because of outward pressure that degrades 
her language, then she can be understood to have degraded herself. Of course, this argu­
ment turns on the Latina making Spanish-speaking an end in Kant's sense. Our point is 
that she cannot be forced to do so. To coerce her to do so, in the sense of legal coercion, 
violates her external freedom. 
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equal dignity of persons by legally imposing a form of moral servitude 
on Latinos/ as. 293 
This Part begins by discussing the moral, ethical, and legal mean­
ing of the free person pursuant to an existentialist interpretation of 
the Kantian idea of equal worth . We then use the concept of the free 
person of equal worth to locate the intrinsic wrong inherent in the 
suppression of Spanish .294 In doing so we step outside the conven­
tional liberal framework, which has difficulty accommodating a com­
plex understanding of individual identity, to discuss the formation of 
identity out of basic identifications, one of which clearly is language . 
To lay the groundwork for this discussion, we revisit  the communitar­
ian-liberal debate as well as the critique of the liberal person that femi­
nist and race critical theory articulate. We ultimately hope to show 
both that one can reconcile a more complex understanding of iden­
tity with a concept of rights and that the ideal of the person need not 
rely on an individualistic anthropology. The mainstay of this case for 
a revived ideal of the person is the aesthetic idea of the imaginary 
domain. 
Mter establishing a right to personality at a general level ,  this Part 
argues that the suppression of Spanish controverts the freedom of La­
tinos/ as reasonably to design , by developing their own sense of cul­
ture and heritage, unique l ives. This argument does not rely on 
metaphysical or foundational notions of the subj ect. 295 Our assertions 
depend instead on a simple, direct interpretation of the normative 
organizational ideal of political or ethical liberalism-the State and 
our basic social institutions should treat everyone as free and equal 
persons.296 At the same time we contend that this interpretation sur­
vives the contemporary critique of the autonomous subject. We begin 
our analysis by reconsidering the ideal of the person. 
293 See RIC!-L\RDS, supra note 79, at 5 .  
294 John Rawls has clarified the relationship between the operation of  wrong- and 
right-making characteristics-the facts "cited in giving reasons why an . . .  institution is . . .  
just or unjust"-in Kantian constructivism. JoHN RAWLS, PoLITICAL LIBERALIS:VI 1 2 1 -25 
( 1993 ) .  Although it  is beyond the scope of this  Article fully to explore this issue, we agree 
with Rawls that some form of Kantian constructivism is the most philosophically j ustified 
path to take in the j ustification of political and, we would add, moral ideals of right. See id. 
295 For a discussion of the difference between a metaphysical conception of the subject 
and our political and moral interpretation of the free person, see D RUCI LLA CoR="ELL, AT 
THE HEART Of FREEDOM:  FEMINISM, SEx, A?\D EQUALITY 3-65 ( 1 998) [hereinafter CoRNELL, 
AT THE H EART] ; D RL:CILL·\ CoRNELL, THE li\-LA.GINARY D oMr\1 '\i 3-27 ( 1 995)  [hereinafter CoR­
'\iELL, Do\L\IN ] .  
296 According to Hegel, the hallmark of moderni ty is the historical and normative con­
struction of the legal and moral person through a concept of right, which in turn legi ti­
mates the State on the basis of whether or not the State allows for the actualization of this 
construct. See HEGEL's PHILOSOPHY Of RIGHT 1 5-24, (T.lvl. Knox trans. ,  1 967) ( 1 82 1 ) .  
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A. The Ideal of the Free Person 
All forms of liberalism start with a simple premise: the State 
should treat us all as if we are free persons of equal worth . 297 Critics 
of liberalism attack this moral, legal, and political ideal of the person, 
charging that it is out of touch with reality. In real life ,  they contend, 
we are not the abstract persons that the liberal model deploys; we are 
not beings who in any meaningful sense actually can be self-determin­
ing. 298 Some of these criticisms, however, fail to recognize the reason 
why Kantian liberalism stresses the significance of justice of the free 
person. Our interpretation of the Kantian ideal of the person is not 
meant to be a full picture of the lives of actual human beings; rather, 
it is tailored to enshrine our freedom as a practice of self-responsibility 
for the lives we lead.299 
1 .  The Kantian Idea of Equal Worth of Free Persons 
If social benefits are not for persons, one may ask, who is the 
beneficiary of any theory or practice  of an ethics of social organization 
or of any theory of justice?300 We (and many others30 1 ) reject the 
answer that the beneficiary should be society as a whole-or a major­
ity of those within it-as an invitation to tyranny. Much political and 
297 Almost all of the important debates in Western liberal jurisprudence and political 
philosophy have been over what it means to treat people as free and equal persons. For an 
excellent discussion of how widely this ideal is held, see Ronald Dworkin,  Why We Are All 
Liberals (Oct. 1 9  & 27, 1 995) ( paper presented at the Program for the Study of Law, Phi­
losophy, and Social Theory) (on file with authors) . 
298 The most searing critique of the liberal ideal of the person remains that of Karl 
Marx. See K\J<L MARX, CRITIQU E  OF H EGEL's ' PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT' (Annette Jolin & Jo­
seph O'Malley trans. ,  Joseph O'Malley ed. ,  1 9 70) ( 1964) . The last hundred years have 
generated fierce dispute about what Marx's  critique of the legal, moral, and political cri­
tique of the person actually means: Was Marx arguing against this category altogether? 
Was he instead arguing that i t  was "undialectical , "  hence one-sided? \Ne cannot explore 
the voluminous l i terature, let alone examine the history of the sweat and blood that has 
been spilt because of the state enforcement of the position that there is no moral nor 
political validity to the ideal of the person. We stand behind the interpretation that a 
Marxist should believe in right and thus, the persons who have them. 
299 Since the Kantian person is an idea that, by definition, must be in  the abstract, it 
often has been thought to be inconsistent with any recognition of our phenomenological 
existence. I have tried to show, however ,  that we can use a philosophical anthropology that 
can recognize certain aspects of our phenomenological existence, such as our sexuate be­
ing, but recognize it in such a way that it does not controvert the freedom that is main­
tained in the abstract definition of the idea of the person. Of course, in this Article, we are 
trying to make a similar argument about how we should grapple w·ith another crucial as­
pect of our phenomenological existence, i . e . ,  language. See CoRNELL, Ar THE H EART, supra 
note 295, at �7-39 ; CoRNELL, DotvLc\J'\', supra note 295, at 3-27. 
300 For a discussion of how the person has to exist at least implici tly in  uti l i tarianism in 
order for the theory to be coherent, see GARY L. FR-\NCIO:--IE ,  R-\IN \NITHOUT THU\!DER: THE 
IDEOLOGY OF THE A.,'-:IMAL RIGHTS MO\/EMENT 1 47-89 ( 1 996) . 
:�0 1 See, for example, Ronald Dworkin 's  distinction between constitutionalism and ma­
joritarianism in  Rol':ALD DwO RKIN , The Nloral Reading and the lvlajoritarian Premise, in FREE­
omr's LAw l-38 ( 1 996) . 
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legal theory conceptualizes the person from this point of view to ex­
amine what constitutes a legitimate relationship between the individ­
ual and the State .302 In our analysis, one can justify for reasons apart 
from its value as a shield against tyranny the political and legal ideal of 
the person. We pursue a second, alternative approach to understand­
ing the person : interpreting the ideal of the free person that Kant 
initially invoked in the context of cultural and linguistic  choices.  
Kant defended the simple idea that the State should treat all 
human beings as "ends in themselves" because as rational beings they 
are the ultimate source of the value they give to their ends.303 This 
idea is Kant' s Formula of Humanity.304 For Kant, an end is an obj ect 
of free choice.  Ends are by definition at least partially "set" by practi­
cal reason. We want to stress partially because Kant does not mean 
that an "end" may not also be an obj ect of desire or inclination. But it 
is reason that is responsible for the unique human characteristics that 
translate an object of desire into an end. It is a misreading of Kant, 
however, to argue that the Formula of Humanity demands respect 
only for our capacity for choosing morally obligatory ends. When we 
take a rational interest in something, we do so by deeming it valuable 
or important and, in that sense , good. In this sense, we do not  value 
our ends as objects of desire , but because they are good.  It is this 
capacity that the Formula of Humanity demands that we treat as an 
end in each person. This is why it is completely illegitimate to force 
someone to take up an end because to do so denies her dignity as 
someone with this capacity. As beings who assume responsibility, in­
cluding self-responsibility in the practice of moral and ethical judg­
ment, each is of equal worth because each bestows value on those 
decisions. 305 
302 For an excel lent  discussion ,  however, of why an instrumental or uti l i tarian account 
of the person never can be an adequate account  of the worth of persons, see JoHN R�wLs, 
A THEORY OF jUSTICE 22-27 ( 1 97 1 ) .  
303 See THE MoRAL LAw: KANT's GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPI-NSIC oF MoRALs 61-64 
(H.J.  Paton eel. & trans. , 1 9 6 1 )  [hereinafter KANT's GROUNDWORK] . For an excellent  dis­
cussion of Kant's Formula of Humani ty, see CHRISTINE M. KoRSGAARD, CREATING THE KlNG­
DOM OF ENDS l 06-32 ( 1 996) . 
304 The Formula of Humanity is Kant's second formulation of the universal law. The 
first is the Categorical Imperative. For readers u nfamiliar with Kant, he states the Categori­
cal Imperative as fol lows: "Act only on that maxim which you can at the same time will that 
it should become a universal law. " KANT's GROUNDWORK, supra note 303, at 88 ( footnote 
omitted and typeface altered) . The Formula of Humanity is stated as follows: "Act in such 
a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any 
other, never simply as a means but at the same time as an end." Id. at 86. 
305 One could term Kant's elaboration of our equal worth as persons as "metaphysical" 
and thus philosophically outdated because it relies on ontological dualism. See KANT's 
GROUNDWORK, supra note 303, at 1 04-08 .  To defend free wil l ,  which is our capacity to set 
our end by reason, Kant  understood dualism as the division of the "human being" into the 
"noumenal" world of moral freedom and the "phenomenal" world of causal determination 
by the laws of nature. See id.; see also KoRSGAr\RD,  supra note 303, at 1 5 9-60 ( providing a 
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Kant's argument for our equal worth is based on his argument 
that the good will-or our rational nature (which , to Kant, is synony­
mous to the good will) -is the only thing that can have unconditional 
value, meaning it can be recognized as the source of all value .306 For 
Kant, something has unconditional value if i t  has intrinsic value under 
all conditions, and the only " thing" that can meet this condition is the 
good will .  307 Even something like happiness and the search for it, at 
least according to Kant, is  conditional and not valuable in all conceiva­
ble circumstances. 308 As beings who ultimately confer ethical value 
around us through setting our ends at least partially by reason, we are 
the source of what makes things important or deemed good.  Objects 
have value because they have value for individuals who bestow value 
on objects rationally by making them their ends. It is this value-con­
ferring capacity as rational beings that human beings recognize in one 
another. This recognition creates the mandate that Kant claims is ba­
sic to both morality and, in an impure form, politics .309 An individual 
summary of the relationship between Kant's noumenal world and the phenomenal world) . 
For Kant, we are free if we make ourselves a law unto ourselves; if we, in other words, are 
self-legislating. We can only become self-legislating if we act solely in accordance with the 
idea of law and not ·with any particular aspect of i ts substantiation. The preeminent good, 
which Kant calls moral,  is the idea of law its el f  and only that. Since the must of the moral 
law is the idea of law that only a rational being can apprehend, when we act in accordance 
with this law, we also are acting solely in accordance with our free will or with our rational 
nature. We know that our maxims are rational and therefore freely chosen by subjecting 
them to the test of universalizabil ity-the test of the moral law. My maxim is  rationally 
chosen and thus freely chosen if i t  can be understood as a ma.xim of all other rational 
beings who subject themselves to the moral l aw. Because the must of the moral law is the 
idea of law that only a rational being can approach, as free beings we become self�legislat­
ing and act solely in  accordance with free wil l  by following the Categorical Imperative. See 
KANT's GROU!':DWORK, supra note 303, at 95-1 04. One may note the e thical irony of a the­
ory of moral freedom that appears to incorporate an act of subjection to the moral law. 
Kant's need to understand moral freedom in this way stems from his acceptance of the 
proposi tion that all human action must be understood through laws of causality. See id. at 
1 1 0- 1 3 .  By making ourselves subject to the Categorical Imperative, it is our free wil l ,  our 
capacity to set our ends by reason, that makes us the cause of the value we give to those 
ends. Thus, by subjecting ourselves to the idea of law, we can be self-legislating, rather 
than legislated-to. See, for example, THEODOR ADoRNo & MAX HoRKHEIMER, D IALECTIC OF 
ENLIGHTENMENT (John Cummings trans. ,  1 944) , for an excellent  discussion of the e thical 
difficulty of a theory of moral freedom that seeks to render itself fully consistent  ·with a 
Newtonian conception of causality. For an excellent critique of the Kantian notion of 
causality, with which Kant starts in his definition of the free will as causality, see CHARLES 
SA.i'lDERS PEIRCE, Causation and Force, in REAsoNING AND THE LoGrc oF THINGS 1 97 ( Kenneth 
Laine Ketner ed., 1 992) . 
306 See K>..NT 's GRO UNDWORK, supra note 303, at 61-66. 
307 See id. 
308 See lM�'LJ\NUEL KANT, On the Relationshzp of Theory to Practice in iv1orality in General, in 
KANT: PoLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 33, at 64, 67 ("The maxim of absolute obedience to 
a categorically binding lmv of the free wil l  . . .  is good in  itself, but [happiness] is not. [ It] 
may, if i t  conflicts with duty, be thoroughly evil . " ) . 
309 See IM:V!ANUEL KA.NT, Introduction to the Themy of Right, in KA;:-;T: POLITICAL vVRJTil'GS, 
sujJra note 33, at 1 32; KANT's GRouNDWORK, supra note 303, at 96-98. 
664 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol .  84:595 
respects the equal worth and dignity of all others because she shares 
in the humanity that makes them the source of value they give to their 
own ends. Hence, i t  is as free  persons that we all have equal worth, 
and it  is this equal worth that law must recognize. 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to rehearse all the criticisms 
of Kantian moral theory or, alternatively, to review the efforts to 
render his moral theory coherent without ontological dualism.310 We 
note only that we agree with those who argue that a strong Kantianism .  
offering a comprehensive view of the self i s  indefensible because i t  
relies on  an  outdated concept of  causality. 31 1 Yet we still want to  de­
fend the Kantian conception of our equal worth as free  persons who 
possess a value-conferring capacity, partially setting our e nds by rea­
son. We do so by adding an existentialist twist to Kant ' s  insight into 
the assertiveness of our value-conferring capacity whenever we judge 
an obj ect of desire to be an end. 
In his book on Kant, Heidegger argues that the factual dimension 
of lived experience makes judgment  and evaluation inevitable .3 1 2  
Moral freedom i s  a praxis of self-responsibility that we must assume as 
part of our moral awakening to the inevitable reality that we do make 
judgments and evaluations, bringing forth a moral self when making 
those judgments and evaluations. Self-responsibility is a practice in  
and through which we constantly are becoming who we are as  we indi­
viduate ourselves by evaluating and re-evaluating our actions,  evalua­
tions, and judgments as we make them our own ends. 3 13 In this 
understanding, we exercise our freedom as a narration that makes the 
value-conferring moment in our actions and judgments one that we 
3 1 0 For an excellent discussion of why Kant's two standpoints need not  rely on onto-
logical dualism, see KoRSGAARD, supra note 303, at 1 59-87. 
3 1 1  See PEIRCE, supra note 305, a t  1 97-2 1 7. 
31 2 See HEIDEGGER, supra note 30, at 89-1 42. 
31 3 See id. \Ne are well aware that one can read Heidegger to have dropped all l inger­
ing aspects of his "humanism" i n  his later writings. See REI NER ScHOR.J\-1ANN ,  HEIDEGGER ON 
BEING AND AcTING (Christine-Marie Gros trans., 1 987) . Our intent is not to enter  in to the 
debate about the meaning of Heidegger's "turn" for his understanding of action and more 
specifically of self-assertion. We only argue that i t  is possible to maintain something close 
to Kan t's  understanding of our equal worth because we are value-bestowing creatures who 
turn our actions into ends that we justify through reasons by giving moral or e thical narra­
tions of our lives. The process of narrating a moral or ethical story is how we bring forth 
the moral self, which then takes responsibil i ty for her actions, valuations, and judgments as 
if they had been her ends all along. This process we call the practice of self-responsibility. 
Both Herbert Marcuse and Hannah Arendt took up the Heidegger-Kant dialogue and 
made i t  central to their own thinking. See ti"..NNAH ARENDT, ON REvoLUTION 47-50 ( 1 963) 
(elaborating on the Kantian ideal of freedom and the role i t  has played in inspiring revolu­
tions) . For an important discussion of Marcuse's appropriation of the ideal of moral free­
dom as a practice of responsibil ity, see MARTIN J. BECK iv1uusTiK, SPECTERS OF LIBERATTOi' 
25-47 ( 1 998) . For an excellent discussion of the Kant-Heidegger dialogue as Heidegger 
conceived it, see IAN 'NARD, KANTL"..NISM, PosTMODERNISM AND CRITICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 36-
56 ( 1 997) . 
-
1999] COSTS AND WRONGS OF NATIVISM 665 
ourselves understand as called upon rationally or reasonably to justify 
to others. This understanding of our moral freedom as a practice of 
self-responsibility for our ends as moral beings suffices to defend the 
idea of our equal worth , even though it temporalizes the way in which 
the moral self is brought into being. 
2 .  The Kantian Standpoint of Practical Reason 
As persons with a life, which is ours alone to lead, we all ask the 
question ,  "What should I do?" By posing this question, each one of us 
takes up the stance of practical reason. From this standpoint, an indi­
vidual cannot be the object of another because each individual is exis­
tentially positioned to ask and answer that question through moral 
reflection only for herself; her actions still will be hers as she reflec­
tively takes them on as such . Each of us has her own moral and ethi­
cal options and reacts to her own set of external demands, although 
some of us are much more constrained by law and circumstance than 
others. 
Liberal political philosophy, particularly when informed by the 
tradition of critical idealism,314 demands that any just societal order 
begin with the treatment of each individual as an equal in the sense 
that we must view each as equally worthy to pursue her own answer to 
that fundamental question, "What should I do?" The State should 
treat each of us as if we are rational in a specific sense-as if we are 
capable of assuming responsibility for our own ends. We are reasonable 
in that we realize that we are capable of recognizing and harmonizing 
our pursuit of the good with creatures who are like us in that they 
have equal dignity.3 1 5  Both notions, rationality and reasonableness, 
must operate in the law. The law should recognize persons as the 
source of ethical value that they give to their own life ' s  decisions when 
they take these up as ends through moral reflection . But i t  also 
should accord individuals the capacity to decide that other human 
creatures are , like themselves ,  worthy of that same recognition and 
respect. We therefore are reasonable only when we recognize in 
others their worthiness to pursue their own lives and recognize that 
we must try to organize both our own lives and a system of social life 
3 1 4 See, e.g. , JORGEN H.�BER.\·1,\S, BETWEEN FACTS AND NoRMS: CoNTRJ BUTIONS TO A D I S­
couRsE THEORY OF L<\w AND D E:viOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1 996) . 
3 1 5  John Rawls's work, which profoundly has shaped the last two generations of liberal 
political, ethical , and legal thought, develops his entire theory from the initial recognition 
of equal dignity in the sense that human beings must be politically recognizable as having 
both of these capacities or capabilities; that is, they are both reasonable and rational .  See 
RAwLs , sufmt note 294, at 48-54. For the purposes of this essay, we wil l  use capacity and 
capability interchangeably. 
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and of oli tical organization that is consistent with the equal dignity p 3 1 6  of all persons .  
The person as a legal and moral ideal must remain abstract if that 
ideal is to denote the freedom on which it  is based.  Because each 
individual undertakes her own practice of self-responsibility, the State 
must not impose definitions of how one can or should realize that 
potential for self-definition. Of course,  we are more, much more ,  
than this abstract free being. The political and m oral point o f  ab­
stracting the ideal of the person from the substance of any one indi­
vidual ' s  concrete life is to protect the freedom-the potential-of 
forming ourselves into a unique being-a being immersed in a life to 
be lived in all the relational complexity we associate with any actual 
living human being. 
3. The Ideal of the Imaginary Domain 
On this understanding, a person is not just a given ,  but implicates 
a practice in and through which the person is constantly engaged, a 
process of assuming self-responsibility through moral reflection on 
31 6 We endorse John Rawls's definition of the reasonable: 
If we ask how the reasonable is understood, we say: for our purposes here , 
the content of the reasonable is specified by the content of a reasonable 
poli tical conception. The idea of the reasonable itself is given in pan, again 
for our purposes, by the two aspects of persons' being reasonable: their 
willingness to propose and abide by fair terms of social cooperation among 
equals and their recognition of and will ingness to accept the consequen ces 
of the burdens of judgment. 
!d. at 94 ( internal cross-reference omitted) . We can highlight the moral and political sig­
nificance of the reasonable by contrasting it to the unreasonable: 
By contrast, people are unreasonable in the same basic aspect when they 
plan to engage in cooperative schemes but are unwill ing to honor, or even 
to propose, except as a necessary public  pretense, any general principles or 
standards for specifying fair terms of cooperation.  They are ready to violate 
such terms as suits their interests when circumstances allow. 
Id. at 50. 
We contrast the notion of rationality operative in our economic discussion. In eco­
nomics a considerably narrower ideal of rationality operates, focused almost exclusively on 
wealth ma.ximization as the expression of self-in terest. The Kantian-inspired notion of the 
reasonable altogether disappears. See generally 1 KEN BINMORE, GAiviE THEORY AND THE So. 
CIAL CoNTRACT 7-92 ( 1 994) ( proceeding under the title "DeKanting Rawls" to struggle with 
the proposition that an expanded concept of economic rationality can encompass the rea­
sonable) . The assertion instead is that people 's  free pursuit of rational self- interest leads to 
a society that realizes the greatest possible wealth. This realization has obvious ethical 
implications in a world of scarcity and physical suffering. Significantly, the Kantian ideal of 
rationality permits the existence of the individual as economic actor. Recognizing rational­
ity as a basic human capabili ty in politics and law necessarily concedes legitimacy to eco­
nomic self interest; political philosophy must not foreclose it in the name of an 
overarching good, but i t  must be allowed to play out as a pan of human freedom. At the 
same time, however, i t  cannot be accorded essentialist status. In Kant, rationality is always 
a limit to self-interest because an end or a maxim is only freely chosen if i t  is chosen in  
accordance with the universal law. Game theory does not understand rationality as  a limit 
to self-interest but rather as the means to its realization in the world. 
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the question, "What should I do?" As persons, then, we inevitably are 
implicated in the working through of personas. Since these are not 
just given or imposed on us but have to be assumed, i t  also turns us 
toward culture. In this sense, culture tends to be a condition of per­
sonhood. The personas in and through which we come to ourselves 
are both culturally expressed and a fundamental expression of 
culture . 
This understanding of the relationship between person and per­
sona is crucial to our defense of the ethical, political, and legal ideal 
of the person against the legitimate and powerful criticisms of this 
ideal that both feminists and race critical theorists have made . In 
crude summation, these critiques argue that the liberal ideal of the 
person is too "thin" to provide political or legal insight into the em­
bodied concrete concerns of everyday life.3 1 7 Significantly, the criti­
cisms do not reject the idea that all persons have equal worth. They 
instead turn on an ethical mandate to provide a "th icker" and thus 
truer conception of the self as the basis for legal reform.3 1 8 We ad­
dress these criticisms and simultaneously maintain as central to our 
defense of language rights the ideal of the free person.31 9 To do so, 
we defend the ideal of the imaginary domain.320 
The imaginary domain is an aesthetic idea that illuminates what 
freedom demands of creatures that inevitably are shaped by their own 
identifications. We understand freedom as a practice of assuming re­
sponsibility for our evaluations of our basic identifications as we make 
them our own in the course of shaping our individual lives. 32 1 Kant 
3 1 7 See, e.g. ,  SARA RuDDICK, ivL\TERNAL THINKJ1'G ( 1989) (arguing that mothering gives 
rise to a distinct mode of thinking and exploring the implications of this thought) . 
3 1 8 For an example of a "thicker" conception of self, see RoBIN \NEST, NARRi\TIVE, Au­
THORnY AND LAw 251-63 ( 1 993) ( comparing her "literary woman" with Richard Posner ' s  
"economic man" ) . 
3 19  See CoRNELL, DoMAIN, supra note 295, at 3-27 and CoRNELL, AT THE HEART, supra 
note 295, at 3-32, for a more elaborate defense of why scholars should maintain the ideal of 
the person in political philosophy. For an example of a feminist who criticizes the abstract 
ideal of the person, see RuDDICK, supra note 3 1 7. 
320 Later we will defend the degradation prohibition as it is a l imit on  the equal protec­
tion of each person's imaginary domain implied by the way we define the ideal. 
32 1 Ronald Dworkin uses a similar concept of the relationship between freedom and 
responsibility to base the legal authorization of ourselves as the only legitimate source of 
value for the evaluative design of our lives. To quote Dworkin's  understanding of his own 
second principle of ethical individualism: 
The second principle is not just a general principle assigning each person 
major responsibility for what happens to him. It is more specific .  It assigns 
people for the evaluative design of their life; it assigns each person the re­
sponsibility to shape his life to a conception of ethical value that is chosen 
or endorsed by him rather than by any other person or group. vVe must 
take considerable care not to misunderstand that assignment. I t  assumes 
and demands a kind of freedom but it is not metaphysical freedom-it is 
not, that is, people's power by an act of free will to alter the chain of events 
predetermined by physical or mental causation. The second principle is 
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defines aesthetic ideas as interpretative in that they help us grasp the 
personal significance of otherwise hopelessly abstract ideals.322 The 
expression of aesthetic ideas facilitates political and moral reflection 
and gives body to our interpretation of the meaning of the free and 
equal person. 323 Aesthetic ideas configure the moral dimension of 
experience. 324 The moral dimension is crucial to articulating the con­
struction of the wrong- and right-making characteristics of any partic­
ular social fact-in the present case ,  the legal suppression of Spanish . 
More particularly, the aesthetic idea of the imaginary domain helps us 
to imagine and to articulate the cross-references by which our case for 
language rights follows from the liberal ideal of the free and equal 
person. 
The imaginary domain expresses an essential right of p ersonality 
by recognizing both our equal dignity and our potential to assume our 
special responsibility for ourselves .325 We cannot assume this respon­
sibility, however, unless the moral and psychic space is protected, al­
lowing us to engage in the practice of self-responsibility through 
which we come to terms with the ethics of our own identifications. 
We may either embrace these identifications, keep them fluid, or 
struggle to discard them altogether. These possibilities are what 
makes way for our ethical respo nsibility for our identifications .  When 
we make an identification, such as being a Latina, a conscious end, 
then we clearly can see why respect for how that identification is ar­
ticulated is crucial to the respect for the person .  But even if we are 
not so explicit in making an identification an end in Kant's  sense,  we 
cannot entirely escape our responsibility for how we l ive with these 
not offended or undermined in any way by a commitment to determinism, 
because it neither demands nor presupposes what we may cal l  relational 
freedom: i t  insists that so far as your l ife is guided by convictions, assump­
tions, or instincts about ethical value,  that  they must be your convictions, 
assumptions, or instincts. You rather than anyone else have the right and 
responsibility to choose the ethical values that you will try to embody in  
your l ife. 
Ronald Dworkin, The Roots ofjustice 29 (Aug. 28, 1 997) (unpublished manuscript, on  file 
with authors) . 
322  See lMivL,\NUEL K'\NT, CRITIQUE OF juDGMENT 1 83 (Werner S. Pluhar trans . ,  1 987) 
( 1 793 ) .  
323 I n  Kant's words, aesthetic ideas draw out a "concept's implications and its kinship 
with other concepts . "  Jd. 
324 I n  particular, aesthetic ideas can draw out the moral dimension of experien ce. 
Although Kant  never directly would have connected aesthetic ideas with his conceptualiza­
tion of the morally free person, I have argued that we can use such ideas to try to give body 
to what would othenvise remain abstract. So, for example, when Rawls argues that the veil 
of ignorance is a representative devise ,  I would argue that it is more precisely thought of  as 
an aesthetic idea. For Rawls 's  most recent discussion of his understanding of the original 
position or the veil of ignorance as a representational devise, see RAWLS, supra note 294, at 
27-28. For a more elaborate discussion of my own use of the aesthetic idea of the imagi­
nary domain ,  see CoR:--IELL, AT THE HEART, sujJra note 295. 
325 See CoR:\ELL, AT THE HEART, s-upra note 295. I 
I 
1999] COSTS AND WRONGS OF NATIVISM 669 
identifications because they always are being reshaped by us as we take 
them on, even if we think we only are doing so by following tradition .  
As persons who can never entirely escape self-responsibil i ty, we need 
the moral space in which to exercise it . The imaginary domain man­
dates that the moral community of persons include each of us and 
provide us this space. 
The imaginary domain operates on two levels within the moral 
community of persons. At one level, the imaginary domain allows 
each of us to demarcate a space for self-evaluation through moral re­
flection. This space must have protection prior to the beginning of a 
conception of proceduralist justice ,  such as the one John Rawls de­
fends. In a famous analogy, Rawls uses the representational device of 
"the original position" and "the veil of ignorance" to engage in a hy­
pothetical experiment in the imagination that guides our moral re­
flection.326 The veil of ignorance forecloses knowledge of our gender, 
our ethnic identity, our linguistic origin, our race, or our class posi­
tion.  Without this knowledge, the perpetuation of social hierarchies is 
not rational because no one knows where in the world of social hierar­
chies she would fall .  
The veil of ignorance helps us envision a procedure for moral 
reflection that, by virtue of its very articulation, forces us to question 
social hierarchies, and at the same time,  challenges their hold on our 
imaginations. But how does one take into account gender, race,  na­
tionality, and ethnic and linguistic background in the hypothetical ex­
periment of the imagination? Certainly we should take into account 
these fundamental aspects of each person's life.  But the solution is 
not to assert that "facts" concerning the meaning of these realities 
about ourselves should reside behind the veil of ignorance .327 Be­
cause these so-called facts are intertwined with basic social hierarchies 
in the real ·world, placing them behind the veil of ignorance frustrates 
the purpose of the exercise of imagining ourselves as free,  equal, and 
unbound by our hierarchical place in society. This difficulty, however, 
does not mean that we should forget these realities; instead, we should 
imagine ourselves as persons free to morally evaluate these hierar­
chies. Behind the veil of ignorance, in other words, the idealized situ-
326 R"..WLS, supra note 302, at 304-09. 
327  Critics of Rmvls wrongly have attacked the idealized representations behind the veil 
of ignorance as if they were supposed to be real human beings. Thus, these critics argue 
that Rawls gives us a hopelessly abstract ideal of the person that cannot guide our moral 
reflection in real life. Real life, of course, is infused with the hierarchies that corrupt our 
thinking about equality. These critics neglect the purpose of a hypothetical experiment in 
the imagination, which demands that ;ve try to represent the conditions for moral reflec­
tion of free and equal persons. Such an experience does not start with real i ty, particularly 
a social real ity that h ierarchies bind together, because the point of the representative de­
vice is to imagine a basis for moral reflection on tne moral legi timacy of the hierarchies. 
How would we think about justice if we did not know how those hierarchies would treat us? 
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ation of the representative includes the postulation  of the self as free 
in the terms described earlier. The imaginary domain ,  in  which we 
conceptualize all persons in the moral community as possessed of the 
right to represent and evaluate what these realities mean to them, pro­
vides a space for that prior evaluation of our equal worth. 328 
At a second level ,  the imaginary domain extends to each person a 
right to self-representation-a right to establish herself as her own 
representative of whom she is because she must take responsibility for 
her own life .329 To be included in the moral community is to be rec­
ognized as having the potential to shape and to reshape one 's  identifi­
cations out of the symbolic material they present. This right to self­
representation subsumes the right to privacy, at least  when inter­
preted as the demand to be left alone.  This subsump tion is because 
the right to self-representation insists that each person must have the 
psychic and moral space to experiment with the personas through 
which culture is expressed so that she may have the chance to 
resignify what culture means to her. By demanding this psychic and 
moral space for each of us, the right to the imaginary domain takes us 
beyond hierarchical definitions of the self, whether caste,  class, race,  
gender, national origin , or linguistic descent imposes it .  Some have 
thought that these socially and symbolically constructed identifica­
tions determine the person.330 But as persons vvith the right to self­
representation, women, Mrican Americans, and Latinos/as cannot be 
reduced to naturalized classes whose entitlements and duties flow 
from their status positions. This right demands that the State and our 
basic social institutions recognize the person as worthy of being who 
she is as a member of the moral community of persons and, as such, 
treat her as the legally authoritative source of any moral or ethical 
meaning she gives to her basic identifications. 
B .  The Dynamic Nature of Identification and Our Disagreement 
with the Communitarians 
We now turn to a detailed response to the several critiques of the 
liberal person that communitarians, feminists ,  and race critical theo­
rists make . Our conceptualization of identifications as central to the 
shaping of identity answers these divergent critiques of the liberal per­
son. For us, a person ' s  identi ty is inseparable from her identifications; 
328 For a more extensive discussion of the imaginary domain and Rawls' s  hypothetical 
experiment in the imagination, see CoRNELL, AT THE HEART, supra note 295, at  1 4-1 9.  
329 See id. at 1 7-18 .  
330 For an excellent summation of the communitarian critique of the liberal person, 
particularly as i t  has been elaborated in  the work of John Rawls, see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, 
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS or JusTICE (2d ed. 1 998) . For a rich analysis of the relationship 
between race critical theory and the liberal ideal of the person,  see PATRJCIA WILLU\IviS, THE 
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS ( 1 99 1 ) .  
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as a result, the moral self is inseparable from an ethics of identifica­
tion through which the person engages the practice of self-responsi­
bility. We have no quarrel with communitarians, feminists ,  and race 
critical theorists when they criticize the phenomenology of the indi­
vidual, often implicit in liberal thought.331 But we argue that they are 
wrong to the extent that they denigrate the significance of freedom 
due to its purported use in a misguided phenomenology or anthro­
pology in liberal theory. 
Our basic identifications are fundamental aspects of our lives. 
We internalize these basic identifications initially as essential to our­
selves, often even without recognizing, let alone rationally assessing, 
the fact that we do so. We cohere into a self only by making sense of 
these basic identifications, whether we consciously question them as 
contestable or not. \\Then an individual assumes an identity, this as­
sumption implies that these basic identifications have received a sedi­
mented meaning or m eanings. We inevitably engage these 
inheritances when we acknowledge ourselves ,  whether as a Jew, a 
woman, an Mrican American , a Latino,  or a Latina.332 
"No one chooses her parents ,"  goes the old saying, and indeed, 
our parents ' identity is only one of an array of life circumstances we 
do not choose. As soon as we are born, we are stamped with a sex. 
Our racialized culture racially designates our parents ( or parent) and 
us with them. We are placed in their arms and delivered into their 
realities-their country, their culture, their class position,  their reli­
gion (or lack of it) , their lived sexualities, and whatever other basic 
identifications that have shaped them. We are immersed into a world 
thick with meaning, meaning that is passed on to us in language . We 
rely on this language to give ourselves form slowly to distinguish our­
selves from our surroundings. We inherit a world that at least  to some 
extent comes to us framed by the language of those who engage us in 
intimacy; they are the ones who first teach us, consciously and uncon­
sciously, what it means for them and in turn for us to be human .  
Communitarians continually remind us that our inheritance of 
language , our country, our culture, and our tradition constitute us.333 
33 1 See, e.g. ,  SAJ'iDEL, supra note 330, at 1 ("This is an essay about liberalism . . . . Against 
the primacy of justice, I shall argue for the limits of justice and, by implication, for the 
l imits of liberalism as wel l . " ) . 
332 See T>..YLOR, supra note 292, at 1 1 1-14.  
333 I t  is important to remember that long before the "new" communitarians, Hegel 
made the same point about the consti tution of human identi ty .  See HEGEL's PHILOSOPHY OF 
RIGHT, supra note 296, at 38-40. But Hegel also understood that people could draw differ­
ent moral and ethical lessons from the recogni tion of how human identi ty is rooted in 
history, language, and culture . I ndeed, Hegel argues that the modern person is distin­
guishable from other legal and moral forms giw::i1 to our humanity. See id. at 39-40. The 
person of modernity is no longer reducible to her social role in established hierarchy. Nor 
is she identical wi th any of the final ends of her community or even with the State. Given 
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We do not, they say, make ourselves up from scratch .  This argument 
is true enough. But it  is  just as true that we revise ourselves ,  even if 
some of us experience ourselves as already imbued with an identity, 
"man " or "woman" ;  "white" or "of color"; 'Jewish" or "Christian" ;  "gay" 
or "straight" ; "Anglo,"  "Latin American,"  or "Asian ."  As we stressed 
before, when we take up these identifications, we become responsible 
for them and for the ethical meanings they receive. 334 Some of us 
may experience our identifications as if ancestral tradi tion,  religious 
conviction , national origin,  or the nature of our sexuali ty carved them 
out in certain forms .  For people who experience themselves in this 
way, it makes l ittle or no sense to separate themselves from these basic 
identifications. Who they are is for them identical to their constitu­
tion as Jewish,  Mrican American , or Asian . But consciously or not, 
they still exercise moral and ethical responsibility when they take up a 
life associated with a particular identification . 
For example, there are many meanings of what i t  means to be 
Jewish . Anyone who simply claims that her Judaism mandates accept­
ance of a particular institutionalized form of Judaism still must con­
front responsibility for this associational decision. Clearly, members 
of the Jewish community constantly exercise this responsibility or free­
dom, as many different meanings of being Jewish have been both ex­
pressed and institutionalized. Still ,  other people do not experience 
themselves as identical with their origins, whether national,  ethnic, or 
religious. Indeed, the entire immigrant story, particularly as i t  empha­
sizes battles between the generations, stems from what it means for 
the members of the next generation to revise their sense of them­
selves by re-evaluating for their own lives the basic identifications of 
their parents . 
Many believe the debate between the liberals and the com­
munitarians to be over whether or not individuals can revise these 
basic ends and identifications or for that matter rationally assess these 
at all.335 As generation after generation of immigrants have shown, 
the complexity of the modern state, the individual herself no longer can have a simple 
identi ty. She must subjectively identify with the ends of her community-the nation state 
in which she is a citizen .  See id. at 1 5  5-59. This insistence on the spli t  and complex nature 
of modern individuality separates Hegel from modern communitarians such as Michael 
Sandel who argues that because our communities' ends are constitutive of who we are, i t  is 
legi timate for the State to impose restrictions on people's ability to revise those ends. See 
S.->.NDEL , supra note 330, at 183 (examining deontological l iberalism and concluding that i t  
neglects the power of  politics to  achieve a level of  common good that individuals alone 
cannot achieve ) .  
334 For a more extended articulation o f  what I mean b y  a n  "ethics o f  identification,"  
see Anti-Racism, Multi-Culturalism, and the Ethics of Identification ,  co-authored with Sara 
Murphy (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) . 
335 For an excellent response to the communitarian argument that we can revise our 
own ideals, Ronald Dworkin ,  Foundations of Liberal Equality, in l l  THE TA:--:NER LECTURES o:--; 
Hc \-L-\0: V.-\LL'ES 1 ,  66-71 ( Grethe B .  Peterson eel . ,  1 990 ) .  
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even the deepest identifications are open to both re-evaluation and 
rerepresentation.336 Thus, the communitarians clearly are wrong 
about what people can do. The real debate is over what people 
should do and should take responsibility for and, more specifically, 
what the State should be allowed to do to enforce people ' s  allegiances 
to specific ends and identifications. If, as some communitarians have 
argued, people ' s  ends and identifications constitute and thus are 
identical with them,337 the State can enforce fidelity to these ends and 
identifications without trampling on individual freedom and on the 
practice of self-responsibility. The individual is the ends and identifi­
cations; she only can be as free as those specific ends that already con­
stitute her. As we already have suggested, this conception of the self 
may indeed be a true description of how some people experience 
their identities, but even then it  does not relieve them of responsibil­
ity. It also suffers from overinclusion: the State still can trample on 
other people 's freedom by reinforcing all people 's allegiances or by 
limiting the space in which people ' s  basic identifications can be re­
evaluated and rerepresented. 
What body should we recognize as the source of moral value for 
these moral allegiances and identifications when they are defined as 
ends? Can the State bestow value on them in its own name or even in 
the name of the "true" interests of the individual? For a communitar­
ian, if the individual truly knows who she is,  she would understand 
that the state-imposed allegiances are truly her own ends. 338 She 
would exercise her practice of self-responsibility in the only way she 
truly ethically can: by living a life in allegiance with her community. 339 
We argue, on the contrary, that the person must be recognized as the 
source of the ethical or moral value she gives to her basic identifica­
tions. To make this argument in no way implies that human beings, 
like persons shedding clothes, simply can detach themselves from the 
ends and identifications that have shaped who they are as persons. 
Our argument presupposes only that people can revise and readjust 
ends and identifications and that even if we accept them as passed 
down to us, we remain responsible for the form in which we accept 
them. It emphasizes that the communitarian insight that human be­
ings grow into individuals only in and through webs of relationships 
also should remind us that freedom is fragile .  Indeed, the degree to 
which persons actually can revise identifications and ends depends in 
part on whether the State and basic social institutions provide them 
��36 See, e.g. ,  supra notes 54-57 (noting that immigrants use English as their primary 
language within three generations) . 
:>37 See SANDEL, supra note 330, at 59-65. 
338 See id. 
339 See id. 
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with the moral and psychic space to do so. This responsibili ty is why 
the equal protection of the imaginary domain is so important. Pro­
tecting the imaginary domain ensures that the person and not the 
State is the source of the evaluations and representations of her fun­
damental ends and identifications. It is precisely because we initially do 
not choose the primordial relationships and identifications through 
which we pattern a self and become a person that we need morally 
and legally provided psychic space to incorporate them,  to re-evaluate 
them, or to contest them through the evaluations and meanings we 
give them. How one does so is inevitably a part of the exercise of self­
responsibility. 
Once we see that identifications are not just s tamped on us, we 
begin to comprehend the ideal or idealized element of identification. 
This element often is made explicit as an ethical or pol itical ideal. 
This is the case with Latinos/as. The identification of Latino/a car­
ries an ethical and political message due in part to the h istorical basis 
of its usage in the United States. The identification implies that the 
person can trace roots to a Latin American country and is ensconced 
in the Spanish language, but is not trying to pass as Spanish-as a 
white European . Identification as Latino/a also is relational-an his­
torical interpretation of the Southwest, Puerto Rico,  Mexico , and 
Cuba, as well as the significance of the economic and poli ti cal domi­
nation of South America for Latin culture and for the Spanish lan­
guage, defines in part the meanings of Latino/a.340 The definition of 
what it means to be a Latino/a thus is partially an act of the political 
imagination . To enhance this identification can be to take it as an 
end through moral reflection. In like manner, Gloria Anzaldua de­
scribes the political and ethical process by which Chicanos/ as came to 
imagine themselves as bound together as a people: 
Chicanos did not know we were a people until 1 965 when Ceasar 
[sic] Chavez and the farmworkers united and I Am joaquin was pub­
lished and la Raza Unida party was formed in Texas . With that rec­
ognition,  we became a distinct people .  Something momen tous 
happened to the Chicano soul-we became aware of our real ity and 
acquired a name and a language (Chicano Spanish ) that reflected 
that reality. Now that we had a name, some of the fragmented 
pieces began to fal l  together-who we were, what we were , how we 
had evolved. We began to get glimpses of what we migh t even tually 
become.341 
340 For an excellent discussion of the pol i tical demarcations that either create or rein­
force identities, see Iris Marion Young, Together in Difference: Transforming The Logic of GroujJ 
Political Conflict, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY C u LTURES 155 ('Will Kymlicka ed. ,  1 995) . 
34 1 ANZALDUA, supra note 1 5 1 ,  at 63. 
1999] COSTS AND WRONGS OF NATIVISM 
C. The D ifference Between Parameters and Limits 
675 
The fact that the boundaries of an identification have political 
and ethical dimensions does not mean that anyone can take on any 
identification.  Neither of us is Latino/a, and if either of us were to 
insist that we are , you would be right either gently to prod us to see a 
psychiatrist or, once you had heard either of us speak Spanish, to 
make reference to this Article and accuse us of moral hubris. The 
communitarians are correct that the inheritance of language, culture , 
and country sets parameters for our lives .342 But they are j ust that­
parameters. They are not necessarily imposed limits that so rigidly 
define us that we cannot develop a personal response to the full par­
ticularity of our situation.343 As Ronald Dworkin has argued, ulti­
mately, each of us personally should make the distinction between 
parameters and limits ,  even if the historical situation in which we find 
ourselves in turn indexes it. 344 
At this point, another important difference with the com­
munitarians becomes manifest. It is a limit on our lives that under the 
above definition of Latino/a, we cannot embrace that identification 
or gain acceptance as those who identify themselves as Latinos/as ,  
even if  we desperately seek to do so.  345 But what if  one of us were to 
marry a Mexican, move to Mexico, become a Mexican citizen ,  achieve 
fluency in Spanish , and raise children of the marriage as Mexicans? 
Assume that the one who took on that overwhelming proj ect of trans-
342 See Dworkin ,  supra note 335, at 67. 
343 We borrow the distinction between parameters and l imits from Ronald Dworkin.  
See id. at 68. 
344 As Dworkin explains: 
The ideal l i fe is always the same: it is a l ife creating as much independent 
value-as powerful a pleasing of God or as much human happiness-as i t  is 
conceivable for a human being to create. Circumstances act as l imits on 
the degree to which the ideal can be achieved. Mortality, for example,  is a 
very important limit: most people could create more pleasure i f  they lived 
longer. Talent, wealth, personality, language, technology, and culture pro­
vide other limits, and their force as l imits will be much greater for some 
people, and in some times and places, than others. If we take an indexed 
challenge view of ethics, however, and treat living  well as responding in the 
right way to one's si tuation,  then we must treat some of the circumstances 
in which a particular person lives differently, as parameters that help define 
what a good performance of l iving would be for him. 
!d. at 66-67. 
345 V\'hen a commentator argues that bilingualism in Spanish and English is a disability 
in the U ni ted States, he is setting out Spanish as a l imit on people ' s  lives that must be 
addressed in the name of equality. See Mirande, supra note 1 7 ,  at 1 03 .  For this commenta­
tor, i t  is only by addressing bil ingualism as a disability that we can hope legally to interpret 
statutes that forbid the speaking of Spanish in  workplaces as discrimination .  See id. at 1 02-
03 .  How an ability to speak two languages at hom<> sensibly could be rendered as a disabil­
ity demands more discussion. See infra note 396. 
Clearly, this conception of bilingualism in Spanish and English as a disability is insep­
arable from the treatment of Latinos/ as in the U nited States. 
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formation were later to tell the other, "At this point in my life I iden­
tify myself more as a Mexican than as an American. "  That individual 's  
life parameters substantially would have changed. Identification as La­
tino/a would no longer seem like simple craziness or hubris, despite 
the fact that many if not all Mexicans would continue to identify that 
person as an Anglo.  
Even though we cannot completely escape our Anglo context, we 
certainly can change its meaning for ourselves-despite the fact  that 
other members of society may not recognize the change .346 Freedom 
demands that the individual should be the only entity empowered to 
set, ethically and politically, the divide between limits and parameters .  
The imaginary domain gives the person the moral and psychic space 
to determine which historical circumstances are limits and which are 
parameters . Concomitantly, the imaginary domain gives the person 
space within which to embrace the parameters of her life ,  thereby en­
abling her practice of self-responsibility. 
D .  Language , Culture, and Identification Within the Parameters 
of the Imaginary Domain 
l .  Language as a Parameter 
In response to the question of whether or not he was "influ­
enced" by the Spanish language, the great novelist jorge Luis Borges 
exclaimed: 
I am inseparable from the Spanish language. My dreams, my aspira­
tions as a wri ter are formed in  Spanish. I t ' s  no exaggeration to say 
that the man I am would not "be" who he is without Spanish. The 
writer I have become is unthinkable without the shape it has been 
given by the great traditions of Latin culture.347 
For Borges, the Spanish language is a personal, ethical , and aes­
thetic parameter of his life both as a man and as an artist. In Dwor­
kin ' s  sense , Borges makes judgments about whether or not  he has met 
his own standards for an effective life as an artist and as a person 
within the parameters of Spanish language and of Latin American cul-
34fi A-; Dworkin articulates this point:  
Anyone who reflects seriously on the question which of the various lives he 
might lead is right for him will consciously or unconsciously discriminate 
among these, treating some as l imits and others as parameters. I might 
treat the fac t  that I am an American, for example, as just a fact  that i n  some 
cases might help  and in others h inder my leading the life I think best. Or I 
must treat mv nationality as a parameter  and assume, whether or not  self� 
consciously, that being an American is part of what makes a particular life 
the right one for me. 
D1vorkin ,  supra note 335, at 67. 
347 Interview by Sonia Moria with Jorge Luis Borges, Buenos Aires, Argemina ( May 
1 985 ) .  
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ture.348 Spanish language and culture are, at least for this one writer, 
what Dworkin calls "hard" parameters.349 Borges can imagine himself 
only within these parameters. The person outside those parameters 
would no longer be the man or writer,  Borges .  
Toni Morrison makes a similar point when she writes : 
The question of what consti tutes the art of a black writer, for whom 
that modifier is more search than fact, has some urgency. In other 
words, other than melanin and subj ect matter, what, in  fact, may 
make me a black writer? Other than my own ethnicity-what is go­
ing on in my work that makes me believe it is demonstrably insepa­
rable from a cultural specificity that is Afro-American?350 
Morrison answers her question through a careful analysis of the first 
sentences of several of her novels, noting that one can find the answer 
in "the ways in which I activate language and ways in which that lan­
guage activates me."35 1  The parameter of her writing that gives it the 
specificity of the work of a black writer is a practice of language, "a 
search for and deliberate posture of vulnerability to those aspects of 
Mro-American culture that can inform and position my work."352 
Morrison's  writing, in other words , is inseparable from her assump­
tion of the identification of Mrican American in the form of a 
search-a search conducted in part by her self-responsibility for the 
articulation of the cultural difference of her people. 
For Morrison, it is through language that we try to fathom cul­
tural difference and try to give shape to "Unspeakable Things Unspo-
348 By using the term "Latin American culture," we isolate the culture of South 
America from that of Spain .  
349 See Dworkin ,  supra note 335, at 70. Dworkin elaborates: 
!d. 
vVe must distinguish between what I shall call hard and soft parameters. 
Parameters, as I said,  enter into the description of any challenge or assign­
ment: they describe the conditions of successful performance. Hard param­
eters state essential conditions: if they are violated the performance is a 
total failure, no matter how successful in other respects. The formal struc­
ture of a sonnet imposes hard parameters: we cannot make a sonnet better 
by adding an extra line, no matter how beautiful i t  is. Soft parameters are 
those aspects of assignment that, when violated, reduce the value of the 
performance but do not annihilate i t: they act as standards of good per­
formance that permit defects to be compensated by high success against 
other standards. Compulsory figures in competitive ice skating are treated 
as soft parameters. It is part of the assignment that the petformance exe­
cute a particular figure, and any deviations, no matter how beautifully exe­
cuted, count as faults. But deviations are not absolutely fatal to winning any 
points at all, and a performance that includes a brill iant deviation may win 
more overall than a lackluster but petfectly faithful one. 
?.so Toni Morrison , U11.1peakable Things Unspoken: The Afro-American Presence in A merican 
Literature, in 1 1  THE T.\:--.:;-..:ER LEC:TL"RES o ;-..: Hu:-otA.c'-: VALUES, supra note 335, at 1 21 ,  1 46. 
% 1  !d. 
352 ld. at 1 62 .  
j 
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k ,353 How does  a writer tell the story of a young Mrican American en. 
irl 's unbeing? How does one tell  this and other horror stories that 
�lock the "rememoration"-which is in turn a representation of the 
previously unrepresented past? Writing, for Morrison, is explicitly an 
act of self-responsibility before the stories that haunt the historical 
present of her life-a life that she deliberately has assumed as that of 
an Mrican American writer. The opening phrase of The Bluest Eye is ,  
"Quiet as it 's  kept."354 This phrase was a familiar one from Morrison ' s  
childhood, one she heard again and again ,  listening t o  adult black 
women talking amongst themselves . The hope in this phrase,  from 
the perspective of the adult women looking back on the young girl­
friends who lived through the character Pecola 's  undoing, is that the 
"us" that is keeping the secret can admit to i t  and therefore confirm 
that this "us" has the power to confront even the most horrible reality. 
Telling a story gives a possible new meaning to the "us" that is formed 
even if the secret that made us can never be fully revealed,  not only 
because it is too horrible ,  but also because the story comes too late to 
save Pecola. As Morrison writes, 
The words are conspiratorial. "Shh, don ' t  tell anyone else," and "No 
one is allowed to know this. "  It  is a secret between us and a secret 
that is being kept from us. The conspiracy is both held and with­
held, exposed and sustained. In some sense it was precisely what the 
act of writing the book was: the public exposure of a private confi­
dence. In order fully to comprehend the duali ty of that position,  
one needs to think of the immediate politi cal climate in  which the 
writing took place, 1965-69, during great social upheaval in the life 
of black people . The publication (as opposed to the writing) in­
volved the exposure ; the writing was the disclosure of secrets, secrets 
"we" shared and those withheld from us by ourselves and by the 
world outside the community.355 
The "we" is in quotation marks because this group is not just there , 
but is formed in part by the secret and the effort to fathom the mean­
ing of the rape of a young black girl who only can be there when she 
hallucinates a white self with the bluest eyes. How can "we" make 
sense of that? Of a young black girl who cannot see herself until she 
becomes mad enough to see herself as the idealized white girl with the 
bluest eyes? She strives to take on her own version of the idealized 
identification "white girl . "  Then she becomes what everything in the 
racist world in which she grew up told her she could not be .  The 
young girl 's  hallucination of herself is madness because she must ex­
tinguish herself to see herself as "worthy" of her existence .  Psychosis 
353 
354 
355 
!d. at 1 2 1 .  
ToNI MoRRISON, THE BLUEST EYE 5 (Alfred A. Kappf 1 994) ( 1 970) ( i talics omitted) . 
Morrison, supra note 350, at 1 47. 
"" 
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is the only way for her to dream up a self because she lives her "black­
ness" as an absolute limit on any attempt to fill herself in and become 
a person . The adult women who tell the story stumble before they 
make the identification with her that they must to reveal the secret, an 
identification they did not make when they let her go to the abyss of 
her madness. Pecola is not alone in the brutal limitations imposed 
upon what she could make of herself as a black girl in a racist society. 
The story proceeds through rememoration-re-identification of what 
it means to be an Mrican American. 
How does the writer find the language to tell this story? What is i t  
about this story and the language in which it  is  told that makes i t  an 
expression of identification and re-identification of the difference of 
Mro-American culture? Morrison explains: 
The points I have tried to illustrate are that my choices of language 
(speakerly, aural , colloquial ) ,  my reliance for ful l  comprehension 
on codes embedded in  black culture, my effort to effect immediate 
coconspiracy and intimacy (without any distancing, explanatory 
fabric ) , as well  as my (failed) attempt to shape a silence while break­
ing it are attempts (many unsatisfactory) to transfigure the com­
plexity and wealth of Afro-American culture into a language worthy 
of the culture.356 
It might seem strange to use Morrison and Borges as if they are 
making the same point. Borges is speaking of the unsunderable con­
nection between himself and the Spanish language and culture. He 
implicitly draws the connection between Spanish language and Latin 
culture . But the Spanish language also embodies the culture of Spain, 
which is not Latin American. Morrison writes in English , but hers is 
an English that amongst other things expresses the colloquial prac­
tices of black folklore and the day-to-day expressions encoded in Mro­
American culture . Both writers articulate the insight that who they 
are is inseparable from the way they are "activated" in language and 
that their language is inseparable from both the culture that brings i t  
to life and their own identification with that culture . Morrison and 
Borges describe language as an essential parameter of their lives, but 
one that the complex relationship language has with culture, ethnic­
ity, nationality, and race shapes. As is the case with all parameters, the 
very attempt to articulate its significance reworks i ts meaning. 
2 .  Language and Culture 
The exact relationship between the person, language, and 
thought remains a matter of dispute, as does the precise connection 
between language and culture . Steven Pinker, for example , has ar-
356 !d. at 1 50 .  
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gued that we all think in  a prelinguistic medium called 
"Mentalese. "357 As a result, the mode of linguistic expression has no 
real bearing on our thoughts and on our access to reality. Pinker 
could imagine a world in which we all speak in the same universal 
language.358 Perhaps James Joyce in Finnegans Wake came closest to 
realizing such a world, undoing the boundaries of historical human 
languages. But to do so Joyce also had to imagine the dissolution of 
the rigid ethnic, national ,  and sexual identifications. 359 
For human beings living today, h owever, language differentiation 
is inseparable from the lived experience of ethnicity, national conflict, 
and racism. This is not to say that Pinker is right or wrong, although 
other thinkers and l inguists strongly disagree with him. For example, 
Benjamin Lee Whorf, who has devoted his life to studying the unique 
syntax of the Hopi language, argues that different structures of lan­
guage can shape our conceptualization of basic parameters such as 
space and time.360 And yet, if we listen to Morrison,361 to imagine the 
English language is not to imagine the form of life of Mrican Ameri­
can culture, even though Mrican Americans speak English .362 
Culture is more than language. To parallel (and deepen) an ob­
servation central to the screening model of discrimination we de­
scribed earlier,363 culture is the full  range of encoded day-to-day 
behaviors, which at least in part find expression in the personas 
through which a culture is assumed. Not all culturally embedded 
communication is verbal. Many ways of signaling to one another  mark 
our connection or our identification vvith a group. Signs-a way of 
pointing a finger, raising the eyebrows, sighing in church,  nodding to 
357 STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT 55-82 ( 1994) . 
358 See id. at 82. 
359 See J>uv!ES jOYCE, FtN;o.;EGANS WAKE ( Paladin 1 992) ( 1 939) . Toni Morrison evokes 
this "paradise" as she ends her new novel by the same name: 
There is nothing to beat this solace which is what Piedade 's  song i s  about, 
although the words evoke memories neither one has ever had: of reaching 
age in the company of the other; of speech shared and divided bread smok­
ing from the fire; the unambivalent bliss of going home to be at home-the 
ease of coming back to love begun. 
To:-�1 MoRRISO"-", PARADISE 3 1 8  ( 1 998) . 
360 See generally BEN]A.MIN LEE vVI-IORF, L\:-JGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REALITY ( 1 964) ( i l lus­
trating the principle of l inguistic relativity, which states that the structure of a human be­
ing's language influences her understanding of reality and her behavior) . 
361 See supra text accompanying note 350.  
362 As the anthropologist Gananath Obeyeskere has observed:  
There are people who are thoroughly fluent in an al ien language but are 
quite incapable of understanding the alien culture . This is simply because 
culture is not coterminous with language. The variety of normative behav­
ior governed by implicit meanings, nonverbal communication,  and 
nonlinguistic symbolic forms shows that language provides at best access to 
the culture . 
GANAi':TH 0BEYESEKERE, THE WoRK OF CuLTURE 230 ( 1 990) . 
363 See supra text accompanying note 250. 
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each other on the street, and shaking hands-allow others to identify 
the signaler as a member of a particular group. 
These nonverbal personas are crucial to how actual human be­
ings express culture . But personas are lived only as the people who 
are the members of the culture and who bring it to life assume and re­
imagine them. Because human beings are the enti ties that express 
themselves and their cultural identifications through these personas, 
the meanings of those personas always are changing. At the same 
time ,  one can both misinterpret and stereotype the cultural personas 
of others. This misinterpretation and stereotyping is one of the many 
ways in which people convey racism and ethnic disparagement within 
a culture . Sometimes it takes the subtle form of mistakenly thinking 
that only other cultures have personas ,  while we white Anglos simply 
represent the moral and decent mode of behavior. 
The proposition that language and culture are not coterminous 
does not imply that language is not a basic parameter of culture . A 
person who has no access to the language of a culture is severely, if 
not entirely, limited in her access to that culture. We may dance the 
salsa; we may love Mexican food; we may be obsessed with the tradi­
tion of hyper-realism found in many of the great South American 
novels; we may be completely convi nced that Puerto Rico is economi­
cally and politically disadvantaged because of its commonwealth sta­
tus.  364 More profoundly, we may have thrown in our lot with people 
who are Latino/a and find in these loves the most important relation­
ships of our lives. But neither our love for Latin music ,  our apprecia­
tion of South American literature, our deep sympathies for the 
political concerns of the Latin American community, nor even the 
profound love and respect we feel for Latino/a members of our fami­
lies will make us part of that culture.  Similarly, learning to speak 
Spanish , while undoubtedly enhancing our access to the culture, 
alone cannot make us a part of it. Language for most of us is more of 
a limit than a parameter precisely because attaining fluency in an­
other language is a truly formidable goal. 
One cannot easily draw with exactitude the relationship between 
language and culture . If we are monolingual, to what extent are we 
enclosed in our culture? George Fletcher, who fully recognizes the 
complexity of this question, convincingly draws a clear connection be­
tween language and culture when he examines the relationship be­
tw·een the English language and the subculture of law.365 Fletcher, in 
one of his several examples, argues that the different meanings of rea­
son in English , German, and French make it virtually impossible to 
364 See DEFREITAS, supra note 6, at 26-36 ( describing Puerto Rico's historic and current 
status) . 
365 See Fletcher, supra note 3 1 ,  at 329. 
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translate accurately the term "reasonable person" and to convey to 
participants in other legal systems the place i t  holds in our legal sys­
tem. 366 Fletcher writes : 
In  contrast to a single rule based on reasonableness, European law­
yers start their arguments with broad, sweeping rights. They would 
say, for example, that you have the right to use all the force neces­
sary to protect your interests regardless of the costs that fal l  on 
others. But this is only the first step of a structured argument. If it  
appears that the defensive force imposed a disproportionate cost on 
others, European lawyers would apply the doctrine of abus de droit­
the principle that defeats the exercise of absolute rights in  particu­
lar situations. Not surprisingly, in view of the doctrine of reasona­
bleness, English-speaking lawyers have no need for the doctrine of 
"abuse of rights. "367 
In Fletcher's view, this variance in the definitions of reason reflects an 
important difference between the subcultures of Anglo-American and 
European legal systems.368 The use of the word "reasonable" suggests 
an Anglo-American preference for pluralism in legal thought as op­
posed to the stronger notion of rights that some European legal sys­
tems defend.369 The word and the meaning it has acquired over time, 
including the preference for pluralism that comes to be a part of what 
reasonableness encodes as a word of art in the subculture of law, pass 
down through the generations and blend into the traditions of legal 
scholarship. For Fletcher, thought, language , and culture have a re­
ciprocal relationship.370 
We think Fletcher is exactly right. The relationship between 
thought, language, and culture is both reciprocal and dynamic. But 
we would make one important addition ,  addressing the question of 
whether or not there is a determinative or consti tutive relationship 
between thought and language and between language and culture :  
this i s  not the right way to  think about these relationships because lan­
guages and cultures live only through persons and personas. It is not 
the right language because human beings also fabricate the cultural 
personas in which they express themselves. Fabrication disrupts the 
causal chain that we need to show a determinative relationship be­
tween language and culture and leaves us with the potential to shape 
and reshape ourselves. 
366 See id. at 329-3 1 . 
367 !d. at 330. 
368 See id. at 330-32. 
369 See id. at 331 . 
370 See id. at 33 1 .  
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3.  Turning Limits into Parameters: Language, Culture, and 
Individual Choice 
683 
We have seen that i t  is hard to learn a new language well enough 
to make another culture accessible , and it is harder still to revise one­
self to identify with that culture, whether psychically or in  one 's out­
ward relations with others. Yet we also have seen that this learning 
and revision is just what generation after generation of immigrants, 
including those from the Caribbean, Mexico, and Central and South 
America, have achieved. Although the high degree of difficulty di­
minishes the potential occurrence of cross-cultural movement, it by 
no means erases that potential . It follows that freedom is deeply im­
plicated in the potential ' s  realization. We repeat our central argu­
ment: Each of us-those experiencing that difficult process of 
linguistic and cultural access, as well as natives-should receive the 
legal freedom to re-evaluate and rerepresent our basic identifications, 
including the significance we give to our mother tongue.  D ifferent 
people will value this freedom differently. 
For us, this distinction between the freedom and the value of the 
freedom is crucial in the case of language rights . Consequently, we 
disagree with the terms that define one current of the multicultural 
debate : the current that poses a choice between a liberal nationalist­
rooted in and contained by l inguistic and cultural context-and a cos­
mopolitan conception of the subj ect-surmounting context to con­
struct an independent, personalized identity. In our view, the choice 
between those two conceptions is false when posed either to defend or 
to undermine the importance of cultural or language rights. 
Jeremy Waldron views cosmopolitanism as an ethical and political 
ideal that best expresses the value of the freedom to make sense of 
our basic identifications.371 Waldron describes the cosmopolitan as 
follows: 
[One] may live all his life in one city and maintain the same citizen­
ship throughout. But he refuses to think of himself as defined by his 
location or his ancestry or his citizenship or his language. Though 
he may live in San Francisco and be of Irish ancestry, he does not 
take his identity to be compromised when he learns Spanish, eats 
Chinese, wears clothes made in  Korea, listens to arias by Verdi sung 
by a Maori princess on Japanese equipment, fol lows Ukrainian poli­
tics, and practices Buddhist meditation techniques. He is a creature 
of modernity, conscious of living in a mixed-up world and having a 
mixed-up self. 372 
37 1 See jeremy Waldron,  i\t!inmity Cultu-res and the Cosnwpolitan Alternative, in THE RIGHTS 
OF MINORITY CuLTURES, sup-ra note 340, at 95. 
372 ld. 
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Waldron bolsters his appeal to the ideal of cosmopolitanism by argu­
ing that liberal nationalists are wrong to emphasize the importance of 
defining oneself through a specific culture and language . 373 ·will 
Kymlicka counters,  correctly in our view, that the sort of cultural me­
lange that Waldron describes does not actually involve moving be­
tween cultures.374 For those who do attempt such a m ove , language 
fluency will be a first, necessary step.  Waldron exaggerates how easy i t  
i s  for us, particularly as  adults, truly to escape our "mother" tongue .375 
Yet Waldron certainly has a right to his imaginary domain and 
deserves the psychic and moral space to define himself as a cosmopoli­
tan.376 Indeed, one can understand Waldron as describing an immi­
grant identity-one that has fluid parameters because many different 
social and historical forces constitute it. 377 Gloria Anzaldua makes a 
similar point when she describes what she calls the consciousness of 
the new mestiza: 
The new mestiza copes by developing a tolerance for contradictions, 
a tolerance for ambiguity. She learns to be an Indian in  Mexican 
culture, to be Mexican from an Anglo point of view. She learns to 
juggle cultures. She has a plural personality, she operates in  a plu­
ralistic m ode-nothing is thmst out, the good the bad and the ugly, 
nothing rejected, nothing abandoned. Not only does she sustain 
contradictions, she turns the ambivalence into something else .378 
Both Waldron and Anzaldua are describing processes by which 
an individual comes to terms with a complex historical web of rela­
tionships. The new mestiza consciousness is in part a political act that 
373 See id. at 105-08. 
374 See Wil l  Kymlicka, From Enlightenment Cosmopolitanism to Liberal Nationalism 
1 0-1 1 (Sept. 1 1 , 1 997) (paper presen ted at the Program for the Study of Law, Philosophy, 
and Social Theory) (on file with authors) . 
375 See id. at 1 0 1 .  
376 Cosmopolitanism as a special, overarching, constn!Cted identifi cation has faced 
criticism as a mask for the more particular white, male, middle-class identi fication of a 
handful of academics. See Bruce Robbins, Comparative Cosrnopolitanisms, in CosMorouTrcs 
246 ( 1 998) (discussing some of the pitfalls of cosmopolitanism either as a reality achieved 
by globalization of an elite or as an ethical or political identi fication that recognizes the 
value of freedom and the equality of all human beings) ; see also Ph eng Cheah , Given Cul­
t-ure: Rethinking Cosmopolitical Freedom in Transnationalism, in CosMorouTrcs, supra, at 290 
(cri ticizing northern academics who critique nationalism as a weapon for southern nations 
resisting re-colonization and control by multinational corporations) . 
377 \Ne must note here, as we saw in supra Part I I .C . 1 ,  that economic discri mination 
remains central to the lives of large numbers of Latinos/ as in  this country. This discrimi­
nation against immigrants, particularly immigrants who are racialized, i s  not l imited to 
Latinos/ as. But because of the discrimination, there is a sense in which cosmopolitanism 
may not be a rational alternative for many Latinos/ as. We must distinguish the decision to 
stay within a banio to reduce the risk of exposure to a brutally discriminatory "outside" 
culture from the affirmance of loyalty to a group identification made by a person whose 
means give rise to alternative choices. 
378 A'-:ZALDL'.-\, supra note 1 5 1 ,  at 79. 
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turns limits into parameters and thereby challenges the meaning of 
being Indian in Mexico. Yet in Anzaldua's description ,  cultures con­
tinue to operate as both limits and parameters in part through the 
personas they make available to the individual seeking to make sense 
of her complex identifications. No Anglo could access the Mexican 
persona from the Indian point of view in the same way that Anzaldua 
does. Both Anzaldua and Waldron not only are describing piecing 
together identities (and in the case of Anzaldua, playing with cultural 
personas to expand their meaning) , but also are telling us how they 
morally and ethically value their identifications. This process of evalu­
ation is that which freedom demands be left to the individual . 
For these reasons, we need not choose between liberal national­
ism and cosmopolitanism in the context of defending language rights . 
Each principle accurately describes how some individuals come to 
value their freedom to make sense of their identifications.  Consider 
as an example individuals who identify themselves as both Quebecois 
and liberal nationalists . For these individuals a commitment to the 
French language is essential to their self-definition, and they should 
be free to identify with their inherited language in this strong man­
ner. Waldron ' s  real rebellion is not against these people, at least not 
on our reading of him. Rather, Waldron argues against the idea that 
our heritage rigidly predetermines our identity so as effectively to un­
dercut the moral or ethical dimensions of whom one might be­
come.379 On this point, we agree with him. People must be morally 
free to make sense of their identifications in their own way. Some­
times this means a brutal uprooting of oneself from one ' s  culture and 
linguistic background. Again to quote Anzaldtla: 
To this day I ' m  not sure where I found the strength to leave the 
source, the mother, disengage from my family, mi tierra, mi gente, 
and all that picture stood for. I had to leave home so I could find 
myself, find my own intrinsic nature buried under the personality 
that had been imposed on me. 380 
It is precisely because the relationship among languages, cultures, 
ethnicities, class, and race is complex that it is difficult to draw the 
kinds of causal claims that tell us what determines what. But this diffi­
culty actually is a good thing. The intractability of grasping exactly 
how these relationships affect one another leaves open a space for our 
freedom to practice self-responsibility. To put the argument more 
strongly, one even can understand the intractability as a result of our 
freedom to re-imagine ourselves and to re-evaluate our fundamental 
identifications and what they mean to us. 
379 
380 
Sn• \-\'aldron,  sujJra n ote 371 , at 1 1 1 - 12 .  
A:'-�ZALDG.-\, sujJia n ote 1 5 1 ,  at 1 6. 
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Chandran Kukathas has defended the position that cultural 
rights ( including group-differentiated rights) to such things as lan­
guage, territory, and culture are necessary for the meaningful exercise 
of autonomy.381 "Put simply," Kymlicka argues, "freedom involves 
making choices amongst various options, and our societal culture not 
only provides these options,  but also makes them meaningful to 
us . "382 For example, 
[ w] hether or not a course of action has any significance for us de­
pends on whether, and h ow, our language renders vivid to us the 
point of that activity. And the way in which language renders vivid 
these activities is shaped by our history, our " traditions and conven­
tions" .  U nderstanding these cultural narratives is a precondition of 
making intelligentjudgements [sic] about how to lead our lives. In 
this sense, our culture not only provides options, i t  also "provides 
the spectacles through which we identify experi ences  as 
valuable . "383 
We agree with Kymlicka on this point. He shows again that the 
way in which language "activates" someone who in turn activates her 
language is  basic to the process of forming a unique person.  But we 
need to address two tensions in his formulation. The first is a techni­
cal point: Kymlicka writes of autonomy while defending the proposi­
tion that our autonomy is dependent upon the phenomenal world.  In  
other words, he is not  using autonomy in the strict Kantian sense. 384 
In contrast, we address this problem with an existential re-interpreta­
tion of Kant's notion of moral freedom, the only kind of freedom 
open to us , according to Kant. Second, a tension remains between us 
and Kymlicka that also lies at the heart of Waldron ' s  disagreement 
with him on the question of how culture, and more specifically h o­
mogenous culture , frames our choices. If our culture effectively 
bounds our choices, then the very culture that purportedly serves our 
freedom limits it, regardless of the culture ' s  contents ( including, for 
example, its protection of individual rights ) . By postulating a kaleido­
scope of cultures, Waldron in part tries to keep us from being limited 
and predetermined.385 Waldron does not want his national origin or 
38 1 See ·WILL KYMLICKA, MuLTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 83 ( 1995) . 
382 !d. 
383 !d. (quoting RoNALD DwoRKIN, A MATrER OF PRJNCIPLE 228 ( 1 985) ) .  
384 Strictly from the standpoint of practical reason, autonomy demands that our phe­
nomenal relationships or ties do not define us. I f  we were to treat ourselves as constituted 
by these ties then we would be treating ourselves as objects of study, controlled or con­
structed by forces that theoretical reason could grasp. For an excellent explanation of why 
Kant  need not defend dualisms in order to defend the self because it is a practical stand­
point and a theoretically demonstrable conception, see KoRSGAARD, supra note 303, at 1 59-
87. 
385 See Waldron, supra note 371 ,  at 1 1 0- 12 .  
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linguistic descent to capture his imagination.386 This predetermina­
tion is inconsistent with most strong conceptions of freedom. 
Kymlicka recognizes that cultures are open-ended phenomena, 
yet at times he lapses into the language of determinism: "familiarity 
with a culture determines the boundaries of the imaginable . "387 In 
other words, because persons construct culture through their identifi­
cation with (or against) it, a "culture" always changes. Toni Morrison 
describes a dynamic relationship : language activates the person, but 
the person also activates language by stretching the limits of the 
meaning of her identifications.388 True, language is a basic parameter 
of our lives, but even if one remains monolingual, it is a cultural pa­
rameter whose meaning changes for her as she struggles to articulate 
its unspoken possibilities.  
Yet, like Kymlicka, we defend the connection among culture, lan­
guage rights ,  and individual freedom. Dworkin 's distinction between 
parameters and limits aids this defense. As Dworkin reminds us, our 
lives are indexed; the true particularity of anyone 's  situation will in­
clude a whole host of limits and parameters.389 We argue that this 
indexing occurs because given sets of identifications form all of us. 
Because there should be no precise way to determine which are limits 
and which are parameters, and because that "determination" is part of 
a person 's freedom, some people will seek to break out of their lan­
guage and national background by assimilating into another language 
and culture. To make this break, some may interpret their language 
as a "soft parameter. "390 Others, like Borges, define their language as 
a "hard parameter,"391 which gives them a fundamental sense of them­
selves. Borges ' s  definition of language as a hard parameter provides 
him the most basic sense of himself as a man and as a writer. We 
experience our freedom in large part through our endeavor to deter­
mine which are limits and which are parameters in our lives. Further­
more, we try to determine how we understand exactly how the 
parameters bind us to a tradition and to the cultural narratives con­
tained therein and how they enable us to tell new stories, including 
stories about ourselves. 
386 See id. 
387 KY\ILTCKA, supra note 381 ,  at 89 (quoting Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, National 
Selj�Detennination, 87 J. PHrL. 439, 449 ( 1 990) ) .  
388 See Morrison,  sujJra note 350, at 1 46. 
389 See Dworkin, supra note 335, at 69-70. 
390 !d. at 70 ( "Soft parameters are those aspects of assignment that, when violated, 
reduce the value of the performance but do not annihilate i t: they act as standards of good 
performance that permit defects to be compensated by high success against other 
standards." ) . 
39 1 !d. ( "Hard parameters state essential conditions: if they are violated the perform­
ance is a total failure, no matter how successful in other respects. " ) .  
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To confront this substantial challenge, we must have our imagi­
nary domain protected. Part of Anzaldua' s  struggle to become a per­
son involved her effort to free herself from the stereotypical personas 
in and through which the maj ority Anglo culture defined the mean­
ing of her Chicana identification. But her struggle did not j ust  involve 
inversion, affirming the features of the stereotypical personas imposed 
by Anglo culture. Instead, her struggle involved a complex re-working 
of the metaphor of the borderlands in which the mestiza can recreate 
the complex being that is herself. This process involved not  only the 
celebration of the Spanish language but also the affirmance of Span­
ish as a living tongue, which the Mexican American Spanish with 
which she grew up changed and enriched. " But Chicano Spanish is a 
border tongue which developed naturally. Change ,  evoluci6n, enri­
quecimiento de palabras nuevas par invenci6n a adopci6n have created vari­
ants of Chicano Spanish, un nuevo lenguaje. Un lenguaje que corresponde 
a un modo de vivir. Chicano Spanish is not incorrect, it is a living 
language. "392 
E .  Equality, Language, and Rights 
Chandran Kukathas suggests that the right to "exit" appropriately 
resolves tensions among language, culture, and individual freedom.393 
We disagree because this negative option does not provide the mea­
sure of freedom demanded here. First, the right to exit implies that 
cultures have sharper boundaries than those existing in the real 
world. Second, it implies that "exit" is possible.  It is almost impossible 
to exit a first language, like it  or not. One may learn new languages, 
but her "mother" tongue stays with her forever. Third, and more im­
portantly, many people do not want to exit. Instead, they want to push 
against or re-interpret the meanings of their culture. 
In place of the right to exit, we propose the right to the imaginary 
domain . This right furnishes the person with the moral and psychic 
space to come to terms with the full particularity of her situation,  with 
language , with culture, with gender, and with sexuality. It does so in 
part by insisting that how we live with and define the parameters of 
our life is basic to our freedom. People differ, and profoundly so 
when it comes to their desire to be rooted in their native language 
and culture . But they certainly should have the right to affirm their 
language because it inevitably is,  at a minimum, a basic parameter, 
392 ANZALDUA, sujmz note 1 5 1 ,  at 55. Similarly, a day care worker protests a supervisor's 
·workplace E nglish: "Our language is . . .  our culture; no one can take that away from us." 
Delgado & Guthrie, supra note 84, at A4. 
393 Therefore, we disagree with Chandran Kukathas's argument that we do not  n eed to 
have cultural rights because the right to exit is sufficient. See Chandran Kukathas, Are There 
Any Cultural Rights ?, in THE RIGHTS OF MI�ORITI CULTURES, supra note 340, at 228, 251 -52.  
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which is crucial to how they shape an identity of their life. At the 
same time, we should never undermine the freedom to re-imagine 
ourselves. 
Only the "degradation prohibition" limits the right to the imagi­
nary domain. 394 The degradation prohibition forbids the characteri­
zation of someone as unworthy because of how she has constituted 
herself from her basic identifications.395 One degrades a person in  
our sense if  one does not  allow her  to bestow value on her  lan­
guage. 396 Again we quote Anzaldua: 
So, if you want to really hurt me, talk badly about my language. 
Ethnic iden tity is twin skin to l inguistic identity-! am my language. 
Unti l  I can take pride in my language, I cannot take pride in myself. 
Unti l  I can accept as legitimate Chicano Texas Spanish, Tex-Mex 
and all the other languages I speak, I cannot accept the legitimacy 
of myself. Until I am free to write bilingually and to switch codes 
without having always to translate, while I still have to speak English 
or Spanish when I would rather speak Spanglish, and as long as I 
have to accommodate the English speakers rather than having them 
accommodate me, my tongue will be illegi timate .397 
This freedom to use one ' s  own tongue is crucial to equal dignity. By 
denying someone the freedom to affirm her linguistic origin as she 
ethically interprets it, one robs from her the basic freedom to practice 
self-responsibility for her identifications. If the State instead imposes 
its evaluation of her language on her, it denies her equal worth as a 
free person. 
People still will ask who,  as between natives and immigrants ,  
should have to  accommodate whom? We should resolve this question 
by reference to the concept of reasonableness, which helps us deter­
mine what we should expect in social relations with others, viewed as 
free and equal persons. We repeat the definition of reasonableness 
we offered earlier in this Article398-we are reasonable when we real­
ize that we are capable of recognizing and harmonizing our pursuit of 
the good with creatures having equal dignity. Applying that defini­
tion, it is unreasonable for Anglos to treat Latinos/as as anything 
other than free persons who bestow value on their language . It fol­
lows that both Official English and Workplace English are unreasona-
394 CoRNELL, AT THE H EART, supra note 295, at 60. 
395 This means, for example, that no one can u·eat someone as less than worthy of her 
personhood because of her lived sexuali ty. See id .  at 3-32 (discussing sexual freedom ) .  To 
treat someone in such a manner is first and foremost to deny them their freedom by mak­
ing their sex or sexuality an imposed l imit on how they can l ive their lives. See id. at 33-65. 
396 See supra text accompanying notes 1 5 1-52 (describing the brutal punishment of 
school children in parts of the United States for speaking their native languages) .  
397 ANZALDL'A, supra note 1 5 1 ,  at 59. 
398 See supra note 3 1 5  and accompanying text. 
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ble.  We can make a similar argument by reference to Kant's  own 
understanding of external right. The suppression of Spanish is a 
maxim that cannot be made a universal law without suppressing the 
form of rightfulness .399 
Of course, some still might say that Latinos/as remain free per­
sons no matter how Anglos view their language and despite any meas­
ures Anglos take to denigrate or more directly to suppress it .  A strong 
Kantian answer would be that such particularistic suppression of a 
creature of reason always falls afoul of the moral law, with i ts universal­
izability requirement. That would be the end of the story. But even if 
we do not stop there , we can see how these measures impose a cost on 
the exercise of that freedom. The imposition of that cost  cannot be 
reasonable in Rawls ' s  sense of the word, because Anglos impose i t  pur­
suant to the view that the linguistic valuation that Latinos/as make is 
less worthy than that which Anglos make. The State' s  imposing the 
assimilation norm controverts the legal freedom the State must au­
thorize as the source of the evaluative design of one's  life .  I t  is unrea­
sonable to expect people to give up their freedom to affirm their lives 
as they see fi t  to "Americanize" themselves. 
Furthermore, Official English clearly degrades people because of 
their linguistic descent.400 By degradation we mean a grading down­
because of ethnicity-of one's ethnic background or linguistic origin.  
In a world of Official English, Spanish speakers are "picked out" be­
cause of their language and marked as not belonging to the maj ority 
group.401 To belong, they have to become "American" and assume an 
399 See supra note 292. 
400 One commentator has attempted to subvert the courts' volition reading in Work­
place English cases, see supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text, by arguing that bil ingual­
ism is a "disability," making it an immutable characteristic. See Mirande, supra. note 1 7, at 
1 03 .  Mirande relies on studies showing that "code switching" takes place automatically for 
many bilingual speakers. !d. at 94. Code switching means at least 1:\vo things. First, bilin­
gual speakers semiconsciously incorporate words from both languages when they speak. 
Second, they unconsciously respond in the language in which they are addressed. That is, 
if  a worker addresses a coworker in  Spanish on the job, she will answer in  Spanish before 
she has a chance to catch herself. Under this analysis, those bilingual in Spanish and 
English cannot help themselves from code switching; therefore the argument goes, bilin­
gualism is both something like an immutable characteristic and a disability. See id. at  94-98. 
We sympathize with Mirande's goal of reforming the law to protect bil ingual Spanish 
speakers from losing their jobs for their "aberrant" speech. But we would find it sad in­
deed if  we had to interpret bilingualism in Spanish in this way in order to make Workplace 
English legally redressable.  We offer a more direct approach to the same end. 
40 1 See Margalit & Raz, supra note 387, at 449 .  They write: 
It may be no more than a brute fact  that people's sense of their own iden­
tity is bound up with their sense of belonging to encompassing groups and 
that their self-respect is affected by the esteem in which these groups are 
held. But these facts, too,  have important consequences. They mean that 
individual dignity and self-respect require that the groups, membership of 
which contributes to one's sense of identity, be generally respected and not 
be made a subject of ridicule, hatred, discrimination, or persecution.  
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identity that others imagine to be bound up with the imposition of the 
English language.402 Workplace English similarly degrades Spanish­
speaking workers and accordingly is invalidated.  
Discrimination against Spanish speakers affects the way they view 
their own language. Speaking Spanish becomes an imposed limit. 
This imposed limit not only violates a person's  freedom, but also sub­
jects her to a serious inequality by turning her language into a mark 
that determines how to meet her life prospects .  Accordingly, courts 
should legally mark this discrimination with the status of a "suspect 
classification."  In the analysis of David Richards: 
In each case its irrationalist object is not some brute fact that cannot 
be changed, but central features of moral personality-iden tifica­
tions that make one a self-respecting member of a community that 
one reasonably values. The suspectness of the underlying prejudice 
in each case is i ts irrationalist interpretation of central aspects of 
human personality and the unjust degradation of the culture 
( moral slavery) with which a person reasonably identifies .403 
Spoken language obviously is central to the identity of many Latinos/ 
as. We should consider steps taken to force a person to forsake that 
identi ty altogether or significantly to repress it as "moral slavery" m 
Richards 's sense.4°4 
CoNCLUSION: ENGLISH ONLY AND THE RIGHT TO 
LINGUISTIC SELF-DEFENSE 
This conclusion turns first to our substantive case against English 
Only. It then addresses methodology, suggesting a series of lessons 
emerging from this Article ' s  j oint deployment of economic analysis 
and rights theory. 
Could there be a situation compelling enough to accord a group 
the right to impose its language or to ask for significant state rein­
forcement of i t? The Quebecois, arguing that French can survive only 
if it insures that the next generation will learn it, have sought to keep 
English from being taught in the schools that have a maj ority French 
population.405 Can English Only statutes that demand the suppres­
sion of other languages have similar defenses? 
Icl. 
402 One, of course, can judge this imposition as a form of denial because one j ust as 
easily can perceive the Spanish language, particularly in the Southwest, as crucial to what i t  
means to  be an "American" who lives in that part of the  country. 
403 R.JCI-L\RDS, supra note 79, at 355. 
404 Jd. 
405 Not all claims of polyethnic right are this strong. The demand, for example,  for 
bilingual education for Spanish-speaking children in New York City does not include for­
bidding a language minori ty to have i ts language in the schools. The opposi te is the case. 
The demand is instead that the Spanish language be allowed to have a presence in the 
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George Fletcher, analogizing to the criminal law doctrine  of justi­
fication, argues that a people has a right to linguistic self-defense in 
some cases. Recall that, for Fletcher, language and culture have a 
close causal connection .406 Fletcher further argues that given a con­
flict between two languages over which language should govern,  there 
can be no "neutral" perspective from which to judge which language 
is better for any culture. He explains: "It is better to think of the 
struggle to retain a language as an expression of a localized imperative 
to survive against an external threat. Thus it seems that the principle 
of self-defense provides a better framework for justifYing measures of 
defense than does the neutral standard of necessity."407 
Fletcher emphasizes historical priority as a key factor in the deter­
mination of who should receive this right of self-defense when two 
peoples and two languages fight for preeminence. Using Kant's  fa­
mous example that who got on the plank first can determine who has 
the right to push the other off,408 Fletcher argues that priority in time 
should be determinate .409 In addition, says Fletcher, only a serious 
and demonstrable challenge to the survival of the language can trig­
ger the right to self-defense. 4 1 °  Finally, Fletcher stipulates three ancil­
lary requirements: first, the defensive measures should be effective; 
second, they must be reasonably necessary, for that is the cheapest 
means available for linguistic survival; and third, there must be a sense 
of proportionality.4 1 l 
We take seriously the proposition of a right of linguistic self-de­
fense.4 1 2 But, using Fletcher's standards, it is crystal clear that such a 
right cannot justifY English Only. No serious threat to the survival of 
the English language exists because there are and will continue to be 
high-powered economic incentives for immigrants to learn English. 
The assimilation process of today's  immigrants, like that of every pre­
vious immigrant group, indeed has triggered a Kulturkampf, but not 
one that threatens the survival of our language . Under the economic 
theory of language and in light of the emerging role of English as a 
global lingua franca, the very suggestion of a threat is absurd. 
schools, a presence needed because of the large numbers of Spanish-speaking c hildren in 
New York City. 
406 See supra text accompanying note 365. 
407 Fletcher, supra note 3 1 ,  at 337. 
408 
409 
4 1 0 
See K-\�T, supra note '292, at 60-6 1 .  
See Fletcher, s ufJra note 3 1 ,  at 337. 
Ser id. 
41 1 Sre id. at 337-38. v\'e note that although Fletcher takes l inguistic patriotism verv 
seriously, he  still questions whether it ever would be necessary to impose the majority lan­
guage in all public offices and services. See id. at 337. 
4 1 2  ·we see this right as a group-differen tiated right in Kymlicka's sense, but one that 
still adheres to individuals. 
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Furthermore, even if a threat caused the issue to be joined, i t  
would not  be at  all clear that English should have a priority enti tle­
ment nationwide. In the Southwest, where most of the Title VII cases 
have arisen, Spanish was first in time.  That Anglos conquered these 
Spanish-speaking areas and that the Spanish speakers gradually lost 
their language rights41 3 presumably would create an issue under 
Fletcher's standard. We would take seriously the proposition that 
Spanish-speaking people in the Southwest (and Puerto Rico) have this 
right to linguistic self-defense, although the articulation of that case is 
beyond this Article 's  scope.  
Absent a plausible case for a right to linguistic self-defense, no 
plausible case for English Only mandates arises because they contro­
vert the equal dignity of free persons. Indeed, if the m eaning of 
"American" turns on identification with a political culture based on 
legal recognition of the equal dignity of free persons, then to repudi­
ate English Only is to do something quintessentially American. 
Three lessons emerge from this Article 's  joint application of eco­
nomic analysis and rights theory to the field of language rights. First, 
economic analysis may be ill-equipped to identify morally defensible 
policy results when one conducts it on a stand-alone basis .  This is not 
because it lacks moral implications, however. To pursue an efficient 
outcome is to pursue the utilitarian goal of providing the greatest 
good to the greatest number on the assumption that "greatest wealth" 
can serve as a valid proxy for "greatest  good."  This assumption is de­
fensible in a world of scarcity and suffering. But problems arise if the 
efficiency calculation comes to contain a broader policy inquiry. For 
one thing, confronting scarcity and suffering means addressing distri­
butional as well as productivity questions. Problems remain even if we 
follow the law and economics tradition and put distributional ques­
tions to one side. The normative weight of economic analysis varies 
directly with the certainty of the results it yields; consequently, the 
results tend to become less and less certain as the economic analysis 
increases in sophistication. Economic analysis, while calculative, is not 
a calculus that yields uncontestable states of nature. It yields a multi­
plicity of possible consequences-complex, contingent results that 
vary with the factors one includes in the cost assessment. 
Consider by way of example some of the economic propositions 
and results this Article considers. Diversity entails costs ,  and an effi­
ciency analysis implying a world of complete segregation follows. Yet 
we also have seen that this result cannot be absolutely right even as a 
matter of cost analysis, for at some point diversity provides benefits .  
4 l  � This loss occurred despite a reservation o f  equal rights i n  Article IX o f  the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo, Feb. 2, 1 848, U . S.-Mex . ,  9 Stat. 022.  For an account of  the disappear­
ance of official bilingualism in the southwestern states, see Perea, supra note 1 0 , at 3 1 6-23.  
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We are left to speculate about the location of a tradeoff point and to 
make a correspondingly ambiguous message for policy.  We also have 
seen in this Article that the costliness of Title VII enforcement pro­
vides only a starting point for discussion of the legitimacy of Title VII .  
Further analysis may show that the costs fall  on a protected class that is  
manifestly willing to bear them. Similarly, even though costs are a 
crucial policy concern, the mere focus on the economic costs of lin­
guistic diversity can achieve no more than very little progress toward 
the articulation of the best policy regarding linguistic diversity. Mean� 
while, the contingent nature of economic inquiry makes it possible to 
smuggle in normative presuppositions that tilt an analysis purveyed as 
"pure" cost assessment. Our point is not to bar these normative 
presuppositions. They may be determinative in a world where projec­
tions of wealth effects are necessarily contingent. But they need to 
acquire transparency. Expanding the context in which economic 
analysis proceeds helps us to see more clearly how fact and value 
in terre late . 
Second, this Article ' s  j oint deployment of economics and ethics 
teaches a lesson about the bearing of economics on cultural debates. 
It  has both heuristic strengths and limitations. The strength lies in 
the ability of economics to freshen the hothouse atmosphere of Eng­
lish Only discourse.  The universalized, rational economic actor enters 
a stage on which nativists darkly depict immigrants as "others" and 
characterize Spanish speech as threatening. By showing Anglos that 
Latinos/as are doing precisely what Anglos would do if they found 
themselves in the immigrant situation,  the rational actor defuses the 
threat. Furthermore, by directing Anglo attention away from cultural 
insecurity and toward cost, economic analysis shows Anglos just how 
one-sided our Kulturkampf is :  English wins in the long run ,  period. 
The weakness of economic analysis in this context lies in the fact that 
the rational economic actor operates free of cultural attachments .  Ac­
cordingly, it has little to tell us about cultural rights . More generally, 
utilitarianism does not and cannot provide us with an adequate ac­
count of the individuation and multiplicity of persons .41 4 To put the 
rational economic actor in the position of an ideal spectator and legis­
lator is to assess empirical costs without assessing individual, subj ective 
valuations of cultural attachments. Different individuals will value 
English and Spanish differently. Respect for them in their multiplicity 
and their individuation means we must recognize and allow for those 
different valuations. Therefore, ethical evaluation must take individ­
ual consequences as well as social consequences into account. 
4 1 4 See Ro.wLs, supra note 294, at 26-27. 
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The third lesson directly follows. Economic analysis cannot take 
the place of moral and political philosophy because reference to their 
value to others cannot quantify and determine the worth of persons . 
We all have incalculable worth as persons , and therefore we all have 
equal value in a significant sense . A powerful message for legal policy 
follows: freedom is the key because our worth as persons flows from 
our capacity to shape an identity through the practice of ethical and 
moral self-responsibility. The problem, of course,  is that no real-world 
legal system can realize complete freedom for every individual. Coop­
eration among free persons in societies requires constant freedom­
limiting compromises . But we strongly argue that these compromises 
must be reasonable. Economic analysis comes in to assist at this point, 
describing (and in some cases quantifying) the costs of protecting 
freedom, which helps to inform our judgment as to what is reason­
able .  In doing so, economic analysis cannot replace the need for nor­
mative standards for treating each individual as a free and equal 
person. 
